





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PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY,

1903-1904.

I.—ADDRESS: METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY.

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, Vice-President.

IN the unavoidable absence of our President, Professor Stout, an absence which we all regret, the duty has devolved upon me of delivering the customary address at the opening meeting of the present session of the Society. As I have had but a short time for preparing it, I must throw myself upon your kind indulgence to make allowance for any defects of argumentative elaboration which may be only too apparent as I proceed. I shall, however, confine myself, so far as possible, to general considerations as to the nature, scope, and method of philosophy, and its present position and prospects in this country.

And first as to the field before it. There are two very different senses in which the term *common sense* is intended and applied. In one of them it means a certain degree of intelligence, in the other a certain set of ideas and beliefs. In the former sense there is involved no opposition or antagonism between common sense and philosophy. In the latter there is, because it is just the set of common-sense ideas and beliefs, current at any period, which it is the task of philosophy to examine, verify, and, if necessary, correct; a task which, I may add, philosophy performs and can perform solely by the application of common sense itself taken in the former meaning of the term. Philosophy is common sense in the former meaning

applied to the examination, verification, and correction of common sense in the latter meaning.

You see how large—I had almost said immeasurable—a field is hereby opened to philosophy, a field nevertheless which it is bound, so far as in it lies, to measure and reclaim. For supposing that any idea or belief of common sense should be examined by philosophy, and should be replaced by some new idea or belief, which in its turn becomes current, and wins general acceptance, at once the question arises, to which of the two, philosophy or common sense, does this new idea or belief belong—is it to philosophy, in virtue of its being due to philosophical criticism, or is it to common sense, in virtue of its having taken its place among generally accepted truths?

It is around ideas and beliefs belonging to this class that the great philosophical controversies in reality rage; such ideas and beliefs, for instance, as are expressed by the terms Substance, Power, Agent, Agency. And I cannot but think that an end will only then be found to such controversies, when some clear line of distinction shall have been drawn, between the essential characteristics of a philosophical idea or belief on the one hand and those of a common-sense idea or belief on the other. And more than this. I think that this hoped-for line of distinction must be itself of such a nature as to assure a certain validity to ideas and beliefs of both classes, within the class to which they are respectively recognised as belonging. I mean that, if and when philosophical theory and analysis fail, if and when they lead to the establishment of the existence of some reality, the nature and mode of operation of which human consciousness has no means of ascertaining, there and then we of necessity fall back upon some common-sense ideas of that reality, ideas which for man have practical validity, as guides to his conception of his own relation to that reality, but which afford no grounds for a speculative knowledge or theory of it. And, farther, I am of opinion that the line of distinction spoken of above must be discovered by philosophy

in reflecting on its own scope and method, for that scope and method it is which constitute it a separate pursuit, and give it the primacy over all other lines of speculative enquiry.

Three and twenty years ago, when I had the privilege of delivering the first Presidential Address from the chair of this Society, at the opening of our Second Session, the point on which I most insisted was, that there was, and could not but be, such a separate pursuit, defined provisionally, and in the most general terms, by its end or purpose of attaining a *Rationale of the Universe*, as mentally visible from a human centre. Well, I think there is no need now to insist on this elementary truth. Our continued existence in such a place as London shows that we as a Society are well convinced of it. The points we have now to keep before us are, what is the true definition of the end of philosophy? and what is the true method of attaining it?—points within the scope of philosophy itself, points of ardent controversy among its votaries. The primacy of philosophy is assured to it by its subjective character, that is, by the fact that consciousness, experience, or knowledge, that is, subjectivity itself, as such, is its object of investigation, and not any object or set of objects assumed to exist, without enquiry into the modes of consciousness by which that assumption is justified. But within this philosophical enquiry there is room for the greatest differences of opinion. These differences of opinion it is which the meetings of this Society afford opportunities of discussing; and while the differences themselves continue to exist, long may these meetings continue. For it is to philosophy that the decision of the great questions which most deeply interest humanity belongs, questions falling under the heads of Ethical, Theological, Æsthetical, Logical, and Psychological, as well as of those speculative questions concerning the nature of the Universe, including the question whether any speculative solution of them is possible to human thought. Some purview of the whole must be taken, before we can reach any satisfactory foundation of doctrine concerning

a part, since some conception of the relations of that part to the whole and to other parts is a necessary ingredient in that foundation.

In casting a glance of retrospect on the year which has just elapsed, we have to lament the loss by death of two most valued members. One of them, removed at a comparatively early age, Professor D. G. Ritchie, well known by his contributions to philosophical literature, as well as by his teaching in the Chair of Logic and Metaphysic at St. Andrews, was the valued President of this Society for the year 1898 to 1899.

The other, Alexander Bain, a veteran in age, a veteran in philosophical teaching, a veteran in philosophical literature, who has had as great an influence on the philosophical thought of this country as any contemporary writer that can be named, joined our Society in the year 1884, a time when support was very welcome, and gave us the advantage of his membership, sending us five years' subscription in advance as token of his goodwill. He many times attended our meetings and joined in our discussions. At the time of his death he had for some years been an honorary member.

And here I hope it will not appear out of place if I say a word of lament on the loss philosophy has recently suffered in the death of Robert Adamson, Professor of Logic and Rhetoric at Glasgow (February, 1902). Assuredly a vigorous and independent mind was here at work on philosophical questions. Most fortunate it is that those four courses of Lectures, two on the history of modern philosophy and two on psychology, extending over two sessions, 1897-1899, at Glasgow, have been rescued from oblivion, and made generally accessible, in the two handsome volumes edited by Professor Sorley.

There is another philosophical veteran, whose loss by death at the age of 88 philosophy has this year to lament, M. Charles Renouvier, whose energies as a philosophical writer continued up to the close of a very long life with undiminished clearness and vigour. He is perhaps best known by his *Essais de*

Critique Générale, the first edition of which in four volumes extended from 1854 to 1864, and the second, very considerably enlarged, from 1875 to 1896; also by his *Science de la Morale*, 1869; by his historical romance, *Uchronie*, 1876; and as the founder, in conjunction with M. F. Pillon, of a periodical, *L'Année Philosophique*, in 1868, succeeded by *La Critique Philosophique* in 1872; and as a contributor to the earlier volumes of the new series of *L'Année Philosophique*, which succeeded *La Critique Philosophique* in 1891, under the able editorship of M. Pillon, and still continues to appear in the shape of an annual volume of the highest importance and interest, to which M. Pillon himself is the chief contributor. Renouvier's last work, *Le Personnalisme*, published this very year, is a singularly able and most instructive exposition of that Neo-criticist theory, founded on Leibniz and Kant, which he had devoted the whole latter part of his life to work out. And the nine or ten preceding years had seen the publication of as many several volumes on philosophical questions from the same pen. I am thankful to be able to offer, from this Chair, my humble tribute of honour and admiration to this illustrious French philosopher, so recently taken from us.

But all the more in thinking of our losses it behoves us to rally our forces, and steadily face the problems of philosophy. And first as to the method of approaching them, its method being that which is distinctive of any particular system of philosophical thought. And here I venture to quote a paragraph from my sixth Address to the Society, delivered in October, 1885, entitled *Philosophy and Experience*, p. 11, on the function of method. "Method in philosophy," I said, "holds very much the same place that Hypothesis holds in science. Both must be tested by their results. But while results in science are tested by successful and verified prediction, and there is no prediction in philosophy, a Rationale of the Existent being its aim, the question is, what are the results which, in philosophy, test the value and soundness of the

method? They are the removal of all gratuitous and merely logical puzzles, the harmonising of all parts or facts of consciousness, or, what is the same thing, of experience, with each other, and thereby by degrees obtaining such a systematic Rationale of the whole, as was contemplated in my first Address, and there exhibited as the great purpose of philosophy. Puzzles are introduced into philosophy by making tacit and unsuspected assumptions; in contrast thereby to the assumptions of science, which are hypotheses adopted for some express purpose, and with full awareness of their hypothetical character. The soundness of a method in philosophy consists, therefore, in its leading to the successful detection and avoidance of unwitting assumptions."

We must, then, I think, go to work in philosophy on a different basis, a different distinction in thought, from that which governs common-sense thinking, by which latter I mean the distinction between Subject and Object, or Self and Not-self, a distinction which seems to suppose some previous or necessarily involved distinction to have been drawn between one or other of those pairs which I mentioned at the outset, I mean, Substance and Power, Agent and Agency, or some equivalent distinction; which distinctions are embodied and expressed by the forms of noun and verb construed with each other in ordinary language. Not that I would reject any of these distinctions as misrepresentations of the truth; but if their nature and validity as ultimate distinctions, lying at the basis of philosophy, are to be examined, it is surely necessary that some distinction in thought should be apparent, on which to ground and justify our examination. It is as the basis of philosophy, and in that character only, that they are challenged.

In ordinary language—and no other is at our disposal—we speak, and to that extent also tend to think, in what I may call the logic of Substance, that which is expressed by noun or pronoun substantive represented in thought as doing or suffering, having or not having, giving or receiving something.

Abstract indeed, or even imaginary, the agent or his doing may be; this makes no difference to what I have called the logic of the thinking—the distinction underlying it is the same. The agent and his agency, the substance and its power, are all alike taken as complete empirical realities. The question I now raise is, whether they are entitled also to be taken as the ultimate basis of philosophy. If we are to test them, we must find some distinction which is still more fundamental, and which will hold its ground as an ultimate distinction.

I think there is such a distinction universally discoverable in experience, and universally applicable, so soon as we frankly and fully adopt the subjective aspect, or our knowledge, of things as our object-matter, and apply it to that, in contradistinction from their objective aspect, or things as they exist. The distinction is that insisted on by Plato in opposing *οὐσία* to *γένεσις*, and by Aristotle in opposing the *τί ἐστι* to the *πῶς παραγίνεται*. Briefly we may call it that between the nature and the history of any object thought of so far as it is thought of, or can be thought of, by us. Let these questions, first of its nature, then of its history, be put to the above-named conceptions—Substance, Power, Agent, Agency, Subject, Object, Self, Not-self. What do we know of the nature and the history of the objects, as we call them, of these conceptions? Let the attempt be made to conceive those same objects from a different point of view, that is, under the guidance of a different distinction, or pair of conceptions.

The distinction of nature and history is applicable to any content of thought, and divides it exhaustively, being nothing but (1) a transverse section, as it were, of one particular time-thread of consciousness, and (2) a longitudinal view of that time-thread in connection with its collaterals. The distinction itself is found by analysis of every, even the least and simplest, empirical experience, and introduces nothing whatever by assumption into the content taken for examination, whatever it may be. If any other content is introduced under

the head of history, either from the antecedent parts of its own time-thread, or from the collaterals, the same questions must be put to that content, and the same distinction applied. What the distinction does is thus to supply a means of accurately questioning the content of our thought. Of course this does not mean that it supplies the answers to our questions, that it gives us a positive knowledge, either of the content examined, or of its history, which we had not before. Obtaining this must depend on quite other conditions than merely applying a distinction as a method of questioning. At the same time it may reveal blanks in our knowledge which were before unsuspected, or may reveal as assumptions or hypotheses what we had previously taken to be data. When this is the case, and for so long as it is the case our only true course is to acknowledge the fact, admitting in the case of the blanks that there is something in existence, the content of which is not positively represented in our knowledge, and only retaining the assumptions or the hypotheses as aids to our own needs in reasoning or in conduct, with full consciousness of this their true character and office. It was, in my opinion, the fundamental error of Kant's theory, that in examining experience he reversed the order of these two questions; he attempted to answer the question of its history, or how experience was possible, before putting the question of its nature, or what it was known as, from which alone the idea of its possibility, its genesis, its history, could be derived; a reversal which compelled the assumption from common-sense sources, though without any philosophical warrant, of the existence of a Subject, of some sort or other, capable of experiencing.

If we apply this questioning distinction to the six most definite of the above list of conceptions, omitting Object for its generality, and Not-self for its negativity, what we shall find, I think, concerning them is, that they fall into the rank of the assumptions or the hypotheses just spoken of. They are brief descriptions, characterisations, designations, of classes and

series of facts, which enable us to deal in thought and practice with those facts, but must not be taken as if they were names or thoughts corresponding to immediately given facts themselves, each to each. That is, they must not be hypostasised as entities. They do not supply an explanation of the facts which they summarise. It is a fallacy to regard them in that light and then to say that they are *noumena*, or things-in-themselves, of which as such we have no knowledge, but which we know in their phenomena or manifestations. They are short expressions of the phenomena themselves. Power, for instance (or any other analogous term, such as Force, or Energy), is not an unknowable something which makes things happen; it is a brief expression for the actual happening of things.

Brought to the test of this questioning distinction, the six conceptions spoken of not only reveal their anthropomorphic character—I mean as being summaries of classes or series of human experiences, not applicable so far as we know to the Absolute or the Universe at large—but also exhibit the phenomena which they summarise as requiring explanation from regions of existence which lie beyond the reach of positive human knowledge. And it is thus a distinction lying within, and inseparably belonging to, positive human knowledge, which forces us to this conclusion, forces us in thought to transcend the sphere within which the six conceptions are applicable. Anthropomorphic knowledge, in virtue of this its own unavoidable distinction between nature and history, forces us to look beyond itself for an explanation of itself, an explanation which, as anthropomorphic, it is incapable of supplying. As long as human nature seeks to know, and this is one of its ineradicable tendencies, so long must we apply this questioning distinction, so long must the last thing in the course of human speculative thought be a question and not an answer, so long must a speculative insight into the Absolute, or a speculative construction of the Universe, be precluded.

I think that this surrender on the part of philosophy of the expectation of obtaining a speculative knowledge of the Absolute, or constructive principle of the Universe, will be the result of modern philosophical enquiry. But the grounds on which it rests will always form an essential chapter in the record of philosophical thought. And I am aware that we are far enough at present from acquiescing in the surrender. In fact the question whether such a speculative construction is or is not within our reach, must for a long time be kept open. We cannot foresee the time when it will be generally accepted as decided in the sense which I have here maintained as the only practicable one.

But supposing it accepted, would the function, the value, the necessity of philosophy be injuriously affected thereby, or would it furnish the smallest reason for regarding philosophy as a futile and vain pursuit? Most certainly not. True, the ideal end which philosophy must propose to itself as the largest it can conceive, discovery of the constructive principle of the Universe, would have been recognised as unattainable, but then the discovery of its unattainability and of the reasons for it would have been made by philosophy, and would of itself have become a great step forwards in our knowledge of the Universe. We should have found that we never had any right to make the assumption, that a speculative knowledge of its construction was attainable. Like all other branches of human effort and thought, philosophy is necessarily tentative. It does not know beforehand whether it will succeed or fail in the attainment of that end which it takes beforehand as the guide of its enquiries. It is only by their result that it can ascertain whether it is attainable or not.

Notwithstanding the supposed surrender of this ideal, the whole content of human thought and conduct still lies before philosophy, as the field for the application of its subjective method. Its special value in exploration of that field remains entirely unaffected. It is still our only valid means of dealing

with the phenomena of human feeling, emotion, desire, action, and practice, the nature and justification of the conceptions of moral right and wrong, and the grounds, if any, which man's practical and moral nature affords for his entertaining ideas concerning his relations to those unseen portions of the Universe, a speculative knowledge of which he has surrendered as unattainable.

Nor is it a small benefit, that the supposed surrender, including the discovery of the reasons which render it imperative, and place man's relations to the Universe in their true light, the light in which his own nature compels him to regard them, also precludes the setting up of further speculative theories concerning the constructive principle of the whole, in place of those which, from time to time, and in different countries, have been devised and surrendered. The whole content of our consciousness, every one of our conceptions, ideas, feelings, and affections is anthropomorphic; the bare idea of Being or Existence, as the *percipi* of a content of consciousness, is man's idea; that there is an Universe at all is a thought of ours. This content, however, is forced upon us, we cannot help experiencing it. And it carries with it its own limitations, the idea of experiences and existences beyond itself but in relation to it, of which, as beyond itself, it can never have positive knowledge, and any idea of which, as in relation to it, can only be an anthropomorphic and inadequate idea. The perception of this truth will at once prevent any one who perceives it from directing his efforts to frame a speculative theory of the Universe, just as the perception that Being or Existence *in itself*, apart from any consciousness of it, was the name for an unrealisable attempt at thinking, the suggestion of a conception which we tried to frame and could not, precluded the hypothesis of a noumenal as distinguished from a phenomenal world. Now, to be finally relieved from following up attempts to frame a speculative theory of the Universe, attempts which from the nature of the case are foredoomed to

failure, is surely to be counted a gain, a benefit, an advantage to human thought.

On the other hand it is also, no doubt, true, that with the surrender now supposed of all such attempts, a surrender founded on the perception of the anthropomorphic character of the whole content of human consciousness, we lose that sense of intellectual security which would seem to have been one main motive, at any rate, for framing such speculative theories. We can no longer survey in thought the Universe from outside, so contemplating it in its entirety, and ascertaining the fixed laws which connect our human portion of it with the rest. We are compelled to survey it from within, our point of view being within the human portion; and from that point of view no limits of it can be imagined or conceived. The possibilities of modes of consciousness, different in kind from any which we as human beings possess, are beyond number, numberless; possibilities to our human thought, but actual existences, it may be, in the Universe beyond. Human speculative thought is like an island of terra firma rising in the midst of an immeasurable ocean, in which no land, no rock, no anchorage for speculative thought, is discernible. Instead of the Universe being the island and human thought the ocean, the Universe has become the ocean, and human thought the island. The intellectual security to be derived from a speculative theory of the Universe is gone; and the loss is no doubt great.

The change which will be wrought by the surrender when it comes—and sooner or later it is inevitable—is enormous, and has both its bad and its good side. But, good or bad, it will be a recognition of fact, it will be forced upon us by experience, in which we shall have no choice but to acquiesce. What will be the position in which it leaves us? How are we to conceive our relation to the Universe, when a speculative knowledge of the nature of the Universe is seen to be impossible? It will be observed, that no alteration is made within the bounds of human experience. What is altered is the idea, that human

speculative knowledge extends to worlds beyond that for which human experience gives us data, without our having data not belonging to human experience, which *ex hypothesi* are impossible. The surrender of this idea involves an alteration (1) in the attitude which we take up with regard to the Universe, making it a practical instead of a speculative one; (2) in the relation of practical and speculative thought to each other.

As to the first point, our idea of the Universe is itself anthropomorphic, and we cannot frame a larger idea, we cannot think of anything beyond it, not included in it, while at the same time we must think of portions of it as really existing, for a speculative knowledge of which no data are within our reach. Towards these portions therefore our attitude, not being one of knowledge, must be one of confidence, a confident assurance that their laws are in harmony with those of our known world, including those of human thought and conduct. I say *must be*, because the tentativeness involved in all human thought and conduct, beyond the point of already acquired knowledge, of itself involves a confidence that the tentative action will not be fruitless of desirable results.

As to the second point, the relation of practical and speculative thought to each other, the change wrought by the surrender in question will consist not only in bringing out the tentative character of all thought, but also in the surrender of the idea of the priority of knowledge to consciousness, or of what is called the *a priori* character of forms of thought or of perception, forms which are a prior condition of all experience. Experiencing is a process in which all our knowledge of being or of existence originates. The simplest sensations, our ultimate data, are revelations. We have no *a priori* or logical test of the truth of that knowledge, that is, of its agreement with the being or existence, of which we call it the knowledge. Logical necessity, the necessity of the laws of thought, is itself but a fact, though an universal fact, of our experience of being or existence. The harmony of thought with thought, of experience

with experience, not of thought or experience with being or existence as separate from thought or experience, is that in which truth consists. Experience simply as fact is thus the guarantee of logical necessity, not logical necessity the guarantee of fact. Of being or existence we can only say *it is*, not *it must be*. But of these the *is* is practical, actually forced upon us as a fact; the *must be*, were it possible, would be speculative, being a logical thought about fact. There is no higher necessity than the practical universality of fact, the practical uniformity of law.

And now a word, in conclusion, as to the bearing of the foregoing remarks on the present position and prospects of philosophy in this country. I have shown you that the existence, the validity, and the primacy of philosophy do not depend upon its success in framing a speculative theory of the Universe; I have shown you how it is, that no valid speculative theory of the Universe can be framed; I have shown you that all our knowledge is based upon data which are revelations, in the sense that we have no further test of their truth; and that consequently our so-called knowledge of that which we think of as the source of those revelations is of necessity a practical idea, not a speculative conception. Now religion is a certain kind of practical attitude which we take towards that same source of the revelations spoken of, and in that character necessarily forms part of the field of philosophical investigation. Religion and a speculative theology are therefore two essentially different things, as different as, on the other hand, are a speculative theology and philosophy.

But what says the ordinary Englishman, imbued with the current group of common-sense ideas and beliefs, which I spoke of at the outset? He identifies religion with some form or other of speculative theology, and he identifies speculative theology with philosophy. Some form or other of speculative theology is what *he means* by philosophy. In what I cannot but call his arbitrary limitation of vision, he refuses even to glance at what

philosophy really is in its true nature. His own particular form of speculative theology, he will tell you, is enough for him; he finds it *practically* sufficient for his religious needs. And so perhaps it may be, but, then, what becomes of its validity as a *speculative* theology? Now I think that the growing divergence of these speculative theologies from one another, and the growing dissatisfaction with the speculative validity of any one of them, are signs that even Englishmen are coming to see the necessity of philosophy, as that line of thought which, from its independent investigation of human nature as a whole, can alone afford a theoretical justification of religion, as a certain kind of practical attitude towards the speculatively unknown and unknowable regions of the Universe. What we need is, that a deeper and an increasing interest should be taken in the nature and purpose of philosophy, and in the means at its disposal, and the method best adapted, for attaining that purpose.

II.—BACON'S METHOD OF SCIENCE.

By HERBERT W. BLUNT.

BACON'S method of science is called indifferently *inductio vera* and *exclusiva*. *Induction*, because it is identical in purpose with the Aristotelian and scholastic ascent from particulars. *True* induction, because the inductive process as described in the *Topics* of Aristotle, is merely dialectical; and while it throws the burden of disproof upon the interlocutor, it is thereby dependent for its cogency upon his inability to produce a counter-instance (*v. Topics*, θ 8, especially 156b, 1 *sqq.*), so that its conclusion is precarious. *Exclusion* or elimination, because it is through the elimination of anything of the nature of an alternative that the new organon claims to guarantee the scientific conclusion against disproof.

The elimination proceeds as follows:—

A.—The observed and recorded facts relevant to any enquiry must first be digested and organised in three *tables of appearance* (*tabulæ comparentiæ*, the latter word signifying by a legal metaphor the appearance in answer to citation before the court of the intellect).

(a) A table of *presence* (*tabula præsentia*) which registers the occurrence of the nature or quality under investigation as it appears in various combinations.

(b) A table of *absence in allied subject-matter* (*tabula declinationis sive absentia in proximo*). This registers the absence of the said nature or quality where the conditions are so like some of those in the table of presence that it might with reason have been expected to occur. Privationes inspicendiæ tantum in illis subjectis quæ sunt maxime cognata

illis alteris in quibus natura data inest et comparet (*Novum Organum*, II, 12); *cf.* Topica Inquisitionis de luce et lumine, (*Works*, vol. ii, p. 317). Videndum etiam quæ sunt ea quæ nullam lucem edant, quæ tamen cum iis quæ edant magnam habent similitudinem.

(c) A table of degree (*tabula graduum sive comparativæ*) which registers the variations in quantity of the said nature or quality according to quantitative variations of some of the concomitants.

B.—We may now proceed to our *exclusiva*. In the complete and perfect form of the method we must put forward on the basis of Table 1 all possible suggestions as to what the general explanatory formula (*i.e.*, usually the mechanical equivalent) of the nature under investigation can be. We then reject on the basis of Tables 2 and 3 those suggestions which are qualitatively and quantitatively inadequate. There should then be left one and but one suggestion as to *forma* or formula, which we may then affirm positively.

If we can be sure that n suggestions are all that are practically possible, and can succeed in rejecting $n - 1$ (post negativas tot quot sufficiunt, *Novum Organum*, I, 105), then the remaining one is the formula, equivalent, or explanation of which we are in search.

If we cannot be sure that the n suggestions include all possibilities, then it is possible that we may reject all and have to begin afresh.

If absence in *proximo* and failure of concomitant variation in quantity do not, owing to defects in our 2nd and 3rd tables, or possibly to coincidences, enable us to complete our rejections, it may well be that we can only exclude $n - m$ suggestions, m being > 1 , so that m suggestions are still left in the field. We must then apparently have recourse to certain devices of method which come under the heading of *prærogativæ instantiarum*. A prerogative instance is one which in virtue

of some kind of superiority may be presumed to carry the election of one candidate for the position of form as against all rivals. So in elections at Rome the century or tribe which secured the right of voting first normally determined the choice of the electorate.

The appeal to a *prærogativa* only takes place when there is insufficient material for the complete *exclusiva*. It is also often available where we cannot begin to contemplate the possibility of a complete *exclusiva*. It is because the elimination is not perfect, and cannot be so *sub initiiis* (II, 19), and because many of the notions which we have of simple natures and qualities are neither good nor true, but vague and ill-defined, that *exclusiva* needs progressive rectification (*ib.* and II, 21). Prerogative instances include many ill-classified types of cases with each a special prestige of its own, that enable us hypothetically and provisionally to make a first vintage (*vindemiatio prima*), as in *Novum Organum*, II, 20 with regard to the "form" or formula of heat, that it is a definite mode of motion. This conclusion is reached by the use of the prerogative instance known as *glaring*. But that Bacon is dissatisfied is proved by his use of other *prærogativæ* in the case of heat, under several titles of prerogative instances, and by his declaration (II, 31) that no form has yet been discovered. *Formarum quarum nulla adhuc inventa est*;—though *adhuc* might conceivably mean only *down to my time*.

To return to the *exclusiva* in its ideally complete form. It may be described as a method of residues built up on a joint use of agreement and difference, qualitative and quantitative. And it is strictly deductive, though it alone, *factâ comparentiâ*, is, in Bacon's view, the real induction (II, 15). The premises of the deduction are:—

- (1) A disjunctive major, usually with many members.
- (2) A negative minor, normally conjunctive, excluding all members of the disjunction save one (*v.* Sigwart, *Logic*, Eng. Trans., vol. ii, pp. 296–7).

It is indubitably valid, provided that its premisses can be duly constituted. It is no less indubitable that it is an instrument which no scientific enquirer has ever employed to any purpose.

Bacon's paradox consists in the deliberate preference of a method of negative reasoning over the positive method of hypothesis with verification. The man of science sets up a tentative or provisional formula, based not upon blind conjecture but upon his accumulated knowledge, which, according to Tyndall's pregnant metaphor, beyond the circle of perfect vision half lights a surrounding penumbra in which at least the direction of advance can be perceived. Bacon rejects such *vindemiatio prima* as a mere *pis aller*. All his references to hypothesis (e.g., *Nov. Org.*, I, 25, 45, 46, 70, 106) are of the nature of warnings, or grudging recognitions within the very narrow limits of *instantiæ constitutiæ* (II, 26). His way is other, "quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone" (I, 105), i.e., the determination of each and any subject by the successive negation of alternative determinations, till the whole field is exhausted. It is apparently what he takes to be the meaning of the Platonic *διαίρεσις*.

The explanation of the paradox lies in the general idea of Bacon's *Instauratio*, and specifically in the relation of the second part which is concerned with the method of science to the third part dealing with the material. Spedding (*Bacon's Works*, I, 370-390) suggests in an interesting argument that the novelty on which Bacon laid stress in his scheme was the formation of a dictionary of nature to serve the exponent of *exclusiva* as Tycho Brahé's observations served Kepler, as meteorological registers serve the expert meteorologist. He quotes the *Auditoris Monitum* prefixed to the *History of the Winds* to the effect that the completion of the organon apart from the *Natural History* would do little, the latter apart from the organon much for the advancement of science (*Works*, II, 16). To the same purpose in the *Distributio Operis* (*Works*,

I, 140) Aut hoc prorsus habendum aut negotium in perpetuum deserendum. It were vain to polish the mirror if there were no *imagines* (*ib.*, p. 141).

Now this encyclopædia is in Bacon's view the work of division of labour. The preliminary cautions are all directed to the collection and registration of material, the *ministratio ad sensum* and *ad memoriam*. The collector must use *auxilia* to the senses, and must eschew hypothesis. He must advance gradually and step by step. His conjectures of the solitary worker must be discounted as due to a personal equation or to a human equation; must be guarded against as *idola*. On the other hand, the expert of the method will not use hypothesis, because not having himself collected the facts and grown to them, so to speak, or brooded over them till his scientific imagination has hatched an idea out of them, he is indifferent to all suggestions alike. Any one is as likely to be wrong as any other, and error is multiple, truth one. The expert will simply take from its pigeon-hole the appropriate *experientia literata* (in one of the senses of that phrase, viz., recorded experience), draw up his tables, outline the possible alternatives and reject all save one, and in the process effect a *διαίρεσις κατ' εἶδη* which, besides the one *axioma* (= general proposition) with its permanent usufruct, will involve new suggestions for fresh and similarly fruitful enquiry in the positive elements underlying the negations or rejections. Still more obvious is it that *vindemiatio prima* or a positive method by way of hypothesis is unsuitable, if we have, as we seem to have here, intermediates between the collectors and the interpreters of nature, subordinate agents engaged in forming *instantiæ constitutivæ*, drawing up tables and the like. None can form an hypothesis which is not conjecture, for none has thought the facts together into an organic whole. Each, on the other hand, can perform his one process which, when the product of the organised labour is complete, is seen to be far more fruitful than if he ploughed his

lone furrow. Co-operation in knowledge, an abandonment of individualistic rivalry and competition, a Royal Society—that is Bacon's ideal. And the success of the Germans in the chemical industries is a partial exemplification of what can be done in such directions by a quasi-nationalisation of scientific effort.

This idea of division of labour in the field of knowledge is to be found in the *Novum Organum*, notably in I, 113, and it seems to account for the form which Bacon's method has taken. A *vindemiator* will be a specialist who has taken for his part the brooding over, or, to change the metaphor, the assimilating certain facts, and his part will not be the highest in the academy of science. The highest will be his who with all subordinates working to his hand exhaustively specificates some genus, establishes some forms or constitutive formulæ adequate in a literal sense to the facts out of which they are elicited. That this is not a fanciful reading of Bacon's idea is proved by the account of Salomon's House in the *New Atlantis* (*Works*, III, pp. 164–5) where he enumerates 18 collectors belonging to three different classes, then three *Pioners*, “that try new experiments, such as themselves think good”; three *Compilers*, “that draw the experiments of the former four” (*sc.* classes) “into titles and tables, to give the better light for the drawing of observations and axioms out of them”; three *Dowry-men*, “that bend themselves, looking into the experiments of their fellows, and cast about how to draw out of them things of use and practice for man's life.”

“Then, after divers meetings and consults of our whole number, to consider of the former labours and collections, we have three that take care, out of them, to direct new experiments, of a higher light, more penetrating into nature than the former. These we call *Lamps*. We have three others that do execute the experiments so directed, and report them. These we call *Inoculators*. Lastly, we have three that raise the former discoveries by experiments into greater observations,

axioms, and aphorisms. These we call *Interpreters of Nature*. We have also, as you must think, novices and apprentices, that the succession of the former employed men do not fail; besides a great number of servants and attendants."

The Pioner and the Dowry-man are the scientist and patentee of to-day. They are allowed to make their facts their own and to form hypotheses, subject in the one case to experimental verification, in the other to success in the amelioration of life. But the troops and droves of effects follow more certainly, if less directly, on the action of the higher degrees, if only the lower degrees work properly to their hands. They will inspire the *Dowry-men*, but they will do more.

If only the lower degrees work properly to their hands. It is this that makes the difficulty, the uncertainty, even wrongness of the work *sub initiis*, for which Bacon apologises (I, 118). The *exclusiva* cannot be perfected unless the tables can be perfected, nor these except upon an adequate basis of collected material. And collection implies selective hypotheses. Has Bacon forgotten this?

It is, perhaps, not necessary with De Morgan (*Budget of Paradoxes*, pp. 50 *sq.*) to suppose that Bacon, like a lawyer, thought that given the facts adequately sifted there was an antecedently existing rule which could be applied, whereas science has to elicit its rule, hitherto unknown, out of the sifting of the facts. The selective hypothesis is supplied from above, after one of those "divers meetings and consults," as an anthropologist or psychologist sends out lists of queries, or a meteorologist rules and registers and instruments. With warnings too against *anticipationes*! And Bacon's scheme is a Restoration. It starts with existing knowledge in order to reform it. Existing knowledge will supply plenty of selective hypotheses to those who will eschew explanation and stick to collection. Classification does not involve concurrent valuation, of necessity and in all ranges of knowledge. At least, as in meteorology, the valuation and interpretation

is in the mind of the *lamp*, and not in that of the *mystery-man* (the mystery-man is Bacon's *original* collector), and not too explicitly in the mind even of the *lamp*. We might instance Galton's collection of finger-prints through subordinate agents, or the work of collection for the *corpus inscriptionum*. The task of research that a professor of physics or chemistry or what not sets his pupil is often enough of a like nature.

Bacon then can at least claim that, granted his conception of collaboration, he is not exposed to a simple fool's mate, such as is offered from the point of view of Mill's logic. And that the uselessness of his method is perhaps not proven till it has been at least tried.

Mill's dissent from Bacon is in the main on the two points of his treatment of hypothesis and his neglect of plurality of causes. Bacon's reason for the former is perhaps clear, even if inadequate. As to the latter, Bacon is not talking of causes in either of Mill's senses. He does recognise plurality of causes in the famous instance of "*mors ex summersione, ex crematione, ex punctura gladii, ex apoplexia, ex atrophia* (II, 17, § 4), but adds, *et tamen conveniunt ista in natura mortis. . . .* Certissimum enim est ista, utcumque heterogenea et aliena, coire in formam sive legem eam quæ ordinat mortem." He denies plurality of "form" and rightly, meaning what he does by form.

Bacon's case against Mill would be that the methods of agreement and difference are fully treated under *instantiæ solitariae quatenus ad similitudinem* and *quatenus ad discrepantiam* (II, 22); the method of concomitant variations under *instantiæ migrantes* (II, 23); that the method of residues is simply a mutilated *exclusiva*; that the joint method of agreement and difference so far as valid is a mutilated *exclusiva* (under the terms of the permission, II, 18, *ad. init.*), but as stated by Mill is invalid, because Mill has forgotten to qualify the absence he would make use of by the necessary limitation *in proximo*; that Mill starts without tables, *i.e.*, at too late

a stage, and owes his induction to Bacon filtered through Herschel with some loss in the process ; that finally Mill owes his most scientific conception of cause (as sum of conditions) to Hobbes (*Elementa Philosophiæ*, II, 9), with whom it was either an adaptation or a misunderstanding of Bacon's account of "form."

Why, then, we have to ask, is Bacon's method of science dead, and Mill's living?

In the first place the great collegiate and socialised or common endeavour of science is as much beyond our strength and our hopes as the great result, the *scientia activa* of the sixth and concluding part of the *instauratio magna*.

In the second place because Bacon was too Aristotelian even in his passionate protest against Aristotelianism. His *forma* was more easily construed by the superficial reader in terms of scholastic and bookish dialectic than in terms of the new physics which constituted the fruitful half-truth of the times.

In the third place because Bacon was really from the point of view of contemporary science an amateur merely. Many a man of science has looked to his pages for inspiration and decided with Leibniz, otherwise much stimulated, that his ignorance of mathematics puts him outside the course of actual scientific development. The scientist finds him still ante-Copernican in his physics, still so much engaged in a recension of Aristotle's organon that his discovery of forms is to be assimilated to Aristotle's account of the definition of attributes, while his materialism has not led him to dissect rather than to abstract nature. We find that Bacon would probably fail to recognise H_2O as the "form" of water, and would rather seek for a *conjugium* of the several formulæ of its colour, weight, and the like. It is not, for example, until *Novum Organum*, II, 24, that, using *formæ copulatæ* (in a sense slightly other than that of, *e.g.*, II, 17) as the forms of simple natures modified by their combination, he first recognises

chemical composition other than verbally (as in I, 75). "Cum enim omne corpus suscipiat multas naturarum formas copulatas et in concreto, fit ut alia aliam retundat, deprimat, frangat, et liget; unda obscurantur formae singulae." But surely it follows that his mechanical view of the simple nature as bound up with a single definite *schematismus* (*calidum* occurs among the schematisms of matter, *De Aug.*, III, 4; *Works*, I, 560) becomes at once unworkable, and if an anticipation of the doctrines of physical chemistry, is only so accidentally, and by way of a "false dawn" to modern science or a sunset to ancient physics. If we add that he undoubtedly coquetted with the doctrine of the transmutability of the metals in the inadmissible sense of the alchemists (*v. Novum Organum*, ed. Fowler, Introduction, p. 27, and the passages there quoted), and that the thought of possible development in the subject-matter of science and of even necessary development in the ideas and hypotheses under which such matter is colligated was completely foreign to Bacon, we have said enough to account for his insuccess in influencing the course of science.

Fourthly, because of his choice of Latin as the language destined to preserve his teaching when English should have perished, and his pretension to something of the nature of an *arcanum*.

And, finally, because of his own imperfect grasp of his own great ideas. The *form* or formula is the nature of which it is the form looked at from another point of view, and so it is both *ipsissima res* and *lex actus puri* and *limitatio natura notioris* as the "form" of heat is a *limitatio* of motion. And we gain by the substitution of the form for the nature of which it is the form, because knowing the latter now in terms of a true genus in nature we know it in wider relations, which enable us, through the latent molecular process in which it emerges, to produce it with a less limited power of control. But the *form* in this sense is not a concomitant of the given nature. It is that given nature otherwise considered. It is not *co-present* with

that nature, though it is present when that nature is present, because it is that nature. Identity in difference of this type is not to be detected by concomitance for observation save by a happy accident, but rather by hypothesis followed by experimental verification. Bacon is not exposed to the objection that you cannot tell which is form and which is that of which it is the form, for form and nature are one and the same thing viewed from two sides, and to know the nature in terms of limitation of a true genus is to know it in wider relations. Nor, for the same reason, to such a difficulty as the impropriety of taking impenetrability for the true *genus* of which inertia is the *limitatio*. But, equally, a method apparently adapted to concomitance is only applicable to identity in difference by one who has formed an hypothesis. If a selective hypothesis is necessary for the collector, so is an explanatory hypothesis for the compiler. If neglect of the former, or at any rate absence of its explicit recognition, is responsible for the fact that Bacon's *Sylva Sylvarum* or *Natural* or *Experimental History* is all but worthless, *omnino falsum* as he had feared might happen *sub initiis*, neglect of the latter is responsible for the cumbrous inutility of the tables for the purpose for which they are drawn up and in the hands of the type of investigator for whose use they are intended. It is, after all, on the *Pioneer* and the *Dowry-man*, with their possibly free use of hypothesis, that both collectors and compilers depend. The interpreter of nature working by negatives can only work upon a mass of stuff which has been put together in the light of provisional hypothesis after provisional hypothesis, just as the law of contradiction is only applicable to a positive material which it does not itself organise but only criticises. Bacon's workers through the division of their labour are for the most part precluded from any opportunity of successful hypothesis. Yet the application of the tables to the discovery of *forms* necessitates acuteness in hypothesis. The criticism from the point of view of Mill is not so unreasonable after all, though

the objection rests on the character of the "form" at least as much as on the invalidity of the method *quâ* method.

And as adapted to the case of *causes*, the method does become exposed to those difficulties classified by Mill and Dr. Fowler under plurality of causes, which are really due to intermixture of effects.

I observe heat. I only perceive that there is always present a definite mode of motion when I have already begun to suspect that heat is just this. Facts are to try new theories by, not to extract new theories from by mechanical means. So roughly runs De Morgan's objection (*Budget of Paradoxes*, p. 56), and it is valid against the *exclusiva* as a method for the discovery of *forms*. There is an apparent alternative-ness of causes due to the difficulty of analysis of intermixed effects which will vitiate our method as applied to the discovery of "invariable antecedents." So runs Mill's objection rectified, and so rectified it is valid. Bacon's own judgment of his first vintage as to the form of heat is true. Of these forms none has as yet been discovered (II, 31), and the investigation is not applicable to causes (II, 20, § 4) for we do not mean "*quod motus generet calorem*," although this may be true in some fields, or in certain subjects.

It is not without significance that the cases in which Bacon is most near a result are the two cases of heat as a mode of molecular motion, and colour as a mode of the collocation of matter (Valerius Terminus with regard to the "direction" as to whiteness, and *Novum Organum*, II, 22, as regards colour in general). It is in the light, that is, of his molecular *hypothesis* that he is nearest to determining mechanical equivalents. The *spiraculum vitæ* may be the *form* in the case of man, and Bacon may have been so far from realising his own hypothesis that he attempted an *Inquisitio Legitima de Motu*, as if even motion were not ultimate, but his method is hypothetical so far as it begins to lead to results, and his hypothesis is a molecular materialism. So in I, 127, where the universality of his

method is proclaimed, it deals indeed with ethics and politics and logic, *i.e.*, with normative and practical studies, but with these only as sciences concerned with *mentales motus* (and *cf.* I, 80).

It is also not without significance that both cases are of simple secondary qualities. *E.g.*, feeling warm I sit and look at my fire, and, abstracting from the relativity to sense, form an obvious hypothesis as to molecular motion. And it is perhaps significant that in the one case, that of colour, Bacon is wholly wrong, and in the other not wholly right. A crucial case for Bacon's method as based on concomitance would be psychophysical parallelism. Precisely where we observe the one order we are unable concurrently and in the same sense to observe the other. It therefore is necessarily a case for hypothesis, and even by the use of hypothesis we do not resolve the one into terms of the other.

The interpreter of nature, then, must depend on the *Pioneer*, and can only present the whole of the accumulated knowledge of the *collaborateurs* in the form of an articulated system divided *κατ' εἶδη*. He can only apply formal tests and principles of consistency which depend upon the teeming brains of the pioneers. What very roughly is the gist of Aristotle's complaint against Plato's *διαίρεσις*, the absence of any movement of thought, which defect unfitted it for the instrument of discovery or of proof, and left it simply a convenient mode of presentment for otherwise established truths, what, again, the critics of Aristotle's own syllogism, from Bacon and Hobbes to Mill and Lotze, have urged with perhaps less truth against that account of the form of inference, is more obviously valid against Bacon's induction. And Mill's induction rests on Bacon's.

Mill's induction, however, lives still, in part because of its close touch with actual contemporary progress in science, in part because while the experimental and so-called inductive canons are simply, in terms of his own strictures upon syllogism, formulæ of registration, he yet has recognised generously and

adequately that hypothesis is the actual starting-point of the purely logical part of the mental process of the solitary worker in science. Method in the former sense is only an *ex post facto* formulation of the result of the scientist's work as he communicates it. His work is really done when he has reached a formula which can be expressed in such terms as "one circumstance only in common" and the like. His actual procedure is involved in processes "subsidiary to induction," as Mill would say, which have preceded. The Baconian machinery is not made less Baconian by Mill's partial adoption of it and as so adopted is obnoxious to a like criticism. But the generalisation of the significance of hypothesis with verification remains valid, because so general as to cover the non-mechanical and not in logical method expressible psychological process of the man of science, as we have it described to us in non-technical language by Tyndall in his lecture on the Scientific Use of the Imagination.

Mill has dropped Bacon's principle of Division of Labour, and he might with advantage have dropped the methods, whether as mutilated *exclusiva* or as application of *prærogativa*, save as regulative ideals. But he has formulated the work of the *Pioneer* and the *Dowry-man* so far as capable of formulation, and so he can join hands with Tyndall the modern as against Bacon the scholastic.

Yet the success of the Germans in the chemical industries may well give us pause before we reject Bacon's scientific ideal. The formulation of the available material, with hypothesis allowed, if allowed at all, only to the higher grades in the scientific hierarchy, reveals gaps, suggests new experiments, enables fuller formulation, and the combined work grows. And the German method rests on negatives, with the aim of ending in a positive, *i.e.*, with an exhaustive knowledge of a completely specified genus. It is freer in experiment, commits more to the *Pioneers*, but with more stress on verification, and more to the *Dowry-men*, provided they secure the patents, but it

is Baconian in its Division of Labour and in its progressive determination by negation, it is Baconian in its tables and in the way that it rests on physics. It is even Baconian in its search for *forms*, though no longer of simple qualities, but of compound substances. But it is not Baconian in its cleavage between form and cause as sum of conditions. It does not rest on observation of concomitance, but on hypothetical equivalence experimentally verified.

It differs, therefore, from Bacon's scheme of scientific research unless we are prepared to suggest that investigations such as those of the German physicists and chemists are what Bacon really meant to allot to his workers of the higher grades as their specific functions. If we do suggest this, then the Baconian conception of science and its method is saved in the fields at least of physics and chemistry, by the office assigned to his Pioners and by a closer connection than he indicates between the work of these and that of the Lamps, Inoculators, and Interpreters of Nature.

I have insisted on the *Pioners* rather than the *Lamps*, because the former are the only exponents of hypothesis prior to the compilation of tables, and the latter do not proceed directly to the rectification of the tables but to inspire the *Inoculators* on the higher plane. But the frequent "consults" of the whole body would perhaps justify the attribution to the *Lamps* and even to the *Interpreters* of important functions in the direction of hypothesis-making.

It is, however, only by the aid of free reading between the lines that we can interpret Bacon's dream as having a vital significance for science. The *Instauratio* is a torso. Even the *Novum Organum* is incomplete (v. II, 21), and the reason seems to be that Bacon had never reached a true *denouement*. If it is only by failure to read between the lines at all that we can indulge in the superficial criticism of Mill and others, it must be confessed that Bacon's claims as *protopirous* are not so substantiated that of himself he can lead us

into Salomon's House. Yet as a dream of that co-operative work of science which seems for a while to run in harness to capital, but must in the long run express itself as a social democracy such as Zola describes in *Travail*, or Mr. H. G. Wells "anticipates," or as an enlightened aristocracy such as Ruskin preaches, the *Novum Organum* has its place among the Utopias which are nowhere and yet everywhere. It is the New Atlantis come from its isolation into the common world; a Platonic apologue, which, like its prototype, rests incomplete, written by a knight-errant of the ideal, masquerading as a new Aristotle!

III.—PROFESSOR SIDGWICK'S ETHICS.

By MISS E. E. C. JONES.

WHAT I propose to do in this paper is to recapitulate very briefly indeed what I understand to be the main points of Professor Sidgwick's ethical view, and then to attempt to answer some of the objections to it that have been brought forward in recent criticisms.

As regards *The Good* for man, that which is in itself desirable, Mr. Sidgwick holds that "if we consider carefully such permanent results as are commonly judged to be good, other than qualities of human beings, we can find nothing that, on reflection, appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation to human existence or at least to some consciousness or feeling"—that "beauty, knowledge, and other ideal goods, as well as all external material things, are only reasonably to be sought by men in as far as they conduce either (1) to Happiness or (2) to the Perfection or Excellence of human existence" (*Methods of Ethics*, Book I, ch. ix, § 4).

With regard to Virtue, and the other "talents, gifts, and graces which make up the common notion of human Excellence or Perfection . . . reflection shows that they are only valuable on account of the good or desirable conscious life in which they are or will be actualised, or which will be somehow promoted by their exercise" (*Methods of Ethics*, III, xiv, § 2, p. 395).

Any quality of human life that is ultimately desirable "must belong to human life regarded on its psychical side, or briefly, Consciousness" (p. 396). And it is only *Desirable* Consciousness that we can regard as ultimate Good for man (p. 397). Consciousness that is painful or even merely

indifferent is not *in itself* desirable. The current notion of Virtue itself cannot without a logical circle be identified with the notion of Ultimate Good, for "to say that 'general good' consists solely in general Virtue, if we mean by Virtue conformity to such prescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main part of the morality of Common Sense, would obviously involve us in a logical circle; since we have seen that the exact determination of these prescriptions and prohibitions must depend on the definition of this General Good" (p. 392, *cf.* p. 391). And neither does Virtuous activity, if accompanied by extreme torture, appear to be *in itself* desirable to the agent, nor can mere subjective rightness of Will be maintained to be Ultimate Good.

It may be said, however, "that we may take 'conscious life' in a wide sense, so as to include the objective relations of the conscious being implied in our notions of Virtue, Truth, Beauty, Freedom; and that from this point of view we may regard cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Free or Virtuous action, as in some measure preferable alternatives to Pleasure or Happiness—even though we admit that Happiness must be included as a part of Ultimate Good. In this case the principle of Rational Benevolence, which was stated in the last chapter as an indubitable intuition of the practical Reason, would not direct us to the pursuit of universal happiness alone, but of these 'ideal goods' as well, as ends ultimately desirable for mankind generally.

"I think, however, that this view ought not to commend itself to the sober judgment of reflective persons. In order to show this, I must ask the reader to use the same twofold procedure that I before requested him to employ in considering the absolute and independent validity of common moral precepts. I appeal, firstly, to his intuitive judgment after due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it; and secondly, to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind. As regards the first argument, to me

at least it seems clear, after reflection, that these objective relations of the conscious subject, when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable, any more than material or other objects are, when considered apart from any relation to conscious existence. Admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences as have just been described, of which the ultimate object is something that is not merely consciousness, it still seems to me that when (to use Butler's phrase) we 'sit down in a cool hour,' we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient beings.

"The second argument, that refers to the common sense of mankind, obviously cannot be made completely cogent; since, as above stated, several cultivated persons do habitually judge that knowledge, art, &c.—not to speak of Virtue—are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them. But we may urge not only that all these elements of 'ideal good' are productive of pleasure in various ways; but also that they seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness. This seems obviously true of Beauty, and will hardly be denied in respect of any kind of social ideal; it is paradoxical to maintain that any degree of Freedom, or any form of social order, would still be commonly regarded as desirable even if we were certain that it had no tendency to promote the general happiness. The case of Knowledge is rather more complex; but certainly Common Sense is most impressed with the value of knowledge when its 'fruitfulness' has been demonstrated. It is, however, aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge, long fruitless, may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light may be shed on one part of the field of knowledge from another apparently remote; and even if any particular branch of scientific pursuit could be shown to be devoid of even this

indirect utility, it would still deserve some respect on utilitarian grounds; both as furnishing to the enquirer the refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity, and because the intellectual disposition which it exhibits and sustains is likely on the whole to produce fruitful knowledge. Still in cases approximating to this last, Common Sense is somewhat disposed to complain of the misdirection of valuable effort; so that the meed of honour commonly paid to Science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale. Certainly the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific enquiry is seriously disputed, as in the recent case of vivisection, the controversy on both sides is generally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis" (*Methods of Ethics*, 6th edition, pp. 400-402).

On the same principle we may allow as possible some infelicitic effects of cultivation of Virtue, and are able to explain the aversion of Common Sense to admit Happiness to be the Ultimate Good.

If these considerations are accepted, the hedonistic or eudæmonistic end is admitted, and Virtue is interpreted as conduct conducive to that end. And an examination of the Morality of Common Sense, the precepts of duty and virtuous action which are currently accepted, leads us first of all to recognise that these rules are difficult to define, mutually conflicting, wanting in independence and self-evidence. The moralist is forced to seek for some principle which is clear and evident, and capable of explaining, justifying, and reconciling these vague and unsystematised rules of Dogmatic Intuitionism. A step towards this is made by Philosophic Intuitionism, which reaches principles of Prudence, Justice, and Benevolence, under which minor rules may be brought, Common Sense Morality appearing on examination to be a system of rules tending to the promotion of the general Happiness, and showing no clear and self-evident principles except such as are consistent with Utilitarianism.

The maxim of Rational Benevolence furnishes an intuitional basis for Utilitarianism, and the Utilitarian rule of "aiming at the General Happiness" is seen to "rest on a fundamental moral intuition." On this view there is, it seems, "no real opposition between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism."

As regards Method, Intuition gives the End, or Good; how that end or good can be best realised must be settled by careful appeal to experience, by a "Hedonistic Calculus." If Happiness is the Good, the right end of action, we have of course Ethical Hedonism. One of Professor Sidgwick's great services to ethical thought consists in the clear distinction between this, which is an ethical doctrine, a doctrine of ends, of what ought to be, and the *psychological* doctrine (Psychological Hedonism) that every one *does* always act from desire for pleasure or aversion to pain. This latter view he has, I think, conclusively disproved. He has also shown that a consistent Ethical Hedonism cannot admit differences of *quality*, but only of quantity, in pleasure (or pain). It may be remarked here that the case for Ethical Hedonism (so-called) would be very much strengthened in expression by a systematic reference to *Pain* as well as *Pleasure* in considering the end. Happiness includes absence of painful consciousness as well as presence of pleasant consciousness; if Pain is *in itself* (apart from consideration of causes and effects) bad and to be avoided, similarly Pleasure is, *in itself merely*, desirable—it is the happiness of any moment that makes *that moment* worth having to a rational creature who is also sentient. Besides the Principle of Rational Benevolence, Mr. Sidgwick recognises another fundamental ethical intuition—that of Prudence or Rational Self-Love—that "interest, my own happiness, is a manifest obligation." He agrees with Butler in recognising a Dualism of the Governing Faculty, or Practical Reason. But since he can find no intuition to the effect that what is for the greatest Happiness of others will also be for the greatest Happiness of the individual agent (*i.e.*, that Virtue will be rewarded), and as,

moreover, an examination of experience admits the view that conduct which best promotes the one will not always best promote the other, this Dualism presents a fundamental problem. The Practical Reason is not satisfied unless *both* my own Happiness is promoted *and* the Happiness of others.* And yet it is interesting to notice that I cannot accept the maxim of Rational Benevolence *unless* I have accepted the maxim of Rational Self-Love; for surely it is only if my own consciousness tells me that my happiness is *for me as an individual* intrinsically worth having, only on this condition is there ground for holding that the happiness *of others* is that which, for *their* sakes, it is worth while for me to promote. Why should I think that another's happiness is any good to *him*, unless I feel that *my* happiness is a good to me? Can I judge his consciousness except by my own? And perhaps it may also be noted here that each individual, when aiming at the happiness *of others*, since he does not aim at the happiness of *one man alone*, has to aim at both happiness and virtue (in as far as virtue conduces to happiness) in each. (And, of course, on the utilitarian view, conduciveness to happiness is the very content of virtue.)†

Professor Sidgwick himself holds that in order that ethical science should be satisfactorily constructed and morality completely rationalised, Ethics must borrow a premiss from Theology or Philosophy; and he asks whether, "if the reconciliation of duty and self-interest is to be regarded as a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction in one chief department of our thought," this necessity would "constitute a sufficient reason for accepting this hypothesis. This, however, is a profoundly difficult and controverted question, the discussion of which belongs rather

* It may be noted that the same difficulty might occur if *good* were not interpreted hedonistically.

† Cf. article on "Rational Hedonism" in *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. v.

to a treatise on General Philosophy than to a work on the Methods of Ethics, as it could not be satisfactorily answered without a general examination of the criteria of true and false beliefs. Those who hold that the edifice of physical science is really constructed of conclusions logically inferred from self-evident premises may reasonably demand that any practical judgments claiming philosophic certainty should be based on an equally firm foundation. If, on the other hand, we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs—it will be more difficult to reject a similarly supported assumption in Ethics without opening the door to universal scepticism.” The strength of this position has not, I think, been always appreciated. It appears to make the case for Ethical Science at least as good as the case for Natural Science.

I go on to consider a few of the objections to Utilitarianism of this type which have recently come under my notice. As regards those that appeared before 1894, I collected all that came in my way, and gave to them the best answer I could in the *International Journal of Ethics* for 1894 and 1895 (vol. v). Also Mr. Hayward's criticisms in vol. xi of that journal (1900–1901) have received, in the same volume, perhaps as much attention as they require.* I will, therefore, pass on to examine some points in the criticisms of Professor J. Seth and Mr. Moore. Professor Seth (in his article, “The Ethical System of Henry Sidgwick,” in *Mind* for April, 1901) considers that Professor Sidgwick has subordinated Utilitarianism to Egoism, yet that at the same time he recognises “three Methods of Ethics—the Egoistic, the Intuitional,

* Mr. Hayward's book, published soon after the article, is to a great extent an expansion of the latter.

and the Utilitarian, as equally legitimate." (This recognition, in Mr. Seth's view, is—"apart from Mr. Sidgwick's theological assumption or postulate—a position which may be called Rational or Intuitional Hedonism, not Rational or Intuitional Utilitarianism." What, however, is Utilitarianism but Hedonism?)

But Professor Sidgwick shows how, in his view, Intuitionism and Utilitarianism coalesce (this is, indeed, recognised by Professor Seth on p. 177). As regards the subordination of Utilitarianism to Egoism, Professor Seth himself quotes on p. 177, the following statement of Professor Sidgwick: "I do not hold the reasonableness of aiming at happiness generally with any stronger conviction than I do that of aiming at one's own. . . . I hold with Butler that 'Reasonable Self-Love and Conscience are *the two chief or superior principles* in the nature of man,' each of which we are under a 'manifest obligation' to obey." And if one *were* subordinate to the other, how could the *three* Methods be (as Professor Seth says they are) regarded as "equally legitimate"?

Again, Professor Seth says that (on Professor Sidgwick's view) "the conflict between Egoism and Utilitarianism is . . . ultimate and insoluble because each is the expression of the Practical Reason"; but what Professor Sidgwick holds is that each is *an* expression of Practical Reason—the expression of Practical Reason is the two together. And again, if there is an "insoluble conflict," as Mr. Seth says, how can one be subordinated to the other?

Professor Seth does not, I think, rightly represent Professor Sidgwick's attitude towards the *natural* Methods of Ethics, and his attitude to Common Sense (which Professor Sidgwick does not regard as sole and final appeal—recognising that Common Sense requires to be "clarified" for philosophical purposes).

Again, Professor Seth asserts that Mr. Sidgwick's "own statement of the principles suggests, if it does not imply,

that both Prudence and Benevolence are transcended in the Principle of Justice of which they are only special applications. All three," he goes on, "are principles of the distribution of the Good or Happiness, and the common mark of all is that impartiality which is of the essence of Justice." It is surely a very odd use of "distribution" to say that Prudence and Benevolence are principles of distribution; and to say that Prudence and Benevolence are transcended by Justice, because "impartiality," which is the mark (it should be *a* mark) of Justice, also characterises them, is also odd, since Justice in this sense is simply the mere form of law—any *law* must be equal and impartial—and Prudence and Benevolence imply a definite ultimate good (Happiness) without reference to which Justice remains a bare form of impartiality, without any content of good to be impartial about. Justice is not (unless we have accepted the Hedonistic principle of Rational Benevolence) a principle of "action with impartial concern for all elements of general Happiness" (p. 181). The form of Law is common to all systems of Ethics, but the hedonistic end is peculiar to Hedonism. The acceptance of Happiness as *end* is a very important addition to the mere form of Law, and on the Utilitarian view, the maxim of Justice seems plainly subordinate to that of Benevolence. And unless it can be shown that from the individual's point of view there is no valid or important difference between *self* and *others*, it seems futile to argue as Professor Seth does (p. 184), as if this difference did not exist. Could we, indeed, have any knowledge of, or care for, the happiness of another, unless we have first recognised happiness as good for ourselves, worth having for ourselves? (*Cf.* above, p. 36). Does not even the very conception of Duty (not to say of Life or Consciousness) imply a valid and important difference between Self and Other? And when it is said that "moral good is always a common, never a private good," what is meant by a *common* good? What is a common good but the good of many individuals? Is not our duty to our neighbour—brother

or sister or wife or child—and the good hence accruing, to the merely “individual” child, &c.?

“The only possibility,” says Professor Seth, “of reducing morality to a rational system is by subordinating Prudence to Benevolence through the subordination of both Prudence and Benevolence to the formal or logical principle of Justice, of which they together constitute the special application and content” (p. 182). . . . “We have only to ask what is the relation of a Logical [whole or genus] to a mathematical [or quantitative] whole to reach the conclusion that the one is the form, the other the content, and that the larger application of the principle of Justice which we find in Benevolence must include and transcend the narrower application of the same principle in Prudence.”

But the question is not to be solved by a mere consideration of the relation between two such wholes, and in any ordinary use of the maxim of Justice this maxim is not applicable in the case of Prudence, because there is only one person concerned. And the maxim of Prudence can be subordinated to that of Benevolence only if we ignore the difference between self and other; it is not from the point of view of the sentient individual that *he* is merely one of those similar units that make up the Logical Whole, and that *his* fraction of the quantitative whole constituted by the various *quanta* of good of all sentient individuals taken together, is on a par with every other equal quantum—this is only true from the universal point of view.

It may seem superfluous to dwell on this point, but Professor Seth lays much stress upon it. “If,” he says, “the point of view of the individual and his happiness is once exchanged for the point of view of society and the general happiness; if the former is subordinated as only a part, to the latter as the true ethical whole; if, in Sidgwick’s own terminology, the principle of prudence is subordinated to that of benevolence, or both to the principle of justice, the dualism and contradiction of ethical

thought immediately disappears, and Utilitarianism, or the identification of the individual with the social whole of which he is a part, is seen to be the only rational principle of conduct, the only principle worthy to be called intuitive." But is it intuitive? And is it either a principle or rational? To me it seems to be none of these good things—indeed "the identification of the individual with the social whole of which he forms a part" seems to me a contradiction in terms; if an individual is *part* of a whole, he surely, *ex vi termini*, cannot be *identified with* the whole—indeed, from his point of view, the whole, as far as he knows it, is only a part of him, his cognitive self being the other part, and that part, too, upon which the existence *for him* of all the rest depends. But even the identification of the individual with the whole does not quite satisfy Professor Seth—the further question would remain, he says, "whether the point of view of a quantitative or even of a logical whole is the ethical point of view." (This seems to me so unfair as to be quite beside the mark.) ". . . . If the Good is itself interpreted rationally, the value of pleasure is determined by its quality, and not merely by its quantity." (Is it rational to hold that pleasure *in itself* can vary qualitatively?) "Sidgwick's main interest," Professor Seth goes on, "seems to have been in the question of the true method of the distribution of the Good, rather than in the question of the nature of the Good. . . . His investigation of the problem of the Good does not compare, in seriousness and in persistence, with his investigation of the problem of its distribution."

If Professor Seth considers Prudence and Benevolence to be principles of *distribution*, it is perhaps explicable that he should think that distribution receives a disproportionate share of attention, but how he comes to regard them as principles of *distribution* is a little hard to understand, and the view that Professor Sidgwick treated the question of the nature of the Good with comparative neglect is still more surprising in

view of the discussions, *e.g.*, in ch. ix of Book I, and ch. xiv of Book III. To the complaint (p. 180) that Professor Sidgwick does not apply to his own intuitions (of Rational Self-Love and Rational Benevolence) the criterion of consistency on which he justly lays stress, it may be replied that the two intuitions in question cannot be shown to be incompatible with each other, that a possible mode of complete reconciliation is indicated, and serious reasons offered for its acceptance, and that Benevolence certainly presupposes Self-Love.

Finally, I would just observe that the conjectural tracing of the sources of Professor Sidgwick's Ethics needs correcting in the light of his own account of the development of his view; and that in many of the quotations from *The Methods of Ethics* which Professor Seth gives there is a curious disregard of context, owing to which a garbled impression is (without doubt unintentionally) produced in several cases; the quotations, too, are in some cases strangely beside the point—*e.g.*, p. 178, line 87, &c.; pp. 180, 184, foot, and 185, top, &c.

I go on to make a few remarks on some of Mr. G. E. Moore's criticisms, in his recent book, *Principia Ethica*.

In attempting to disprove Hedonism, by which he means the doctrine that Pleasure is the sole good, Mr. Moore lays stress upon what he calls (1) the principle of organic unity; (2) the method of isolation. The principle of unity is that the value of an organic whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts. This he uses chiefly, I think, for the purpose of showing that though wholes of which pleasure (or pleasant feeling) is a factor are highly valuable, and none of the parts (except pleasure) taken alone seem valuable, it does not therefore follow that the value of the complex whole is due to pleasure. By the method of isolation, we separate a thing or quality from its causes, accompaniments, and effects, and as so separated endeavour to determine by reflective inspection (by "looking to see") whether it has value or demerit in itself, and, if so,

how much. Pleasure, he decides, though it has *some* intrinsic goodness, has not much, in isolation, and is by no means the sole good. He settles this by a hypothetical consideration of cases in which every element of the concrete instances, except pleasant feeling itself, has been abstracted from, and of cases in which the other elements of a whole which is good in itself are considered apart from the pleasure or happiness which is their normal concomitant.

In dealing with Professor Sidgwick's doctrine (which he recognises to be free from some of the defects and faults of previous English Hedonistic Moralists) Mr. Moore first attempts to answer the contention that nothing outside of Human existence can be good or the good for man. He takes the passage of *The Methods of Ethics*, already quoted above (pp. 33-35), and objects to the limitation of good to certain characters of Human Existence. "Is this conclusion justified?" he asks (p. 83). "I cannot think it is. 'No one,' says Professor Sidgwick, 'would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in external nature, apart from any possible contemplation of it by human beings.' Well, I may say at once that I, for one, do consider this rational; and let us see if I cannot get anyone to agree with me. Consider what this admission really means. It entitles us to put the following case:—Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admire—mountains, rivers, the sea, trees and sunsets, stars and moon. Imagine these all combined in the most exquisite proportions, so that no one thing jars against another, but each contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing everything that is most disgusting to us, for whatever reason, and the whole, as far as may be, without one redeeming feature. Such a pair of worlds we are entitled to compare; they fall within Professor Sidgwick's meaning, and the comparison is highly

relevant to it. The only thing we are not entitled to imagine is that any human being ever has, or ever, by any possibility, *can*, live in either, can ever see and enjoy the beauty of the one or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even so, supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation by human beings; still, is it rational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly? Would it not be well, in any case, *to do what we could to produce it** rather than the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that it would, and I hope that some may agree with me in this extreme instance."

To this I reply that I cannot myself see that it is of the smallest consequence what happens so long as there is no consciousness anywhere in any creature of this happening—not that I think anything can or does happen or exist apart from all consciousness, but just supposing that we put the case.

I submit, however, that Mr. Moore does not really put this case, for he says, "*Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can . . . Would it not be well . . . to do what we could to produce it . . . ?*" "The ugliest world" is described as "containing everything that is *most disgusting to us.*" (This includes more than mere ugliness.) And in the last paragraph of his book he speaks of the love of *imaginary* things and persons as "undoubtedly good." "It is enough for my purpose," he remarks (p. 84), "if it be admitted that, *supposing* no greater good were at all attainable, then beauty must in itself be regarded as a greater good than ugliness: if it be admitted that, in that case, *we* should not be left without any reason for *preferring* one course of action to another, *we should not be left without any duty whatever, but that it would then be our positive duty to make the world more beautiful*, so far as we

* Italics mine.

were able, since nothing better than beauty could *then result from our efforts.*" *

This refutation, then, of the limitation of human good to goods of consciousness by reference to imaginary cases of beauty and ugliness seems to me to break down. The appeal is to our imaginative appreciation or disgust, and to our duty to produce beauty rather than ugliness. Can we, by help of such considerations, make any decision about things that are *not* matter of any consciousness? Is not even the attempt to put the case, and to estimate the hypothetical beauty and ugliness on the supposition of their not being objects of consciousness, quite futile?

Mr. Moore goes on to consider the doctrine that Pleasure alone is good for its own sake (p. 87). He first spends some pages in combating the view that "*pleasure alone and not the consciousness of pleasure* is the sole good," quoting in support of it a passage from the *Philebus*, in which Socrates sophistically presents to the victimised Protarchus an arbitrary mixture of possible and impossible. "You would not think you needed anything else if you possessed for your whole life the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures in completeness?" Socrates enquires. "Certainly not," Protarchus answers. Then Socrates supposes his interlocutor to be divested of sight, wisdom, intelligence, reason, memory and knowledge, and asks, "Would Protarchus be content in this state of destitution if he still had the greatest enjoyment, but without knowing that he had it?" To this Protarchus feebly, but very naturally, responds, "Socrates, your reasoning has left me utterly dumb." He is too surprised and shocked to retort, "Yes, certainly, *if* I still possessed this blessing in completeness."

Why Mr. Moore should have troubled to give so much space to this refutation of *pleasure without consciousness* I do not know, as he admits that he thinks it is *consciousness of*

* Italics mine.

pleasure which Hedonists have meant, and after the quotation he gives from *The Methods of Ethics* there could be no doubt about Professor Sidgwick's view.*

But even the formula, "Consciousness of Pleasure is the sole end," does not correctly give Professor Sidgwick's view, for he expressly says that we have to include *absence of pain* as well as *presence of pleasure* in the Hedonistic end. The most striking point in Mr. Moore's account of Good and Bad is that while it is rather reluctantly that he admits mere happy feeling to be intrinsically valuable, he fully allows that Pain (unhappy feeling) is in itself a great and unmixed Evil. "Great evils may be said to consist either (a) in the love of what is evil or ugly, or (b) in the hatred of what is good or beautiful, or (c) in the consciousness of pain." Probably the love of evil is itself evil, and the love of good persons may be sometimes good, but what is the evil of which the love is an unmixed Evil, what is that good in persons the love of which is an unmixed good? Is not "*love of good persons*" very vague indeed? Is it the love *as felt*, or *as contemplated by a third person*? Is it good to the persons who feel it? Is anything definite left as good in itself except beauty, anything as evil in itself except ugliness and pain? Is it so certain that ugliness and the love of it are evil, and that beauty and the love of it are very great goods? And if Pain (there can be no Pain without consciousness of pain) is in itself a great evil, how can we escape the admission that Pleasure or Happiness (conscious, of course) is a great good? If Pain intrinsically, abstracting from its causes, concomitants, and effects, is in itself and while it lasts evil, if a feeling-tone of absolute indifference makes any state in which it occurs *intrinsically* worthless—worthless while it lasts, *considered in itself*, what justification is there for not treating Pleasure or Happiness

* Pleasure without consciousness seems to me a contradiction in terms—as impossible and absurd a notion as colour without extension, warmth without temperature, or music without sound.

(the feeling-tone which is the contrary-opposite of Pleasure) correspondingly? If Pain is to be estimated *in itself*, abstracting from any particular causes, concomitants, &c. (and, of course, causes, concomitants, and effects of Pain may be excellent), ought not the opposite Feeling, Pleasure, to be also estimated in abstraction from all particular causes, &c. (which may, of course, be bad)? Mr. Moore himself is very emphatic about the need of the "method of isolation," but in order to convince us that pleasure is not *intrinsically* good he appeals to concrete cases where causes and concomitants are supposed such as to arouse strong condemnation of the whole state. Would not his supposititious cases be more effective if more in conformity with ordinary human experience? And, by the way, does cruelty mean mere pleasure in contemplating suffering? If it had no effect direct or indirect in *producing suffering*, would our condemnation of it be so severe?

I think, too, that there is a constant tendency to forget both that it is *General Happiness* which is the utilitarian end, and that (the world and human life being what they are) among the most important means to this are the currently-accepted rules of morality.

In as far as appeal is made to intuition, it is, of course, to each individual's intuition; if the appeal is to common sense and common usage, it seems to me that Happiness is as much sought and as highly estimated as Pain is avoided and disapproved—and that appearances to the contrary may be satisfactorily explained (*cf. Methods of Ethics*, Book III, ch. xiv, § 5). Why else do we habitually wish each other long life and happiness, many happy returns of the day, a happy new year, a merry Christmas, why do we have Christmas trees for children, why try to secure happiness for others, why reward labour and merit with the means of securing, from among many sources of happiness, those which the labourer most desires, or can best turn to account?

No doubt Mr. Moore's method of isolation may be a valuable help towards finding out the character and value of any whole or part *in itself*, apart from causes, &c. If we want to know, *e.g.*, the value at the moment of its occurrence of a state of consciousness, or any element of it, this method applied with exact care is what it is necessary to use. We must abstract rigorously from all particular causes, concomitants, and effects. This is what Professor Sidgwick has, I think, succeeded in doing in estimating Pleasure or Happiness. But anyone can use it for himself—and I cannot understand how anyone who has carefully and systematically used it can say that any whole state of consciousness or any part of such whole is intuited by him as intrinsically worthy, as good in itself, if abstraction has been made of all pleasant feeling—that is to say, if it is taken as absolutely indifferent, or in some degree painful. Who would care to live through a year, much less a life, in which, whatever else there was, there was not a moment's happiness? Who would think it, in itself, worth having? It seems difficult to allow this without allowing the great intrinsic value of Happiness or Pleasure.

If the good is a good of consciousness, it must be the good of some consciousness in particular—and if a good of Feeling (*i.e.*, Happiness) it is a good of the consciousness of the particular person who feels it, and can only be a good to other consciousnesses indirectly. All Happiness, I think, is in itself absolutely good from the point of view of an universe consisting of creatures capable of Happiness and misery; but it could not be good from the universal point of view unless it were first good from some individual's point of view, since it can only exist, or be contemplated or imagined as existing, as the good primarily of the particular creature that experiences it; the good of each being, although good in itself, only a *part* of the good of the whole—the sole good being the sum of the good of each and all.

And it seems to me that since each man is himself and not another, and since (if the good is Happiness) he can only know good directly as part of his own feeling-consciousness, and since there is no such good except what *is* part of a feeling-consciousness, that therefore Egoistic Hedonism is rational from the individual's point of view—supposing there were no one but himself, as we are “supposing” so much. It is surely true (*cf.* p. 99) that the difference to any individual “between his own happiness and another's happiness” is “*for him* all-important”—his own greatest happiness is “not merely the ultimate rational end for himself, but a part of Universal Good.”

“Ultimate rational end for himself” means, I suppose, what is intrinsically good to him personally—*his* good in a sense in which it cannot be another's, in a sense without which no good of feeling could exist at all. In this way Egoism must be the presupposition of Universalism in Hedonistic Ethics. Everyone who is part of the universe has, it would seem, reason to try and realise all parts of the good of the universe—but unless each one's own Happiness concerned him specially there would on hedonistic principles be no good of the whole to be aimed at. I think that some at least analogous considerations would apply to any non-hedonistic good of conscious creatures.

Without denying the Principle of Organic Unity,* it may be observed that since *pleasure* is necessarily *felt pleasure*, the only whole that we are here interested in considering in relation to the Principle is a whole of consciousness. The only elements that such a whole contains are elements of (1) cognition or perception, (2) feeling or emotion, and (3) volition; and the only abstraction that seems valid and applicable in the

* It may be said, however, that this principle and its application seem to need much fuller exposition and discussion than Mr. Moore has given us.

case of any of these three is an abstraction not of *all* cognition or *all* volition (attention) or *all* feeling, but of any particular case or kind of cognition, feeling, &c. We have, *e.g.*, no experience of volition cut off from cognition, or destitute of feeling-tone. Thus there exists no concrete Whole of consciousness that is without feeling-tone, and no feeling-tone that is not the feeling-tone of some whole of consciousness. Though feeling can be distinguished in thought from cognition and volition, the separation is not so much comparable to that of, *e.g.*, an arm from a human body (as in Mr. Moore's illustration) as to that of Life or Intelligent Consciousness from such an organised body.

And if Pleasure or Happiness is allowed to have some value, while no one can hold that *any* combination of volitions and cognitions, if accompanied by unremitting torture, or even absolute indifference, would be good *in itself*, and, on the other hand, the only ground that anyone can find for refusing to allow that happy feeling is good in itself seems to be by reference to *causes, concomitants, or effects* that are disapproved—if this is so, how can we escape the affirmation that it is Happiness and it alone which is in itself (*i.e.*, in abstraction from all *particular causes* and accompaniments) worth having? At the same time, the notion of organic unity, which may be extended to cover the whole of conscious life, helps us to see how it is and why it is that happy feeling under the name of pleasure is so readily condemned—for all actual happiness as well as suffering has causes, concomitants, and effects, and these may, *in any given case*, be such as we disapprove. I believe that the grounds of disapproval may, in any instance, be explained, systematised, and justified by appeal to effects upon General Happiness—but I will not pursue the point here. And another contributing factor to the condemnation of Happiness, when called by the name of *Pleasure*, is the influence of the word itself; it is, to most of us, what Bentham calls a *dyslogistic* term—an instance in which a word, “like the Tartar’s bow, shoots back upon him

that uses it, and mightily disturbs and confuses his understanding."

My attention in the above discussion of Mr. Moore's attack on Hedonism has perhaps been too entirely taken up by Chapter III (Hedonism) and the destructive side of the argument, with which indeed that chapter is almost exclusively occupied. The chief point in Mr. Moore's positive case against Hedonism is that though nothing is good which is not pleasant, the only things which are good in themselves in any high degree are very complex wholes, the goodness of which cannot be arrived at by any computation of the separate values of the constituents into which they can be analysed. Of the complex things which are intrinsically good, the chief are the love of beautiful things and the love of good persons.

In any complete consideration of Mr. Moore's whole view, the constructive side of his doctrine must, of course, be included. I hope that I may have an opportunity at some other time of attempting some discussion of it.

IV.—REALITY.

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON.

I. OBJECT.

AT the very basis of philosophy lies the distinction between consciousness as a knowing, or knowledge, and that same consciousness as an existent. In philosophy we are making consciousness, our whole knowledge of things, our whole mental content, awareness, or furniture, the object-matter of our enquiry. In other words, we are exercising the psychological function of Apperception, as distinguished from perception or consciousness simply, which nevertheless is pre-supposed therein, and pre-supposed as an inseparable part, constituent, or element, of the apperceptive process. All consciousness is a reflective or retrospective process, and apperception is therefore nothing more than attention to some particular content of that process, or perception *plus* attention to its own content as it recedes into the past, or becomes objective to the attention.

Apperception itself, with its content as apperceived, is therefore a necessary part, but by no means the whole, of the object-matter of philosophy.

It is with consciousness as a knowing that we are specially concerned in philosophy, not with its inseparable aspect, consciousness as an existent, which is the fact or actual process of perceiving, attending, and apperceiving. To confuse these two aspects, though in fact inseparable, to attribute to one what is true only of the other, is the ruin of philosophy. Of course we must not lose sight of the existent aspect of consciousness, while occupied with the other aspect. It is the distinction between them which it is necessary to keep in view. The ground or reason for drawing the distinction is discoverable by

apperception in the process of simple perception itself, which, prior to apperception, is always a perception having content, or whatness, that is, being of some particular kind, though this is not a *whatness* as distinguished from an *existence*, until apperception has distinguished the fact of the content being perceived from the content as a whole, and thereby also from the remainder of the content which is its *whatness* in the narrower sense. The order of knowledge as distinguished from the order of existence thus begins with a perception of a content, or of whatness in the larger sense. Before you can know that anything exists, you must know something of what it is; its existence alone, its bare existence, without a whatness of any kind, cannot in any way be conveyed to us, or realised in thought; without a content, existence would be the existence of nothing, consciousness the consciousness of nothing; both alike would be non-entities.

Consciousness thus, in virtue of its being an objectifying process, always makes us aware of the existence of some content of consciousness; the ideas of *existence* and *object* are ideas rooted in the nature of consciousness itself. But these ideas, or rather the experiences which they represent, are not of themselves enough to give us the knowledge, or account for the idea, of a Conscious Being, the Subject of objects, such as we take ourselves to be in common-sense thinking, and such as is assumed by Psychology as its special object-matter—a knowledge or an idea, into the nature and validity of which, as of all other apparently fundamental ideas, it is the business of Philosophy to enquire. A long course of experience would seem to have been requisite before any such knowledge or idea could have been attained, a course of experience compelling us to recognise consciousness as such, and to make it as such our object, that is to say, as distinguished from other objects which are recognised as not-consciousness, and the existence of which is recognised as independent of our own. Only as the result of some such long course of experience does it seem

possible that we should attain the knowledge or the idea, that consciousness not only has an existent or objective aspect, inseparable from its philosophically subjective aspect, or aspect as a knowing, but also that as a particular existent, the *differentia* of a conscious being, it belongs to an order of existence, in which we must conceive it as in some way generated by something not itself, and its existence as the prior condition of its having contents or objects as a knowing process.

The order of knowledge and the order of existence (which latter is in knowledge derived, as we have seen, from the former) are thus the reverse of one another, or run in opposite directions, both being processes. But it is with the order of knowledge that we are specially concerned in philosophy; and it is in knowledge, that is, in consciousness as a knowing, that the ultimate data of experience lie. Till events or changes in the order of existence have produced into existence, or determined to exist, a state or process-content of consciousness, there is no knowledge from which the knowledge of an order of existence, or of the existence of anything, can be derived. But this derivation is based, not upon perception of the series of events or changes by which the state or process-content of consciousness has been produced, but upon features, or changes in features, of the process-content itself, which features or changes are immediately perceived in retrospection from what we call the present moment, and the perception of which is the prolongation of the same process-content into the future. In elucidation and support of the foregoing paragraphs I may refer to my *Metaphysic of Experience*, Book I, Ch. II, § 5; *Reflective Perception*, and more particularly to the first half of the section, Vol. I, pp. 72 to 91.

The place and function of consciousness as a knowing, the reason (so to speak) for its existence, thus lie in its being the evidence of everything else, and of itself in all its modes. Its knowledge of its own existence is immediate; or rather let us

say, to avoid misconception, our idea of existence itself, the meaning which we attach to the term, is derived from the immediate perception which the process-content of consciousness has of itself, in continuing as a process-content. The *meaning* of all terms belongs to consciousness as a knowing. Knowledge consists of consciousness. To use a paradoxical expression, nothing *matters* but consciousness. What else may exist besides consciousness as a knowing, or whether consciousness may be *causa sui*, that is, whether it is sole existent, or self-existent, are questions, the answers to which, if attainable at all, must be sought in the analysis of the process-content of consciousness as a knowing, which is the only source, as it is the only issue, of evidence. In all enquiries we begin with a knowing and we end with a knowing, and we are modifying our knowing throughout the process. But this does not imply or necessitate the thought, that in that process we can have true perceptions, or ideas, or thoughts, of such objects only as are or may be themselves part of the process of knowing, and owe their existence to that process. For it is only the knowledge of the independent existence of objects, not that independent existence itself, which is included in the process of knowing. In other words, Existence does not of necessity consist of consciousness, as knowledge does.

In philosophy we have to see what the analysis of consciousness as a knowing tells us on this point. And this must be an analysis without assumptions. The process-content of consciousness as a knowing, not as an existent process, is the object-matter to be analysed. To suppose that, because it is itself an existent process, therefore all that falls within it, in the sense of being its object as a knowing process, also falls within it, or is part of it, as an existent process, and cannot exist otherwise than as part of an existent process of consciousness, is an illegitimate assumption, founded on confusing the distinction between consciousness as a knowing and consciousness as an existent. Consciousness as a knowing may be a

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knowing of many other existents besides itself, as well as of the fact of their, and of its own, existence being independent of the knowledge which it has of them.

But all assumptions, and not only the one now signalised, must be put aside in the philosophical analysis of consciousness as a knowing. The true meaning of all the general terms we employ in analysis must first be ascertained and justified by that analysis, before their use can be anything but provisional; and as provisional, till that has been done, we must be content, and thankful, to employ them. The meaning of the term *Reality* is the special object of the present paper. And what we have to ascertain concerning it is this, what ultimate elements of consciousness, and what *de facto* unavoidable, inevitable, or constant conjunctions of them, are the constituents of the idea, or in the first instance give rise to the idea, which we designate provisionally by that term. We have, of course, at the outset of our philosophical analysis, a provisional idea of reality, derived from our pre-philosophic experience, which is our guide in the enquiry; and our purpose is to ascertain, by means of analysis, what form, if any, of that provisional idea is also the sole valid form of it, *de facto* unavoidable, and in harmony with other *de facto* unavoidable ideas, which are also derived from experience and ascertained by similar processes of analysis.

It is a fatal though very prevalent tendency in philosophy to treat some familiar ideas, that of reality for instance, as if their meaning was already ascertained by philosophical analysis, when in fact they are only provisional, and to use them as standards of truth, or tests of philosophic validity, forgetting that it is the ultimate constitution, or origin *in the first instance*, of these ideas, which in philosophy is the point in question. This is to ignore the *differentia* of philosophy, and to place it on the same footing as the positive sciences, practically denying its special characteristic, that of examining consciousness as a knowing, whereby it stands in correlation with, but also in

contradistinction from, all the other sciences. We then find ourselves asking, in the case of reality, Is *this* real? Is *that* real? and so on, instead of asking, What we mean by the term Reality, or what is the analysis, what the validity, of the idea. We are then doing actually, though perhaps unintentionally, what Kant for ever, by his failure, showed to be futile, when he worked out a theory of it—taking Categories to explain how we arrive at a consistent experience, instead of showing how categories, or any general terms, are derived from *de facto* inevitable experience. We are glorifying the *a priori*, that is, the constitution of some assumed Subject of consciousness.

There is no greater error, no greater delusion, than to take the distinction between Subject and Object as the ultimate basis of philosophy. It may be *true* that there is no consciousness without a Subject, as there is none without an Object. But this is not an immediate datum of consciousness, not an immediate piece of knowledge. The validity of both ideas, Subject and Object of consciousness, has to be ascertained by analysis of the content of consciousness, without calling in either an assumed Subject or an assumed Object to account for it. These are objects of provisional ideas derived from pre-philosophic experience, the ultimate constitution, or origin in the first instance, of which has to be ascertained by analysis, just as much as that of any other pre-philosophic ideas. You cannot in fact assume a Subject as the basis, or as part of the basis, of philosophy, without thereby changing philosophy into psychology. When we say *I*, and *We*, and so on, in philosophy, and speak of them as agents, as everywhere must be the case, since language is formed on a pre-philosophic basis, we must remember that we are using terms provisionally only, without prejudice to the results of philosophic analysis, whatever these results may be. We must remember also, that the very purpose of analysis is to give us back the *analysandum* in a different shape from itself, that is, in the shape of constituent elements and their mode

of conjunction, which account for, or correspond to, the *analysandum* as a whole, but do not contain it over again, as one of its own constituents. The validity or non-validity of the idea, in the true shape which it assumes under analysis, is the result at which the analysis aims. This may show that it has a true and valid meaning, though it may divest it of that explanatory character which it seemed to possess, when supposed to stand for an immediately known and unanalysable entity.

It is in the light of considerations like the foregoing that we must interpret such phrases as *Esse is Percipi*, which taken by themselves are susceptible of very different and conflicting constructions. If these considerations are true, when we say, or think, *Esse is Percipi*, our meaning can only be that the term *percipi* is the meaning of the term *esse*, or that *esse* (in its utmost generality or abstraction, including all its particulars, *i.e.*, all cases of *existere*, under it) is the object of *percipere*, or of consciousness (in its utmost generality) in its character of a knowing, not in its character of an existent; and *percipere* the evidence of *esse*, which is its *object* as a knowing. Our meaning cannot be (what it is often supposed to be) that the secret, or essence, or inner nature, in virtue of which *Esse* is *Esse*, or Being is Being, consists in *Percipi*, or is identical with the *percipere* of a percipient.

The logical fallacy of this latter interpretation is, that it supposes us to have some knowledge both of *esse* and of *percipere*, before we have any perception, consciousness, or knowledge at all, that we know them as different from each other, and that (so knowing them *a priori*) we proceed to ask of one of them, *viz.*, *esse*, not what it is, but upon what it depends, or in virtue of what it is *esse*. The phrase *Esse is Percipi* is then interpreted as if it was the answer to this illogically put question, and was an assertion that the inner nature or essence of Being was Knowing, instead of asserting that Being could only be thought of as the object of a Knowing.

Briefly stated the truth is this. *Esse is Percipi* expresses neither (1) that perception gives us a knowledge of the whole nature of being, or of any being, nor (2) that being, or any being, depends upon perception, either for its nature or for its existence, but (3) that we must think of being, and of every being, as at least the object of perception, independently of the question as to the existence of such a perception. For, in saying *esse is percipi*, nothing depends upon the mere existence of the perception, but all depends upon its nature as a reflective or self-objectifying process, i.e., upon the fact that, as it proceeds, it differentiates its content, perceiving part after part as *past*, that is, as *object*, different in point of time from the then present moment of perceiving, which will in its turn be perceived as having been a present moment of perceiving, or content of perception not yet objectified as past. The fact that a perception, when it exists, is perception and objectification of a content, not the fact that the perception itself exists, is that which determines the meaning of *Esse*.

Here perhaps I may be allowed to say, that this whole paper (barring minor corrections and additions, none of which affect the three preceding paragraphs) was written before seeing Mr. G. E. Moore's article "The Refutation of Idealism," in *Mind* for October, 1903, No. 48 N.S., containing his skilful dialectical attack on the logic of the phrase *Esse is Percipi*. Though I still see no reason to alter anything in what I have written, I am glad to recognise that Mr. Moore (if I have rightly understood him) rejects Idealism, however different from mine the route may be, by which he reaches his conclusion.

II. MATTER.

We are far away at present, I mean so far as this paper has as yet gone, from anything that can be called Reality. Or rather, if we use the term at all, there is no reason for prohibiting its application to anything which is or can be

thought of as an object of consciousness. Now the provisional idea of reality, with which we start in philosophy, and which we have to examine and, if requisite, to correct by philosophical analysis, I take to consist of three points, namely, the object (including event) called *real* must, first, exist or take place independently of the existence of a percipient; secondly, it must not be illusory, but, in unchanged circumstances, must continue to be or to appear as it is or appears at any given moment; thirdly, it must have some efficient operation in changing or maintaining the state of things around it. Stated briefly, by the *real* is meant, in pre-philosophic thought, the opposite of that which is appearance only. Now whence arises this distinction in the first instance, or what are the facts in actual experience which compel us to perceive it? And will they justify us, or in what form will they justify us, in maintaining it as a true distinction, and the idea of reality as a true idea, when examined by philosophical analysis?

The answer will be found, as I shall now briefly endeavour to show, in those phenomena of actual experience which compel us to form the idea of Matter, and of an external material world, in the first instance; or which, in other words, give us our first perception of Matter and an external material world, including our own organisms as material objects which are spatially inclusive of, as well as different from, our consciousness which is the perception of them. The first formation of three cardinal ideas, or original perception of three objects involving those ideas, will then be found to be included in that perception which we call briefly the perception of Matter, namely (1) the differentiation, in point of kind, of consciousness from some of its objects, which are then thought of as not-consciousness, (2) the local separation of consciousness from the greater part of these latter objects, by its localisation in one of them, the physical organism, and (3) the idea of efficiency or real conditioning, derived from the perceived fact, that certain states of consciousness arise only, but then arise

inevitably, on the coming of two or more material objects into contact with one another.

The perception of Matter, it will thereby be shown, gives us our first perception of Reality; that is, the idea of Reality is derived from the idea of Matter, which in its turn is derived from facts of immediate experience. And the question which is commonly stated as that of the Reality of Matter, as if the idea of Reality was an *a priori* or standard idea, under which Matter must be brought if we would conceive it as other than an idea, is thus changed into a question concerning the nature and the truth of our idea of Reality, and the answer shown to depend, not on any *a priori* concept or provisional idea, but upon facts of actual experience, namely, those which together constitute our perception of Matter. In what I have here alleged and am about to allege concerning the reality of Matter, I do not think there is anything which is not to be found in my *Metaphysic of Experience*, Book I, Chapters IV to VIII inclusive, though I here attempt to bring the essential points together in a single conspectus. Indeed I think there is little, if anything, in this whole paper, which will be new to readers of that work.

The perception of Matter is a complex perception, and it is evident that no attempt can be made to ascertain the historical order or genetic sequence of those experiences which are its constituents, or the succession of steps in its formation which depend upon attention to the repeated combinations and changes in the combinations of those constituent experiences spoken of in the last paragraph but one, and of the still more simple elements of those experiences. We have no data upon which any such historical enquiry could proceed, the reason being that they are facts belonging, for the most part at any rate, to the period of infancy, which it is beyond the power of memory to recall. We have complex experiences which we can analyse into their constituents, and when we take either these complex experiences or their constituents, or the

elements of those constituents, one by one, as being such and such *in the first instance*, what is intended is, not to indicate their position in the historical order of the genesis of knowledge, but to insist on what they are *per se*, apart from association with other facts or ideas which, in pre-philosophic experience, may have become so closely bound up with them, as to appear to furnish a reason or explanation of them. It is of course true, that whatever empirical state of consciousness appears anywhere, in order of knowledge simply, must also have had a first appearance, relatively to its own later appearances, in order of the genesis of knowledge; but it by no means follows that this first appearance is prior in time to that of other empirical states of consciousness, in that same order of genesis. It is simply as an aid to abstraction in analysing, that the phrase *in the first instance* must be understood.

But now for the facts. It is solely with the content of consciousness as a knowing, which is the evidence of everything, itself included, that we have to do; not with consciousness as an existent, or with consciousness as a psychological function, both of which, as shown above, derive their meaning, or are known to be what they are, from consciousness as a knowing. When, therefore, I proceed to state, that our perception of Matter is formed out of perceptions belonging to the psychological functions of sight and touch, I am using these functions solely as means, and the only means at my disposal, of designating the experiences belonging to consciousness as a knowing, upon which I mean to rely as contributing to constitute the perception of Matter; I must not be held to be assuming the existence of those functions, or founding any conclusions upon their supposed nature or capacities. I do not assume the existence of a *Psyche*, any more than I assume the existence of Matter. To do so would for a metaphysician be illogical. The sense of sight gives us no immediate perception of its own organ, the eye; neither does touch give us any

immediate perception of its organ, the sensitive skin surface. It is solely the immediate objects, that is, the contents of these sensations objectified in consciousness (which as shown above is a reflective or objectifying process) which can furnish legitimate grounds for relying on the validity of the complex perception of Matter, which they compel us to construct by their varying combinations and dissociations. We construct it, no doubt, by the active exercise of attention, thought, and reasoning; but here again nothing in my argument is built upon, no conclusion is drawn from, the nature or capacities of these psychological functions; it is the facts belonging to the immediate content of consciousness which compel us to attend, think, and reason as we do, in constructing the complex perception of Matter. And it is such processes as those employed in this construction, though not these processes alone, which originally give us the data from which our knowledge of the existence, nature, and capacities of these psychological functions is derived.

Now visual and tactual sensations normally occur in conjunction with each other, we experience sensations of both kinds simultaneously. And, as contents of consciousness as a knowing, the sensations of both kinds are spatially extended. Both are what we may call surface sensations, and these sensations themselves are extended, the sensations themselves occupy two of the dimensions of space, meaning here by the term *dimensions* that they have length and breadth inseparably united with their sense-quality. And this I take to be an indisputable and cardinal fact of immediate experience. The sensations themselves have spatial extension in the two dimensions (so to call them) of length and breadth.

The next point I would notice is, that attention to these two sensations in combination, as when we see and touch what we afterwards call a small object which we can grasp with the hand, gives us our first notion of such objects, and adds the perception of the third dimension (so to call it) of space, depth,

or distance other than superficial, to the perception of the two first dimensions, which belong to sensations of both kinds severally. These combinations are our first perceptions of solid objects, as we afterwards call them. So far as we have gone at present, they consist of surface sensations enclosing a space of three dimensions. And it may be noted, that our conception of solidity never gets beyond or away from this original perception. Space in three dimensions, tangible on the surface, is essential to it, however far we may go in dividing any so called solid object. Solid matter is a continuum of solidity, divisible *ad intra*, though not necessarily divisible *in infinitum*, as the space is which it occupies, or which its tangible surfaces enclose. That is to say, minima of volume, atoms of mass, are conceivable, anything less than which would not be matter, or a material solid.

Thirdly, we obtain from attention to these two sensations, in alternating and varying combination and dissociation with each other, our first perception of what we afterwards call our own body, as the constant central object of a spatial panorama in three dimensions of space, a panorama containing various solid objects, moving and stationary, in ever varying relations of distance relatively to each other and to the constant central object of the panorama. All these contents composing or contained in the panorama are contents of consciousness. Some are visual contents only, others tactual as well, while those which in certain cases are tactual only, as when we touch or feel in the dark, or with eyes shut, become also visual as well as tactual in changed circumstances, and the visual and tactual contents of sensation then combine and harmonise with each other into one complex content, or single object of consciousness, single because occupying one and the same portion of space. And this is the case with that central object of the panorama which we afterwards call our own body. In short, we then have experience of what we afterwards call an external and material world, a world which, as then

experienced, consists of nothing but contents of consciousness as a knowing.

Now up to this point, that is, so far as our analytical description of the experience of visual and tactual sensations has gone at present, notwithstanding that this experience is experience of an external and material world, there has been nothing but consciousness in knowledge, that is, in consciousness as a knowing; nothing but what we now call consciousness. But the idea of consciousness has never presented itself or occurred therein; for there has been nothing presented, no state of consciousness has occurred, from which it could be distinguished; it is not known or recognised as consciousness; only its several contents have been known and recognised, because different and distinguishable from one another; but the whole which they compose has not been named or classed—simply because nothing which is not-consciousness has occurred. Perception and object perceived have not as yet, in any case or class of cases, been distinguished as different in kind from one another.

If it should be objected, that we may or even must have had perceptions, though not of what I have called not-consciousness, yet of *unconsciousness*, that is, intervals or interruptions of consciousness, which are not the contrary but the contradictory of consciousness, and that these suffice to give us a distinct idea of consciousness, my reply is this. Such intervals of unconsciousness must either be perceived as void portions of the chain or time-stream of consciousness as a knowing, in which case they are still parts belonging to consciousness as a knowing, and do not lead to the distinct recognition of consciousness, or else they pre-suppose the distinct recognition of consciousness, that is, suppose it to have already taken place, in being opposed to it as its contradictory, unconsciousness. That is to say, the occurrence of perceived intervals of unconsciousness does not in any way involve or lead up to what I have called the recognition of consciousness, or suffice to give us a distinct idea of it.

What, then, are the facts or the circumstances, or are there any, which in the first instance, that is, without aid from other sources than the experiences now described, compel us to break up this undivided phenomenon into consciousness and not-consciousness, while retaining in consciousness the positive sense-quality of that part of the whole which we distinguish as not-consciousness; or in other words, to distinguish the undivided phenomenon into perception, which is consciousness, and object perceived, which is not-consciousness? This, I think, is the crucial question.

I proceed to show that there are such facts, and that they are to be found in our tactual experience, in conjunction always with facts of visual experience. The compelling facts are two: first, the fact that one and the same sensation cannot be in two or more places at one and the same time; secondly, the fact that what we afterwards call the primary properties of matter are an exact replica of the tactual sensations which, in combination with visual sensations, go to constitute our original knowledge of solid objects, and which we afterwards call our perception of those primary properties, that is, of matter. The fact that one and the same sensation cannot be in two places at once compels us to duplicate in thought the content of that sensation, to locate one of its two members in the central object of our panorama of consciousness, as a state of consciousness which is a perception of the other member, and to refer that other member to a non-central object of our panorama, to which it belongs as a constitutive property, perceived but not perceiving, that is, as something which is not-consciousness.

Let us now see more particularly how this is. A solid object as above described comes, let us suppose, into visually apparent contact with the constant central object of our panorama of consciousness, that is, with our body. A sensation or set of sensations of touch and pressure occurs. Now to which of the two objects, the central or the non-central, does this sensation belong? (I speak of the whole set of sensations

in the singular for the sake of simplicity.) In which is it located? It seems to belong to both; indeed to enter into both, as a constituent contributing to constitute both of them as solid objects. The inseparability of the distinguishable elements, the extension-element and the sense-element, in the least and simplest phenomena of sight and touch, as also the inseparability of the distinguishable elements, the time-element and the sense-element, in all phenomena whatever, was shown in my *Time and Space* (1865), Part I, Ch. II, § 11, "Elements and Aspects of Phenomena." And this fact, which is a fact of experience, I for one have never ceased to insist upon, as fundamental in philosophy. The appearance just spoken of therefore, should it occur, would be illusory. One and the same sensation cannot be in two separate objects at once. As a matter of fact, we cannot imagine or conceive it; in trying to do so, we *ipso facto* break up the one sensation into two. Observe what happens when contact, the visually apparent contact, between the two solid objects is broken. The tactual sensation ceases to exist as a sensation, but in its stead there arises, or rather there remains alone in consciousness, a representation of that tactual sensation as belonging both to the central and to the moving or non-central object; all three alike, I mean the two represented sensations and the representation of them, making part of the hitherto undifferentiated panorama of consciousness. This is the fact of experience, this representing process is the process of experiencing, which breaks up the panorama of consciousness as a knowing into consciousness and not-consciousness, the part which is not-consciousness being perceived but not in turn perceiving, though still belonging, as a perceived part, to the panorama. We must now see more particularly how this is.

Representation or redintegration is an essential part of that process-content of consciousness as a knowing, which gives us our original panorama of consciousness. Without it, there is

no continuous consciousness at all. But representation is a term containing two meanings; it means at one time a represented, at another, a representing, representation of the same content. Of these, the represented representation, or memory image, of a sensation, as in the case of the tactual sensation now in question, is necessarily represented as belonging to the solid object or objects which the sensation originally contributed to constitute in our panorama, a panorama which, as continuous in time, has throughout one and the same central object; but the representing representation of the sensation, as will presently appear, can be conceived as belonging to that central object alone. But first (to keep strictly to our present instance) of the tactual sensation represented as belonging to the moving non-central object.

If we imagine or try to imagine this represented tactual sensation as making part of the process-content of consciousness as a knowing, that is, as belonging to a perceiving as well as perceived object, we can then no longer regard it as making part of the same panorama as before, which, so far as our present knowledge goes, is identified as one and the same by the constancy, or continuity in time, of its central object. The moving non-central solid object, to which the represented tactual sensation belongs, and which we are now endeavouring to imagine as a perceiving as well as a perceived object, must in that case (on the analogy of our own original panorama) have a panorama of its own, of which it is the constant central object, when perceiving as we are now imagining it to perceive. And this is no doubt the case, when we think of such solid moving objects as seats of consciousness, that is, as persons. But as continuing to belong to one and the same panorama of consciousness, the tactual sensation, represented as belonging to the moving non-central object, cannot be represented as consciousness, but must, along with that non-central object which it contributes to constitute, be represented as an object which is not-consciousness, perceived but not perceiving. It must,

therefore, as consciousness, be represented as located in, and in some way or other as belonging to, the body, which is the central object of the panorama.

Briefly to sum up the argument. The tactual sensation we have been speaking of can only be in one of the two objects, the central or the non-central, of the panorama, this panorama remaining the same as hitherto, that is, continuing to have the same central object. It must, therefore, as a sensation, be in the central, and not in the non-central, object of the panorama, since, if it were in the non-central, it would be in a different panorama, a panorama in which that non-central object would be central. That is to say, there would be a breach in the continuity of consciousness as a knowing, a breach which, besides involving a change of the object-matter spoken of, namely, the panorama to which the central and the non-central objects alike belong, would leave the dilemma which has been occupying us in precisely the same unsolved condition as before. And the same reasoning holds good of the representation representing the sensation. On the other hand the represented sensation and the represented representation of it must by the same reasoning be located in the non-central object of the panorama, and conceived as properties contributing to constitute it as an object which is not-consciousness.

If we suppose, as I think we must, that the experience now described as containing acts or processes of sensation, perception, representation, and reasoning, takes place in the period of early infancy, we must of course suppose also, that it takes place without any recognition by the infant of the nature of the process, or of its several steps or component elements. He has the sensations, perceptions, and representations, and he performs the reasoning, which we can now recognise, distinguish, and describe as what they severally are, in terms derived from later knowledge, that is, ultimately, from analysis of our own later actual experiences. Still the infant's experience is not the less real because he cannot recognise or analyse it as it

actually occurs to him, or because we cannot now reproduce, in memory or in imagination, the thoughts and feelings composing that experience of his as it actually occurred. Who shall say what an act of reasoning *feels like* to the infant?

But now observe the great and unique significance of the step which we have now taken. We have obtained, indeed have had forced upon us by experience, our first idea of existence as distinguished from consciousness, for the question as to location, the question *where* as distinguished from *what*, is a question concerning the existence of that concerning which it is put. Besides this we have obtained our first idea of the existent aspect of consciousness, as distinguished from its aspect as a knowing; and we have also obtained our first idea of concrete consciousness itself as an existent, of its location as such a concrete existent in its own central object, the body, and also of certain different modes of it when so located; that is to say, we have obtained our first idea of existent consciousness and its modes, which afterwards, in their character of existents, become the object-matter of psychology. The perception of the difference between the two subjectivities, the philosophical and the psychological, has here its origin; for we have obtained our first idea of an object possessing, but not being, consciousness.

Observe, moreover, that the sensation and its representing representation do not cease to make part of consciousness as a knowing, when, owing to their location being ascertained, they are thought of as existents also. Both our original tactual sensation and the representing representation which represents it are alike, of necessity, located by thought in that central object of our panorama which we call our body, the representing representation (though it still continues to be a knowing) losing, as an existent state of consciousness, that definite spatial extension which still remains an essential element in the sensation, and in the representing representation of it as a knowing. And in the moving solid object, in which we locate

the represented representation, or object as we afterwards call it, of the original tactual sensation, there is nothing represented but what is a repetition or duplicate of that original sensation. The surface feelings of touch and pressure, when represented and located in the object, become in thought, or are thought of as, the primary properties of matter, namely, space occupation, hardness, and resistance to pressure, properties which are actually perceived in tactual sensation.

Of what these properties are *in themselves*, that is, if we attempt to imagine them as separate entities or agencies, acting in, through, or upon matter, as we do when we give them separate single names, such as Force, Energy, or Agency, we have no notion whatever, save what we gather from the sensations by which we know them, which belong to our consciousness as a knowing, and which they are said to cause or produce in us. They consist of the represented motion or tendency to motion, which is represented as belonging to matter in all its parts, down to its minutest particles, another mode of representing space occupation, hardness, and resistance to pressure. These properties must in the first instance be thought of as objects of consciousness as a knowing, not as an unknowable entity or agency, or *Ding-an-sich*, as would be the case if we started with an *a priori* idea of Reality, manifesting itself in or as the phenomena of consciousness. Force, Energy, or Agency, taken as an entity acting in, through, or upon matter, but having an existence separable from it, is a fiction, the fruit of a wrong analysis of the experiences which constitute the perception of matter, wrong because it mixes up with their analysis an attempt at accounting for their genesis.

These considerations bring us to another most essential point in the conception which experience compels us to form of matter; and this is the third of the three constituent experiences, mentioned above as necessarily contributing to our perception of it. Observe what happens when the visually apparent contact, after being broken, is renewed between the

central and the non-central solid objects of our panorama, in combination with the ideas of them which we are now supposing to have been formed. The renewal of the contact is immediately attended by a new tactual sensation, which would not occur without it. The contact causes (to use the ordinary term) the occurrence of the new sensation, but it cannot be said to cause its nature as a tactual sensation, or as a representation. These belong to consciousness as a knowing, and cannot be thought of as caused by anything, consisting as they do in ultimates, or combinations of ultimates, in knowledge. The nature of the thing causing and the thing caused are both assumed as known, provisionally at least, before the question of a causal connection between them can arise. At the same time, the occurrence of the contact is essential to the occurrence of the new tactual sensation, and that down to the minutest particulars of change, so that any difference in either of the bodies, or in the mode of their coming into contact, would be attended by a corresponding change in the sensation. In this respect the two solid objects and their contact are more properly characterised as *real conditions*, in contradistinction from causes, of the sensation, which latter term implies, that the whole nature of the consequent as well as its occurrence, is determined by the contact. The Law of Uniformity does not account for the qualities of the things which it connects, though knowledge of it enables prediction.

From this experience of Matter, that is, of the contact of solid external objects with the body, which is also a solid object and the constant central object of our panorama, we form, I think, our original conception of Reality, that original conception upon which we mould our ideas of the reality of whatever else we call real, though we may apply the term to very different and even to immaterial agencies and objects. The real in matter lies in its primary properties, which from the subjective point of view are known as represented tactual sensations, and from the objective or existential point of view

are thought of as determining by contact with our bodies, but independently of our ideas or volitions, the occurrence of new tactual sensations in us, the same in kind as those which we have already received from them. A tangible object is at once the object and the cause, or rather real condition, of a sensation of touch. That we know it only by sensation and representation, modes of consciousness, is no argument against its existence as represented, independently of the existence of consciousness. Its efficacy in producing a new tactual sensation, by its action on coming into contact with our body, is the evidence of its independent existence and activity, that is, of what we call its *reality*. We think of it as existing, in order of real genesis, prior to the sensations and representations which it causes or determines to exist in us, while, in order of the genesis of knowledge, these sensations and representations are prior to the knowledge which we have of its nature and existence. And it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how anything whatever which we call real, not being immediately known to us, even if it should be something non-material, can escape from this law of mediate representation, that is to say, of being thought to exist in the shape and with the qualities which compose our representing representation of it, objectified as its properties.

Touch holds an unique position among the avenues of knowledge. It is the only sense, the only kind of feeling, which has an objectified representation or replica of its own content for its real condition as well as its object. In handling a solid object we have presented in sensations the very thing which gives rise to those sensations at the time. Moreover, all other sensations, feelings, and states or process-contents of consciousness, not only have not such replicas of themselves as their real conditions, but, whatever their own kind or quality may be, they have real conditions of one kind only, and that the same as in the case of touch, namely, motions and interactions of material particles, in which term all modes of matter

in motion, as, *e.g.*, ethereal vibrations, electrical charges, and cerebral activities, must be held to be included. Sight, for instance, is evidence of the existence of ethereal vibrations proceeding or reflected from the object said to be visible, impinging upon our organ of vision, and evoking the visual sensation, quite different in point of kind from tactual sensation. Thought again, and emotion, in all their modes, seem to depend for their occurrence upon cerebral activities, in whatever way we may conceive these activities to be related to the action of external objects upon the organism.

Matter, then, seems to be not only that object which gives us our first conception of Reality, but also that which includes every kind of real condition of which we have positive knowledge. All human knowledge is conditioned upon the real existence and operation of matter, in endlessly varied modes of motion and their combinations. At the same time, while giving us our conception of Reality, and our conception of Real Condition, it gives us no knowledge whatever of its own real conditioning. It does not explain its own existence, while the conceptions to which it gives rise compel us to regard that existence as requiring and capable of explanation, if only modes of consciousness were accessible to us, other than those which we derive from matter itself. The possible modes or qualities of consciousness must be conceived by us as unlimited in number, since we have the experience of an indefinite number of them, and know of nothing by which that number can be limited. The nature and operations of matter limit the number of modes of consciousness which material beings can experience, but within this number is inevitably included the thought of a world of reality and real conditioning, evidenced (though not to us) by modes of consciousness which are not within our experience, and containing the real conditions of our material world.

III. SUBJECT.

We may see from what precedes, that the result of approaching experience from the subjective side (philosophically not psychologically subjective), that is, of enquiring what we know of things rather than what we tacitly assume them to be, as if we knew *a priori* what *being* meant, is to substitute the philosophical distinction between real conditions and their conditionates, a distinction arrived at by analysis of the process-content of consciousness, for the pre-philosophic distinctions of Substances and their Attributes, Agents and their Actions, Causes and their Effects, in which the conceptions of Substance, Agent, and Cause are taken as ultimate and explanatory, and to bring the phenomena, which were previously referred to one or other of the three latter distinctions, under the former single distinction, as particular cases of it. But it is also evident, that this does not enable the conception of Matter, to which all positively known real conditions have been shown to belong, to take the place or perform the function previously supposed to be held or performed by one or other of the three pre-philosophic conceptions of Substance, Agent, or Cause. To think in this way would be to ignore the result arrived at, since it would be attempting to bring the conception of Real Condition under one or other of those pre-philosophic conceptions.

The substitution of the conception of Real Condition for that of Cause is no mere change in nomenclature, but has important consequences in psychology. It enables an alternative hypothesis concerning the genesis and development of consciousness to be offered to psychologists. It makes it possible for any one to maintain, that the function of being the proximate real condition of consciousness, as distinguished from its cause, can (to say the least) be equally well performed by a material as by an immaterial agent or agency, without his thereby incurring the imputation of being a Materialist in

philosophy. And the practical advantage of adopting this alternative can hardly be overrated. Briefly stated it is this, that a scientific physiological psychology can be thereby incorporated with, and assigned a definite position in, a philosophy in the strictest sense of the term. But now to turn to our present question—the term Subject.

The conception of Subject in current philosophy, in which it is taken as if it were an independent philosophical conception, and not merely as another side or aspect of a concrete conscious being or organism, is nothing but one or other of those three pre-philosophic conceptions mentioned above (substance, agent, cause), taken as ultimate and explanatory of the phenomena of consciousness and conscious action. It is the conception of an immaterial conscious being, or conscious agency, inhabiting and actuating the concrete conscious organism, and so accounting for the phenomena of consciousness and conscious action which it displays—a conception which merely repeats as an explanation the very thing to be explained. But these phenomena, as shown above, are divisible into objects known as real conditions of consciousness, which are not-consciousness, and states or processes of consciousness which are conditionates of them. And this division neither is, nor professes to be, any explanation or theory of the phenomena, into which we are compelled by analysis to introduce it. Philosophy is of necessity the ultimate formulation of the questioning we put to the Universe in which we find ourselves, but it does not change that questioning into unquestionable knowledge, nor does it assume that it is of necessity capable of attaining a speculative conception explanatory of the nature of that Universe, which is the object-matter of its enquiry. It may be found to issue in the attainment of a conception which can be shown to be the highest which we are capable of attaining, though not sufficient as an explanation of the Universe. Now the real conditions of consciousness must, we have seen, be conceived

as something which is not-consciousness, whatever further conception we may form of it or them, whether as material or as non-material. But the current conception of Subject in philosophy is an attempt to override this division, by identifying consciousness with something, not otherwise specified, which, besides being consciousness, is also its Substance, Agent, or Cause. It is virtually an assertion, that the conception of a Conscious Being is incapable of analysis, and ultimate alike in thought and in existence. Generalising this fallacious conception would, it is evident, supply a ready though fallacious explanation or theory of the Universe, by supposing it to be imagined as a single vast Person.

If, then, we adopt in philosophy, as I think we must, the term Subject as a philosophical term, and not as another mode of designating the conscious organism, we must restrict it to mean either something which is consciousness, or something which is not-consciousness but which is among its real conditions. And we have to make our choice between these alternatives. Now consciousness, not agency, is the essential characteristic of what, in philosophy, we want the term Subject to express. Subjectivity implies consciousness, implies *knowing* as distinguished from *object known*. At the same time it is not consciousness as a general conception, but a particular, individual, and existent consciousness, that we want to express, and this the term Subject necessarily implies. Accordingly we must say, that the consciousness in any sequence or grouping of contents of consciousness connected in memory, which at any present moment is being continued into the future, is that which is most properly called the Subject, being a condition of knowing, *conditio cognoscendi*, in relation both to its past already objectified states or contents, and to its own continuation as consciousness into the future, of which it is the pre-requisite. The memory bond is that which makes it a single unified consciousness. The Subject is thus consciousness of itself, that is, of consciousness, not of a supposed substance, agent, or cause of itself. And this is the

true meaning of the pre-philosophic terms "I" and "Self," when these are taken as philosophical terms with a definite and ascertained meaning. "*Subject*," "*I*," and "*Self*," are terms which in philosophical use are applicable solely to consciousness, as distinguished from any Being or Agency which, as such, is not-consciousness.

I should here observe that the opposite alternative as to the meaning of the term Subject was the one adopted in my *Metaphysic of Experience*, Book III, Ch. I, § 4 (Vol. III, pp. 59 to 78), where it was taken to mean the sum of the proximate real conditions of consciousness. That is its true meaning in Psychology, which I was then considering. But we also want the term in Philosophy proper. And there is no reason why we should not adopt it in both, with a different meaning in each, so long as we clearly discriminate its philosophical from its psychological use. In philosophy it is a *conditio cognoscendi*, in psychology a *conditio existendi*.

Light is thus thrown upon the formation of the pre-philosophic conceptions of "I" and "Self," which being embodied in all language exercise so powerful an influence upon philosophical thought, in preventing analysis, and securing their own adoption in philosophy, as if they were philosophical conceptions. For we have seen (1) that there is no immediate experience of an Ego or Self, as a Substance, Agent, or Cause, that is, of a Feeler, Perceiver, Thinker, or Doer, as distinguished from a Feeling, Perceiving, Thinking, or Doing, and (2) that there is a positive experience from which the existence of proximate real conditions of consciousness may be inferred, the existence, namely, of neural and neuro-cerebral activities in living conscious organisms, which activities are never immediately presented as contents of the consciousness which they proximately condition. Now since pre-philosophic thought invariably assumes that, in order of existence, there must exist a doer, before a doing of any kind can take place, that is, since it always in thought places a doer before a doing, referring the

existence of the doer (not of his doing) to some immediately preceding real condition, and so on *in infinitum*; and since, in the case of consciousness, we are conscious of modes of being conscious—feeling, perceiving, thinking, doing—without being conscious of any proximate real condition of them; we resort to an expedient, in pre-philosophic thought, to supply this absence of an immediately perceived proximate real condition by the idea of an agent *sui generis*, an agent whose agency consists in modes of being conscious, and upon whom those modes can re-act so as to modify his subsequent action. It is thus, I think, what I have ventured to call the pre-philosophic conceptions of “I” and “Self” arise, conceptions which are unobjectionable so long as they are frankly accepted as what they are, namely, pre-philosophic designations of individual conscious beings, also called Persons, designations always calling for analysis; but which are fatal in philosophy, that is, when treated as ultimate, true, and unanalysable conceptions; for when so treated they not only put a stop to further analysis, but appear of themselves to secure a basis for a theory of the Universe, by identifying all agency with consciousness. The conceptions of a concrete conscious organism, and of an “I,” “Self,” or “Subject,” which is consciousness and agent or agency in one, are alike pre-philosophic, and cannot be adopted as ultimate conceptions, incapable of analysis, in philosophy.

The fact that in conscious process and conscious action, both volitional and non-volitional, we are never immediately aware of the neural or cerebral activities upon which that conscious process or action proximately depends, is the fact which not only enables, but almost irresistibly compels us to look for the agency of the process or action within the consciousness; that is, so long as we have not acquired or, having acquired, disregard the knowledge of the existence of these neural and cerebral activities, or in other words confine our view to what is sometimes called introspection alone, which is virtually to assume that nothing but consciousness exists. The whole real

mechanism, so to speak, of consciousness goes on without our being immediately aware of it, aware as we immediately are only of the consciousness which proximately depends upon it. But it is a fatal error in philosophy to treat this real mechanism as non-existent, its existence and its function, as the proximate real condition of consciousness, being established by analysis of the contents of consciousness itself without assumptions.

Now it is on introspection alone, disregarding all knowledge of the mechanism, that all our ordinary thought and ordinary language concerning conscious process and conscious action are founded. Everything that we call a motive or a determinant of conscious process or action is a state or process-content of consciousness ;—some sensation or perception, some pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, representation or idea, wish, interest, emotion, thought, anticipation, purpose, volition. The laws of association are ordinarily held to be laws expressing connections directly obtaining between states of consciousness. All conduct, we say, is determined by motives, and no motive is ever anything but some state or mode of consciousness. The agency in consciousness is thus found, or seems to be found, within the consciousness itself. By disregarding the real mechanism we erect consciousness itself into a system of what we call purely mental or psychical processes and actions, a system having its agency within itself. In the ordinary or pre-philosophic use of the terms *I*, *We*, *Self*, or *Subject*, we do not enter on the consideration of the seat of the agency implied in those terms ; we take them to designate concrete self-conscious agents, without further analysis of them. It is only to concrete self-conscious agents, not to their constituents taken severally, that Moral Responsibility can be conceived as attaching. The Freedom of action attaches, when it exists, to the mechanism or real conditioning alone, and is pre-supposed in moral responsibility. But moral responsibility includes both constituents, the real action of the mechanism, and the consciousness which is dependent upon it.

But the disregard of the mechanism is arbitrary, and consequently the independence of the psychical or mental system, having its agency within it, is imaginary. Once admit the existence of the mechanism, and its relation to consciousness as determining the occurrence of its states and contents, and the mode of applying this conception in explanation of the whole course of conscious process and action is clear; that is to say, no new difficulty arises in applying it, such as to call for the supposition of a real agency within consciousness itself. I do not say that there is no difficulty in seeing how merely physical movements, actions and re-actions, in living nerve or brain matter which is not-consciousness, movements not initiated or directed by feeling or thought, can bring about trains of consciousness which are called rational because they are apparently so initiated and directed, that is, in which conscious purpose seems to be the guiding motive. A great deal has still to be done both in facing and overcoming this difficulty.

But the mode of applying the conception in question is clear. Say, for instance, to take the case of volition, where the difficulty just spoken of is most apparent, that in a case of conscious choice between alternatives, the idea of the one is more pleasureable than that of the other, or that it is the idea of an action which is right while the other action is wrong or dubious, and that I select and resolve accordingly—what really takes place is, not that the more pleasureable idea, or the idea of right as compared to wrong or dubious, determines the occurrence of the state of mind called selection or resolve, but that the cerebral activity conditioning that idea, in interaction with the cerebral activity conditioning the alternative idea, determines the occurrence of the cerebral activity conditioning the state of consciousness called selection or resolve, which latter cerebral activity again conditions the efferent neuro-cerebral activity requisite to produce the presentations, if any, which are involved in what we call the realisation of the

selected idea, or the carrying out of the resolve. The course of the action runs entirely, so to speak, through the activities of the mechanism and their interaction; it does not run at all through the states or processes of consciousness which they condition. And the same account obviously holds good of other cases of conscious process or action, of the most varied kinds, from those in which the motive seems to be a simple sense-presentation, as where we withdraw the hand from a hot coal which we have inadvertently touched, to those in which the motive seems to be some complex moral idea, or some intense emotion, or vividly felt desire, whatever may be its kind, or the rank it may hold in the scale of moral and spiritual significance. There is always some activity in the mechanism which determines its occurrence and its intensity, and in which resides that efficiency in contributing to direct the course of action, which we wrongly attribute to the feeling or idea itself in calling it a *motive*. When psychologists talk glibly, as they so often do, of the undoubted influence which mental or psychical states, ideas, thoughts, affections, desires, volitions, and so on, exert on the body and bodily actions, they forget, as it seems to me, the high probability (to say the least) that psychical states may be themselves conditioned, not upon a "mind," or psychical agency within consciousness, but upon neuro-cerebral processes, and that their supposed effects may be conditioned upon the continued operation of those same processes.

It is solely to express this relation of consciousness to the mechanism which proximately conditions it, that consciousness is rightly called an *epiphenomenon*. As consciousness simply, it does not act as a motive in conscious process and action. But this is not to give the mechanism alone the place or function of the whole conscious being, nor is to deprive consciousness simply of its own place and function in the scheme of things. We cannot but analyse conscious process or action into its two constituents, the mechanism and the consciousness. And it

must never be forgotten, especially in calling consciousness an *epiphenomenon*, that its ultimate nature or qualities as such stand altogether outside any possibility of being accounted for by any cause or real condition whatever. They are ultimate data of knowledge, from which our very idea of cause or of real condition is originally derived. We indeed receive them as data, through channels the nature and existence of which we infer from them, after having received them; previously to which inference we do not recognise them or think of them as data. Our whole knowledge immediate and inferential thus consists of consciousness, which only in point of its occurrence and genesis can be accounted for; the real conditions accounting for these latter being inferred objects, not consisting of consciousness, which objects, however, give us no insight into their own causes or real conditions. And such causes or real conditions we must of necessity think they have. The very same evidence which forces us to infer their real existence, as part and parcel of a real physical world of Matter, forces us also to infer, that they along with the rest of that world depend for their nature and existence upon some real world or worlds, other than themselves, the nature of which cannot possibly be inferred from anything we know, or can ever get to know, of their own nature and activities as physical or material existents. The evidence for the real existence and efficiency of Matter is also evidence for the real existence and efficiency of the Supra-material or Unseen.

To return to the place and function of consciousness as a constituent of conscious process and action, we have seen that it is not an efficient link or motive therein. All the agency or efficiency therein belongs to the other constituent, the living nerve or brain mechanism. What, then, is the place or function of the consciousness? It is the evidence of the nature and direction of the activities of the mechanism; not of course of its physiological structure and activities, or of the laws which it obeys as living and organised matter, but of its character,

tendency, and value, as known from the consciousness itself, which is its conditionate. It is the knowledge which the concrete conscious being has of his own nature and activities as a conscious being, and therefore of the mechanism or active constituent of that being, when once the two constituents are distinguished from each other as we have now distinguished them. And the evidence thus afforded is of the highest significance. Briefly stated it is to the effect, that in all conscious process and action, volitional and non-volitional alike, the tendency or direction of the activities of the mechanism is from the bad to the good, from the good to the better, and not *vice versa*. We shrink from pain and seek pleasure, involuntarily as well as voluntarily, and all voluntary action is indisputably directed towards the attainment of some as yet unattained end or good. There is, I think, no serious controversy on the question of direction or tendency. The only difference made by an analysis of conscious process or action like the present is, that it attributes that direction and tendency solely to the mechanism, excluding the attendant consciousness, which it considers solely as conditionate and evidence of the direction and tendency of the mechanism, not as also contributing to determine it. But it is the mechanism, and not the consciousness, which is the real link, or link of real conditioning, connecting us as real and material beings with the real supra-material and unseen world, of which it is the real conditionate.

It is a Power (using this term in the most general sense) with which it thus connects us, but a Power of whose nature we can know nothing but what is involved in that Hope which is inseparable from, because it is the emotional element in, the tendency of our living mechanism to the good, combined with the thought of the infinite possibilities (so to call them) of the nature and qualities of consciousness, which as qualities are wholly independent of causation or conditioning. It is an infinite and eternal Reality, known to exist, but also known to

transcend any positive or definite conception which we can form of it, though at the same time a Reality which we can only represent to ourselves by ideas derived from our positive knowledge, ideas which are thus of necessity anthropomorphic. It is this Hope, inseparable from connected consciousness, combined with the thought of the infinite possibilities of consciousness, and not any speculative conception of the nature of the Divine Being, which is the living root and well-spring of religion. For it leads us individually to put Faith in a Divine Being, infinitely higher and greater than humanity, of whose nature we can form no speculative conception, but whom we of necessity name and think of in terms derived from human knowledge. Religion means for us—the relying upon, and responding to, the Goodness of an omnipotent and omniscient Reality. And the highest form of goodness, unalloyed, is Love in the Christian sense of the term. Faith, Hope, and Charity, St. Paul's well-known triad, what are they? They are the roots which Christianity has in the nature of man. A practical conception of his relation to the Universe, founded in his experience of his own nature, and concerning his own conduct and its issues, his own hopes and fears for the future, and of infinite interest to himself, is thus the nearest approach which man can make towards a speculative conception of that Universe, of which he finds himself an infinitesimal particle.

V.—FAITH AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

By L. T. HOBHOUSE.

WHEN a religious creed has lost its vital hold and nothing has come to take its place there are two makeshifts possible by which men seek to fill the void. One is to re-state the old belief in metaphysical terms, alleging truth of idea where it is no longer possible to plead truth of fact and using the ambiguities of abstract terms as a cover, behind which by moving rapidly from one meaning to another the direct conflict with brutal fact may be indefinitely evaded. The other is to seize hold of the very temper of mind which accompanies the decay of religion and make of it a means of evading sheer denial. For if an active and aggressive scepticism with its claim to judge all things by the test of reason in the name of truth is the cause of destruction to supernaturalism, the effect of that destruction is a scepticism of a different temper—disappointed and disillusioned with a world emptied of its gods, in which the key to all the final problems is still to seek, disheartened with a victory which has possessed it of a bare and devastated land. In this mood scepticism is ready to be turned against itself, and there soon arise those who question reason much as reason questioned authority. Who, they ask, made science a ruler and judge over us? Science has her methods, to which she is welcome, but why should they be held superior to any others? Science, like theology, is human, the product of human thought, and, if we push it to the bottom, of human instincts. Her conclusions are not infallible, and her scope is not exhaustive. As to her first principles and fundamental assumptions, men have never yet come to an agreement about their nature, origin, and validity. The uniformity of nature which is assumed in all generalisation

is difficult to formulate in terms upon which all would agree, and has been admitted by distinguished men of science to be itself a matter of faith. And if faith is admitted at one point why not at others? It is surely not for "reason" to make arbitrary distinctions.

And the appeal may be pushed further, and urged perhaps more subtly and persuasively upon the rationalist. The world, it may be said, is doubtless capable of being rendered intelligible, and in that sense is in the end rational. But it is intelligible only to a perfected intelligence, and to the human mind at its present stage it is all fragments and gaps, full of hard stumbling blocks and appearances of sheer contradiction. On what ground of reason, the rationalist may be asked, do you rest your belief that these gaps may be filled, these fragments pieced together, and these painful stumbling blocks of contradiction smoothed over? Whence your confidence in a rational explanation of all things, wherein relying you reject all explanations that you hold irrational. Be frank and admit that all along you are building upon faith—faith in reason no doubt, but none the less faith. And having once admitted faith as the necessary basis of the speculative reason, be wise as well as frank and allow yourself to indulge in faith also in the region of the practical reason. Recognise that the demand of reason upon the world is not only that it should be intelligible but that it should be just, or say rather that if the terms be taken in their full significance the world cannot be intelligible unless it is just. Extend your faith, therefore, and take comfort when you look upon the prosperity of the wicked and hear the deep sighing of the poor. Only allow the faith which is in you to have full play. Do not fear your own instincts, but let them carry you onwards to a realm of inward peace and confident outer activity, to which, as a mere reasoner, you will never attain.

The appeal thus seductively made to the rationalist on general grounds is backed up by special considerations drawn

from the present condition both of psychology and of the theory of knowledge. In the first place we are told that far from being irrational in allowing emotion and desire to influence belief, we are merely facing facts in admitting frankly to ourselves that this is just what emotion and desire inevitably do. Our beliefs, we are told, are grounded upon our passional nature, and when the scientific man, with his dogma of the supremacy of truth, comes in to crush us with his superiority he is all the time merely following another passion of his own. He has a desire for truth; others have a desire to find particular things true; and he, it is suggested, is as much biassed by his desire as anyone else. This statement, I am aware, looks something like a *reductio ad absurdum*, but it appears to me the fairest statement that can be made consistently with accuracy of much of the argumentation upon these lines. But the matter is pushed further. What, it is asked, is the general test of truth to which the rationalist would refer us? Has the scientific man any satisfactory account to give of the ultimate criteria of knowledge, and if not, if all our existing knowledge consists of isolated fragments of ideal systems which here and there we are able to test by finding that they conform to fact, is it not possible that the beliefs dismissed by science as superstitions may erect for themselves as good a test and stand it equally well? For how does the case stand? Here are certain beliefs. No one doubts that they are the expression of genuine states of mind. But how are we to tell whether or not they correspond to reality? We need not here ask questions as to origin, for origin and validity are separate conceptions. All we need ask is, whether applied to our practical living experience, they work satisfactorily and so verify themselves. We believe, we are told, in the gods we need, and we are right in believing in them. That is true which works well. The genuine inner experience, which is established and confirmed by subsequent experience, equally genuine, is as good an intimation of reality as anything else

which our limited human intelligence could provide. In a somewhat similar spirit other lines of thought have led to the suggestion that religious belief, if not true, is at least biologically valuable, and that just as natural selection has favoured a protective organ in one creature, an organ for sight or for hearing in another, so in the human race there is evolved a set of supernatural conceptions that have guarded social morality, and, on the theory that what works well, if not true, at any rate needs no further enquiry, here is a simple and sufficient justification of the acceptance of the supernatural. Finally, the whole conception is made more systematic by the theory that the basis of intellectual constructions is not the self-evident axiom but rather the deliberate postulate. We have no longer need of the understanding to make our system of nature, the will is a more efficient and a more adaptable organ. For instance, if we do not find identity in experience we must postulate the identity we do not find. If the postulate works well in the practical operations of life, it has justified itself and no more questions need be asked about it. It is only necessary, it would seem, to give a long pull and a strong pull, and, above all, a pull all together, and we can make our reality, within wide and somewhat indeterminate limits, very much what we please. For all that appears to the contrary we can settle the question of immortality by simply resolving by a sufficiently overwhelming majority to be immortal, and if doubt is thrown on these assertions, analogies are again not wanting in the world of psychology. One writer tells us that it is simply irrational to decry faith in a fact, wherever the fact becomes fact by our having faith in it, and we have the authority of Mrs. Eddy and her countless followers to prove that at least in the important department of the relation between mind and body, faith removes, if not mountains, at any rate, the aches and pains that nervous flesh is heir to.

I shall perhaps be told that I have failed to state the view which I am criticising without caricaturing it. I can only

plead that I find it impossible to state the case in my own words and yet keep from all suggestion of the ridiculous. We seem in the main to be dealing with one or other or both of two propositions. The first is, that by believing a thing we make it true; the second is, that we can believe in a thing without asking ourselves seriously whether it is true or false. As to the first of these propositions, we are sometimes told that it is not so ridiculous as it sounds, because there are instances in which we are forced to admit it to be the plain fact. What we believe about the future, for instance, often influences the actual event so far as it depends on our actions. In particular, the sanguine man, and that is the man who has faith, is more likely to succeed than the despondent man. So far it is true that faith is an actual force, and, in the main, a healthy force. But, in the first place, what has operated in these cases is not the insufficiently grounded belief but the attitude of will, the resolute, high-spirited, unswerving determination which carries a man on. And from this distinction we may learn a lesson that may be applied in other cases. It is not the ungrounded and perhaps incorrect belief which is intrinsically valuable, but the state of feeling, emotion, and will from which that belief issues and to which it ministers. In practical affairs, in so far as the premature belief itself is essential, there is too often the Nemesis of rashness or other misdirection of effort, and if philosophical analysis is to be applied to these matters, it must surely be allowed to go below the surface, and separate what is of genuine value from what is superabundant and possibly hurtful. Thus in the cases taken there is a higher state of mind than that of the spurious courage due to ignorance or over-confidence, namely, genuine courage, based on determination to do the best whatever happens. Nevertheless, it will be said, the belief is in certain cases the operative force, for there are natures not strong enough to act at their best, except under the influence of an over-belief of one kind or another, and where their action is a factor the

event will in a measure depend upon what they believe it certain to be. Clearly this is a dangerous line of argument for the advocates of faith. It has a wider application, and suggests that after all it is only the old familiar recommendation of irrational belief as a moral prop for the weaker brother that is being urged upon us. Whatever the practical wisdom of this recommendation, to urge it in this connection would clearly be to abandon the case for emotion as a vehicle of truth.

But let us carry the matter a step further by taking another class of cases where the fact is affected by the belief in it. In the case of faith-healing, belief often affects not only the future but the present state of mind or body. The child or the childish adult whose pain vanishes when he is clearly and emphatically assured that he has none, illustrates vividly the dependence of a certain order of fact upon the recognition accorded or refused to it. We have here, no doubt, another class of cases, the limits of which are at present ill-defined, in which our state of mind affects the reality to which the state of mind has reference. In the first case that we took, the reality is some event external to ourselves, affected by our action ; in the second set of cases it was the state of our own feelings or our own body. The common characteristic of both these cases is that in them our state of mind is itself an operative cause working under certain conditions which are in part determinate, in part, in the present state of our knowledge, not determined.

In so far as any event depends upon a state of our minds, and in so far as that state of mind depends upon the belief which we entertain, it needs no argument to prove that a fact may be affected by our belief about it. Experience, however, shows us that this kind of causation is restricted to a very narrow sphere. In the special relation of mind and body some physiologists are perhaps disposed to think that the sphere is somewhat wider than was formerly supposed, and that some

small percentage of what was formerly classed as quackery may be based on a true causal relation. But all this, besides being concerned with a region in which the facts are still hopelessly intertwined with self-deception and fraud, is in reality quite irrelevant to the present argument. That our mental state operates on our bodily tissues, and through them may affect other things, is a popular way of stating a very familiar fact. But, upon this ground, to draw a kind of blank cheque upon the intellect to construct in any department it pleases any image of reality it pleases, and to take that for reality, would be a most inconsequent proceeding. The neurotic imagination is a poor basis for a world philosophy.

I pass to the second question of the belief which we are asked to hold without questioning as to whether it is true. There are two possible interpretations of what is meant. It may be suggested that we should hold the two positions simultaneously, that we should believe and, at the same time, not believe the truth of what we believe. I cannot state this position in any form which is not to my mind a contradiction in terms, for I cannot make anything of belief which does not constitute an assertion of truth. But, it may be said, the conception of the will to believe involves no such contradiction. Will necessarily influences belief. When we resist an orator's appeal to our emotions on the ground that, logically regarded, he is all the time talking clap-trap, we can only do so by a determined effort to keep our minds fixed on the real facts of the case. What, it may be asked, is this if not the will to believe? The reply is that it is precisely this analogy which justifies us in treating the will to believe as an expression tacitly inviting us to divorce belief from truth. The effort of attention with which we follow a difficult demonstration or resist an emotional appeal is an effort after Truth, and the point of the argument in favour of entrusting belief to will is that there is no radical distinction between this effort after truth, and the effort to attain belief without regard to truth.

The two are held fundamentally identical, because effort and passion enter into both as though effort and passion were not necessarily present as moving forces in all that we do, good and bad alike. The rational objection to accepting conclusions without evidence is relegated, perhaps with a dash of temper as "snarling logicity," to the plane of an antiquated prejudice. We are recommended to exert our wills not in order to follow an argument or to sift evidence, but to do the universe the "deepest service" in our power by obstinately believing that there are gods. The plural number one gathers from recent works is to be taken literally, and the world awaits with interest to learn whether it is Jupiter and Minerva, Isis and Osiris, Mumbojumbo, or Unkulunkulu in whom it is to make up its mind to believe. It wants but an effort, and once again we shall all "have sight of Proteus rising from the sea and hear old Triton wind his wreathed horn." However this may be, the point of the whole argument is that we do our duty in the world by suppressing logical criticism and accepting the belief to which emotional impulse prompts. And when we are asked to do this deliberately we are in effect being invited to believe without regard to the truth of what we believe.

Now to take up this position open-eyed would be voluntarily to embrace a self-contradiction, and would therefore be difficult. But there is another way of advocating the will to believe, in which, to escape from self-contradiction, it merely amounts to a recommendation of insincerity. And this is by no means difficult. All that is needed is that the different sides of the contradiction should be held apart. Belief is, I suppose, an acceptance of an idea as an element in the general system of conceptions whereby we harmonise our experience and regulate our conduct. If our thought were always consistent and coherent, there would be only the one system for each of us, harmonious throughout alike in methods and results, but in point of fact we know that actual human beings, obtaining their experience in fragments, and thinking it out very inadequately,

have many different and frequently incompatible groups of ideas lying side by side in their minds without touching or interfering with one another. The view we have now before us seems to recommend that we should encourage this fragmentariness, that with regard to some of the most important of our notions we should, while conscious that they have not stood the tests which we ordinarily find necessary as a check to hasty judgment, nevertheless set them firmly in one or other of our fragmentary systems.

Fragmentariness of this kind passes by delicate shades into insincerity, but in its most typical form there is no need to apply to it any harsh epithets. What we find common at a time when fixed principles are melting away is a type of mind in which the different orders of experience are separated off into, as it were, water-tight compartments. With a very rigidly scientific view of all mundane affairs for example, combined perhaps with a complete scepticism as to orthodox religion, there will go a readiness to believe any new thing in the domain of the supernatural, and the more determined a materialist a man is in his judgments of human history and contemporary events, of politics, and also perhaps of private affairs, the more we are likely to find him, or possibly her, ready for the cult of the extremely irrational in another sphere. These two mental attitudes exist side by side. They do not come into contact. But though it is easy to imagine people growing, without noticing it, into this condition of double-mindedness, it is not easy to understand anyone's recommending it as a healthy condition of mind. It might indeed be advised by a cynic, as a means of making the best of both worlds, but we are here not discussing cynicism, but a serious attitude of mind in connection with the deepest problems of existence, and, dealing with the matter in the same spirit, we are bound to point out, not only that the attitude recommended is indefensible, but, that even the practical advantages claimed for it are more than doubtful. For the faith in things spiritual, which is thus kept

in a separate compartment from things temporal, ceases to vitalise and inspire our judgment of the practical things with which we have to deal. Indeed the separation does positive harm. It is only because he keeps a private storeroom of nourishment for his spiritual nature that a man is capable of being a sheer materialist in his judgment of the things of this world, and, conversely, it is only by forcing him to recognise that if there is a spiritual at all it is to be found in this temporal experience that he can be made to bring his religion into contact with actuality. Against the doctrine that for the sake of practical religion we must have a faith that is divorced from scientific method, it may on good grounds be retorted that the only religion of practical value is that which we can seriously treat as flowing from and applying to that very same experience with which science has to deal. To make life a coherent whole is the aim not merely of theoretic reason but of practical morals.

As there are those who find an extravagant supernaturalism necessary for their own mental balance as a corrective of their equally exaggerated materialism, so there are others who on similar grounds recommend supernaturalism as morally and educationally necessary to the world at large. They find the heart of man so depraved, and the rules of right and wrong so far divorced from reason that except through fear of a supernatural judgment they cannot believe that we poor human beings can scrape up enough of moral decency to keep society together. The most conflicting forms of supernatural doctrine may be taught, provided only that some form of the supernatural be retained. Such a position, of course, could never have been taken up in days when supernaturalism had a living hold, and it well illustrates the condition of mental twilight that we are describing, in which intellectual incoherence passes through various shades of self-deception into definite insincerity, the background being all along a narrow and perversely materialistic interpretation of actual experience.

We have seen then that the will to believe, in so far as it means determination to retain belief in that which in our hearts we do not consider true, is a contradiction in terms. In so far as it is an invitation to us so to shape our minds as to divorce the fundamental questions from the problems of practical life, it is an invitation, theoretically speaking, to inconsistency and, practically speaking, to irreligion, while lastly, in so far as it rests upon the suggestion that what we believe can affect reality, it is a crude generalisation from a very narrow order of facts, in which the conditions are peculiar and cannot, therefore, be applied to a wider sphere.

But, it may be said, what is the criterion of truth? are we after all irrational if we adopt that method of verification which is the distinctive boast of science? The answer is clearly in the negative, provided the method of verification is the same in both cases. But is it so? If I understand correctly the method propounded to us by the exponents of practical desirability, it amounts to this, that certain beliefs, arising no matter how, but felt with intensity, are decided by application to our practical experience. We find ourselves contented with them. They meet our needs, they suffice to direct our actions, and they come across no practical obstacle; that being so, the suggestion that they are in the same position as a scientific hypothesis, which is verified by consistency with the facts, is put forth. On this we must remark first, that bare consistency with the facts is not, by careful thinkers, held sufficient as a final demonstration of a hypothesis. More than one hypothesis may be consistent with the facts, and it is clear that more than one hypothesis cannot be true. And this is suggestive for our purposes. A hypothesis may well accord with the facts without being itself true, when it contains within it descriptions and generalisations which are true. Thus, I suppose the Ptolemaic system of the universe summed up a mass of recorded observations and generalisations as to the movements of the planets, which were in the main perfectly

sound, and eking these out with certain further suggestions which were not based upon experience, or were based on a faulty interpretation of experience, it formed a certain concrete picture of the material universe. On the basis of this hypothesis, the motions of the planets and the occurrence of astronomical events became, in great measure, capable of being predicted, and so for a long while the hypothesis accorded with known facts, and not only accorded with them, but assisted I imagine in the practical requirements, if we may so call them, of reducing these facts to order and anticipating the future. The hypothesis served this purpose in virtue of the element in it which was sound, as being derived by legitimate generalisation from well-attested experience. But so far there is no test to discriminate what is sound from what is unsound, and so long as we only look to bare consistency with fact as contrasted with necessitation by fact, we cannot make this distinction. Similarly, a religious creed is a concrete embodiment of a certain ethical and spiritual experience. In virtue of the experience which it embodies a creed may serve our practical needs well and, within certain limits, perfectly, but, nevertheless, it is the kernel of experience and not the husk of spiritual imagery which is the solid truth. Mere conformity with experience, then, is not enough either in science or religion. But there is a more fundamental point. The verification which science requires is the verification by further observations or further inference from observed facts, that is to say, the scientific hypothesis is an assertion of fact, and it is decided by comparison with other assertions of facts. The hypothesis of faith, on the other hand, is an assertion of fact which is to be decided at best by its utility, and this means, when the facts are fairly faced, its satisfaction of our desires. As long as our impulses, our cravings, our thirst for some sign of justice, or mercy, or love in the order of things is satisfied, so long all is well, and we may believe in the scientific truth of the belief by which we obtain this satisfaction. It is clear that the two

things are not on all fours. The verification which common-sense and science desiderate is a verification of assertions of fact by facts. The verification which we are told that faith requires is the verification of assertions of fact by our own wishes. Now, it is said that neither scientific men nor philosophers are agreed as to the final criterion of truth. Be that as it may, they are, I should imagine, agreed as to certain negative points, and there is one negative which common-sense teaches us long before we philosophise, and that is that emotion is a very bad guide to truth. When we desire to form a cool and accurate judgment we dismiss desire and feeling. The doctor calls in another practitioner to diagnose the case of his own loved ones, or, as Aristotle reminds us, we come to the best decision as to whether Helen shall be retained or dismissed by sending her out of the room while we hold our deliberations.

We are told that all this rationalism has in it something pharisaical, that we cannot be rational through and through, for all our common-sense and our science rest upon assumptions; that some of these assumptions at least are not self-evident, but that they are, in fact, instruments of which we make use deliberately with the distinctively practical end of harmonising our experience by their means. To criticise this view of things would involve a complete statement of the theory of knowledge, for which this is not the time. But I may point out, first, that if the theory were true it would lead us not so much to the justification of faith as to the destruction of knowledge and the encouragement of scepticism as the only rational attitude, while, secondly, I may be allowed to say, that to my mind, a different opinion of the structure of knowledge is a truer one. Our thought builds upon experience by methods of which it is not conscious, till it comes to look back upon them, and philosophise about them. These methods are, in point of fact, by no means unerring—if they were so we should never hear of a hasty generalisation or a confusion of

ideas—but reflective thought sifts them and selects out as sound the elements which consist and cohere with one another. These methods are, in the first place, not foreign to reason, but, on the contrary, are merely the expression in general terms of what in concrete cases reason actually does. They are not assumptions which it is open to the rationalising mind to take up or lay down at pleasure, but they express those acts or functions in which the work of the rationalising mind consists. And if they are capable of being set as first principles at the top of the chain of deductions from which the judgments of common-sense are derived, they are equally capable of being deduced in turn from the work which thought achieves. The ideal of knowledge in this view is a complete circle, or, if the expression is preferred, a system in which the different parts necessitate one another, and what are called the fundamental assumptions of thought are merely the most wide-reaching strands which form the inter-connection of the parts. It is, of course, true that, on such a conception of verification there could be no absolute certainty in any knowledge short of complete knowledge of all things that are, and so in fact we find that, in the advance of science, we are not merely extending our territory, but continually modifying, in one way or another, even those results which have been regarded as best established.

But though rational thought is never final, it is at any given stage the nearest thought to truth that we can have. For the reason is simply the effort of the mind to grasp its experience as an articulate and coherent whole. Unreason lies in the formation of beliefs in isolation from, and ultimately in defiance of, the general body of thought. The rational view is that, since truth must be a consistent whole, we cannot admit inconsistent judgments, nor can we admit methods of forming judgments in one part which are known to lead to false results in another. It is one thing to admit that, our experience being incomplete, the body of thought resting on it is not final, and that accordingly judgments shown to conflict with it may still

contain a measure of truth. Such an admission is merely an arrest of judgment pending an appeal to a still wider experience. It is quite another thing to admit for purposes of utility, and not of truth, methods which are definitely known to give false results. In the first case we are merely recognising that a rational system must be a gradual growth. In the second, we are abandoning the principle on which any rational system must grow.

But, we may be told, it is not the satisfaction of desire which is intended as the test, but the much harder fact of practical utility. A hypothesis is sound not because it satisfies our wishes, but because it works well—that is to say, we work well by holding it in our minds as a truth. It enables us to go about the world, and do the work the world requires of us. This position may be most fruitfully considered in its biological setting, to which a brief reference has already been made.

If, then, it were true that certain beliefs are useful, or, to push it to the furthest point, necessary to the life and growth of the species, could that be taken as evidence of their truth? Let us first hold fast the point that it is truth which we are considering, and not utility. The evolutionist must not ask us to believe as true certain beliefs which he can see to have been useful, purely upon the ground that they were useful. He may say that it would be a sad day for the race when we come to criticise these principles if our criticism is to weaken them, and he may suggest to us, as a practical proposal, that in the interest of race preservation we should agree to bury all question about them. This is to suggest a certain practical attitude. But he cannot at one and the same time ask us to face the question and also refuse to face it. Evolution having brought him, and presumably us, to the point at which we are able to look back over the ascending process, and discern that certain thoughts served as the ladder by which we have climbed to our present vantage-ground, we cannot put ourselves back upon the position of those who are upon the ladder. At least,

we can only do so by descending on to it again, and so losing our vantage-ground. In other words, we are in the same dilemma as before, that we are asked to be either inconsistent or insincere. Clearly, if the evolutionist is to tell us anything of the truth of our religious beliefs in the strict sense of truth, it must be through the explicit assumption that what is permanently valuable to the species does in some sense correspond to reality. Now, within certain limits, this is a very fair assumption. For, taking the term reality in a popular sense I suppose we may admit that if the sense organs, for example, do not accurately inform us as to the nature of things about us, they would hinder and not assist us in the struggle for existence, and that, on the evolutionist hypothesis, the eye and the ear come to be formed as they are because in their present structure they do, in point of fact, inform us accurately as to what is passing around us, and so enable us to meet the necessities of existence. The same argument is fairly applicable to ethical truth. In the main it may very fairly be argued that the judgments we have come to form about conduct, the mass of instincts and traditions which have grown up to regulate this judgment, have grown up in accordance with certain social needs, and if they radically failed to meet those needs, if they were on the balance injurious, the societies holding them would go under in the struggle for existence and disappear. Whence, conversely, the moral attitude of a society which has survived and come to the top is the attitude which corresponds best to the real requirements of human existence. We may at once expand and correct this view if we look a little further into the actual moral order. The rationalist, who faces the facts, will not, I think, find harmony actually attained in the existing moral judgments of men, and if he does not find harmony, he will not admit that there is final truth, and if he looks at the working of natural selection he will not expect to find final truth, but only very rough truth, the preponderance, on the whole, of truth over falsity. For

natural selection does not secure that any instinct, or any faculty, or any structure should be perfect or life-giving through and through. It secures only that it should give life more often than it gives death. The rationalist, therefore, calling in conceptions of evolution to his aid, is justified in treating our moral judgments as data which it is his problem to harmonise as best he may, and it is only in the ideal harmony that he will find complete ethical truth.

If we assume provisionally that such an order is established so that in principle the rationality of our moral nature is vindicated, further lines of thought are opened up. We have now reached the conception of a spiritual reality, for the moral is spiritual, a spiritual order having its very imperfect manifestation in the life of humanity. This reality we may use as a starting-point of a philosophic system. This was in essence the aim of the *Critique of the Practical Reason*. Kant's position was that the analysis of mathematics, physical science, and metaphysics—all classed together as the work of the speculative mind—yielded no positive conclusions upon fundamental problems. Exactly the same analysis might be applied, he conceived, to the moral judgment, and with more positive results. Now, if the system of moral judgments is valid, I can see no flaw in principle in Kant's method. It must be legitimate to trace the axioms which these judgments imply, and to treat those axioms as conveying truth.

Unfortunately if the method is right in principle it cannot be said that the application has met with general assent. The three ideas of the speculative reason, God, freedom, and immortality, which Kant found justified by the criticism of practical reason are, in reality, of very doubtful application to ethics. On the contrary, it may be contended that the only rational system of ethics is one which finds the value of moral action within the sphere of human life and conduct in this world, and the only general assumption which the moral consciousness makes and which the practical reason has to

justify is, that the purposes of social human life are worth realising and capable of being realised by human effort.

But be that as it may, in the notion of axioms applied by the practical reason, we pass out of the sphere of faith, and beyond the limits of our present question, which is precisely this, whether if reason fails any belief resting on other grounds is to have any claim upon our acceptance. As to morality, rationalists will not readily allow that it has any need of any special backing; but the rationalist unless very readily contented or blindly optimistic, must admit that the human imagination craves other sustenance than that of mere morality. The more he is permeated with the irrationality of the world as he sees it the deeper is his underlying thirst for some assurance of a higher order, in which the wrongs are righted. Of intimations of such a higher order he, in common with the irrationalist, has his share, but he will not admit them blindly, as long as he is determined to govern his beliefs and to rule himself only according to the best evidence attainable of the actual truth. Does this mean that he must dismiss from consideration everything that he cannot prove, that he must attach no weight to much that in him, as in all humanity, seems to speak of a wider, a higher and a nobler reality than anything which we actually see or touch? This is, to my mind, the kernel of the problem. Having made up our minds to put aside all juggling as to the belief which is not true, as to the imperfect axiom which may be voluntarily postulated, as to the useful which may be confused with the true, and having frankly admitted the distinction between the vague suggestion that feeling prompts and the articulate proposition which reason proves, are we to take the world precisely as reason shows it us or are we to give weight to the element of feeling as well? For the latter alternative I see two reasons. One is that the instinctive revolt against the limitations of experiences as we know them, against the unspeakable injustice of things, the universal waste of faculty, and the brokenness of life, has

in it one of the qualities which belongs to proof, that is to say, it is, to many of us at least, compelling and recurrent. It is the character of proof to master us, not, as it were, by attraction but by force. It compels us to give assent, while the flowery paths of imagination merely entice us on. And so, speaking from my own experience at any rate, it is that when any particular scheme is propounded with a view to restoring one's happy belief, that "God's in His Heaven, and all's right with the world," the scheme is alluring but not compelling. But if we turn from every successive concrete scheme of things back to the blank world that we find and say that that is all we know or can know, always there seems to arise in revolt this same inner consciousness, with its insistence, that though every actually propounded scheme may be demonstrably false, still there is something more, it may be entirely beyond our powers of conception, but something in which the spiritual problems wherewith experience groans and travails would find a solution and leave us at peace. This insistent counter-belief has, I think, the same quality of coming back, though we expel it with a pitchfork, which the reluctant irrationalist is bound in the end to concede to demonstration. What precise value can we attach—if we try to stand outside ourselves and our own impulses to believe or to question—what precise value can we attach to this impulse? I think we may arrive at a fair valuation if we bring in a second consideration. Through the whole course of the upward evolution of the mind we find that the function of reason is to analyse and render explicit that which is before held confusedly. At the lower stage we see through a glass darkly what in the next stage above we see face to face. Instinct prompts to action, of the end and meaning of which it is unconscious. Instinct fused with intelligence is still half-conscious, or at best imperfectly conscious of the meaning and tendency of its own behaviour. At all the stages in the procreation and rearing of the young, for example, the succession of instinctive acts leads the

animal blindly on from stage to stage, each step seeming to it intrinsically delightful. While the whole process is, as we say metaphorically, Nature's object it is never as a whole the object of the animal which acts. This blindness of instinct dominates the animal world. But in principle the same limitation applies to human conduct as well. Our own motives are but imperfectly present to us in the act. Nor are they reasoned out. They are shaped by the scheme of things in which we grow up, and which arranges for us plans of action and chains of consequences of which we agents never have a perfect idea beforehand. Only in proportion as we reflect and analyse does the full bearing of what we do become clear to us. We find a rational meaning for our impulses, while we also sift out from them what is irrational and unworthy. A rational scheme of conduct, could it be perfected, would represent a kind of purified deposit from the ore, the very crude ore, of instinctive and traditional behaviour, in which what was wholly intelligent and of value should be separated from the impurities arising from selfish desire and limitation of view.

Instinct as such, it should be remarked here, is no infallible guide to truth. At its highest development in the animal world it is, after all, a quite fallible basis of reaction. If we analyse the beliefs which in human experience we call instinctive, we find their basis in some sensibility, some manner of perception, probably emotional perception, so subtle as to defy our rationalising intelligence, as the finer feminine intuition outruns the slow conclusions of the clumsy and prosaic male. When we judge by instinct we form judgments on data too fine or too complex to be analysed out. But such judgments are far from infallible, though those who most trust to them are wont to note only the affirmative instances of success. Thus the immediate unproven judgments of our sensibility carry us much further than our analysing reason could do, but they are also much more heavily charged with error. Reason lumbers along in their wake with slower but surer tread.

It follows on this account that the element of reason in human conduct is dependent on the element of feeling as that which originally prompts to action. The world of feeling is a tangle in which it is the business of reason to sort out the threads. But the work of reason is never in our experience complete. On the contrary it often seems that in proportion as we come to a higher stage of conscious intelligence, so do further depths and heights of imagination and feeling open above us and beneath us, and the work of reason is to follow in the directions to which it is thus pointed rather than decline to move beyond the ground that it has already won. It has, indeed, the right to reject the utterance of imaginative feeling when laid down as dogmas, professing to be settled truth, but it has not the right to decline investigation of the kind and measure of truth to which imagination may point. And this double attitude seems justified to the ethical rationalist by the history of religion and ethics, for here we find that what is for us an established rational order of conduct, has been propounded in the past under religious forms which we as rationalists now reject. We do not believe in the gods of Olympus, but we believe in the wisdom of Athene, and perhaps in the vengeance of the Erinnyes. We do not believe in the God of the Israelites, but we believe in the law of righteousness. Similarly we believe in the law of love, of forgiveness, of self-surrender, and we seem to recognise in the evolution of religion precisely that movement from an imaginative to a rational apprehension of truth which has been described.

A just conception of mental evolution then would by no means allow us to despise the promptings of feeling in our search for truth. Neither would it allow us to accept as sufficiently accredited the formal creeds into which these promptings crystallise themselves. Experience comes to us first in half-formed and ill-understood feelings, emotions, and imaginings. The practices and the theories which we base on these are irrational, and the first work of rational criticism

is to destroy them as such. Its second work is to dig among the ruins for what was in reality beautiful or true, to get back to the elements of experience which were faultily used, and to piece them together again on better principles. Investigators have shown that even in the crassest primitive magic there is often a genuine experience embodied and distorted. A taboo may be partly based on the facts of the transmission of disease by infection, though it may be applied to qualities which cannot be so transmitted, and may be made the basis of rules which sanitary science would hold foolish. Similarly the worship of household gods may be an irrational form in which the rational love of home and family expresses itself, the love of God an expression for the recognition of duty, the possibly undue exaltation of a virtue for its own sake the unconscious admission of its necessity to society. In these and countless other cases with very varying degrees of error the rational ordering of life is as it were anticipated, and being partially apprehended it is enshrined in some concrete belief or practice. Now the discrimination which we apply to the past is also required in the present. We must firmly reject irrational beliefs, and yet allow that they may embody a measure of truth. To find that measure is always our problem, and in doing so we must frankly admit that the stimulus to onward movement is always the formless element of feeling that reaches out beyond the rational order of established truth. We shall then not undervalue that insistent feeling which in our dissatisfaction with the world drives us forward to seek for new solutions, and yet we shall decline to accept, until confirmed by rational tests, any solution which it proposes, and therewith also the bare promise that of a surety there will be a solution. We have no such absolute assurance. Yet though there is no one word of a message of certain truth that they can give us we have no reason to doubt that there is a real significance in the confused utterances within us which respond to the deeper voices of nature or human life, as we listen to the singing of

the birds on wet spring evenings, or sound the depths of a human tragedy without solution on this world's stage, or let ourselves be swept along in the tide of some noble verse. What it is that life would say to us in these moods we cannot tell. All we know is that experience is charged with a deeper significance which we cannot adequately apprehend, but we can listen and try to piece the broken message together. Just as we have come to understand the instinct which prompts the animal to feel and act without understanding, just as we can often trace the genesis of a creed which an earlier race formed without knowing how or why, so if we do not stifle enquiry by premature certainty our successors may value justly the thoughts and hopes, the fancies and yearnings, which we find it hard even to express, and may find for them a place in a rational order which it was beyond our power to construct.

As a forerunner of thought, then, feeling has its place, and we should do ill to close our minds absolutely to its suggestions. But we do still worse if we deliver over our reason to its guidance. We do worse again when we feign to ourselves a reasoned assent to conclusions to which in reality we are prompted by desire alone. And we do worst of all when we seek to escape the whole difficulty by discrediting reason and clouding the issue between truth and falsity. Those who concern themselves so much with practical results may be referred to history to determine whether dogma or rationalism has caused the more tears to flow. The will to believe must, when successful with ourselves, grow into the will that others should believe as well, for belief so attained is a pyramid based on its apex, needing much support of sympathy from outside, and trembling to its fall at every blast of incredulity. Dogma has persecuted with all the cruelty born of panic. The consciousness of internal weakness drives it to suppress overt discussion. Shorn of all external support, dogmas have short lives, and the dogmatic spirit is tossed from creed to creed, ransacking the ages for a God that will outlast the seasons'

changes of fashion. Meanwhile rationalism moves slowly onward, incorporating such suggestions of feeling as it finds sound, well aware of the smallness of its achievement and the vastness of the problems that loom beyond, but strong in the sense of inward harmony and in the knowledge that what it has done, whether much or little, is always thorough and honest work.

VI.—REMARKS ON THE SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS.

By EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

IN every study of the moral consciousness as a whole the subjects of moral judgments call for a very comprehensive examination. Such a study must comprise a discussion both of the general characteristics and of the particular branches of those phenomena which have a tendency to evoke moral condemnation or moral praise, and in each case the investigation should be both historical and explanatory. The present paper, however, will be neither the one nor the other. Its object is simply to examine the general nature of the subjects of moral valuation from the standpoint of the enlightened moral consciousness.

Moral judgments are commonly said to be passed upon conduct and character. This is a convenient mode of expression, but the terms need an explanation.

Conduct has been defined sometimes as "acts adjusted to ends,"* sometimes as acts that are not only adjusted to ends, but definitely willed.† The latter definition is too narrow for our present purpose, because, as will be seen, it excludes from the province of conduct many phenomena with reference to which moral judgments are passed. The same may be said of the former definition also which, moreover, is unnecessarily wide, including as it does an immense number of phenomena with which moral judgments are never concerned. Though no definition of conduct could be restricted to such phenomena as

* Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, i, 5.

† E.g., Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 1900, p. 85.

actually evoke moral emotions, the term "conduct" seems, nevertheless, to suggest at least the possibility of moral valuation, and is therefore hardly applicable to such "acts adjusted to ends" as are performed by obviously irresponsible beings. It may be well first to fix the meaning of the word "act."

According to Bentham, acts may be distinguished into external, or acts of the body, and internal, or acts of the mind. "Thus, to strike is an external or exterior act: to intend to strike, an internal or interior one."* But this application of the word is neither popular nor convenient. The term "act" suggests something besides intention, whilst, at the same time, it suggests something besides muscular contractions. To intend to strike is no act, nor are the movements involved in an epileptic fit acts.

An act comprises an event and its immediate mental cause. The event is generally spoken of as the outward act, but this term seems to be too narrow, since the intentional production of a mental fact—for instance, a sensation, or an idea, or an emotion like joy or sorrow or anger—may be properly styled an act. The objection will perhaps be raised that I confound acts with their consequences, and that what I call the "event" is, as Austin maintains, nothing but bodily movements. But Austin himself admits that he must often speak of "acts" when he means "acts and their consequences," since "most of the names which seem to be names of acts, are names of acts, coupled with certain of their consequences, and it is not in our power to discard these forms of speech."† I regard the so-called consequences of acts, in so far as they are intended, as being acts by themselves, or forming parts of acts.

The very expression "outward act" implies that acts also have an inner aspect. "Intention," says Butler, "is part of the

* Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1879, p. 73.

† Austin, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, 1873, i, 427, 432 sq.

action itself.”* By intention I understand a volition or determination to realise the idea of a certain event; hence there can be only one intention in one act. Certain writers distinguish between the immediate and the remote intentions of an act. Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to escape him, saved his victim from drowning with a view to inflicting upon him more exquisite tortures. The immediate intention, it is maintained, was to save the enemy from drowning, the remote intention was to inflict upon him tortures.† But I should say that, in this case, we have to distinguish between two acts, of which the first was a means of producing the event belonging to the second, and that, when the former was accomplished, the latter was still only in preparation. A distinction has, moreover, been drawn between the direct and the indirect intention of an act:—“If a Nihilist seeks to blow up a train containing an Emperor and others, his direct intention may be simply the destruction of the Emperor, but indirectly also he intends the destruction of the others who are in the train, since he is aware that their destruction will be necessarily included along with that of the Emperor.”‡ In this case we have two intentions, and, so far as I can see, two acts, provided that the nihilist succeeded in carrying out his intentions, namely (1) the blowing up of the train, and (2) the killing of the emperor; the former of these acts does not even necessarily involve the latter. But I fail to see that there is any intention at all to kill other persons. Professor Sidgwick maintains that it would be thought absurd to say that, in such a case, the nihilist “did not intend” to kill

* Butler, “Dissertation II. Of the Nature of Virtue,” in *Analogy of Religion, &c.*, 1893, p. 336.

† Mackenzie, *op. cit.* p. 60. The example is borrowed from Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, 1895, p. 27, note.

‡ Mackenzie, *op. cit.* p. 61. Cf. Sidgwick, 1901, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 202, note 1.

them;* but the reason for this is simply the vagueness of language, and a confusion between a psychical fact and the moral estimate of that fact. It might be absurd to bring forward the nihilist's non-intention as an extenuation of his crime; but it would hardly be correct to say that he intended the death of other passengers besides that of the emperor, when he only intended the destruction of the train, though this intention involved an extreme disregard of the various consequences which were likely to follow. He knowingly exposed the passengers to great danger; but if we speak of an intention on his part to expose them to such a danger, we regard this exposure as an act by itself.

A moral judgment may refer to a mere intention, independently of its being realised or not. Moreover, the moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention. In this point moralists of all schools seem to agree.† Even Stuart Mill, who drew so sharp a distinction between the morality of the act and the moral worth of the agent, admits that "the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention."‡ The event is of moral importance only in so far as it indicates a decision which is final. From the moral point of view there may be a considerable difference between a resolution to do a certain thing in a distant future and a resolution to do it immediately. However determined a person may be to commit a crime, or to perform a good deed, the idea of the immediacy of the event may, in the last moment, induce him to change his mind. "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." External events are generally the direct causes of our moral emotions; indeed, without the *doing* of harm and the *doing* of good, the moral

* Sidgwick, *op. cit.* p. 202, note 1. On the subject of "indirect intention," cf. also Bentham, *op. cit.* pp. 84, 86.

† Sidgwick, *op. cit.* p. 201.

‡ Stuart Mill, *op. cit.* p. 27, note. Cf. James Mill, *Fragment on Mackintosh*, 1835, p. 376.

consciousness would never have come into existence. Hence the ineradicable tendency to pass moral judgments upon acts, even though they really relate to the final intentions involved in acts. It would be both inconvenient and useless to deviate in this respect from the established application of terms. And no misunderstanding can arise from such application if it be borne in mind that by an "act," as the subject of a moral judgment, is invariably understood the event *plus* the intention which produced it, and that the very same moral judgment as is passed on acts would also, on due reflection, be recognised as valid with reference to final decisions in cases where accidental circumstances prevented the accomplishment of the act.

It is in their capacity of volitions that intentions are subjects of moral judgments. What is perfectly independent of the will is no proper object of moral blame or moral praise. On the other hand, any volition may have a moral value. But, so far as I can see, there are volitions which are not intentions. A person is morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, and the reason for this is that a deliberate wish is a volition. I am aware that, by calling deliberate wishes "volitions," I offend against the terminology generally adopted by psychologists. However, a deliberate wish is not only from a moral point of view—as being a proper subject of moral valuation—but psychologically as well, so closely akin to a decision, that there must be a common term comprising both. In the realm of conations, deliberate wishes and decisions form together a province by themselves. In contradistinction to mere conative impulses, they are expressions of a person's character, of his will. A deliberate wish may just as well as a decision represent his "true self." It has been argued that a person may will one thing and yet wish the opposite thing. Locke observes:—"A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail upon him. In this case it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action

that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way." * Yet in this case I either do not intend to persuade the man, but only to discharge my office by speaking to him words which are apt to have a persuasive effect on him; or, if I do intend to persuade him, I do not in the same moment feel any deliberate wish to the contrary, although I may feel such a wish before or afterwards. We cannot simultaneously have an intention to do a thing and a deliberate wish not to do it.

If it is admitted that moral judgments are passed on acts simply in virtue of their volitional character, it seems impossible to deny that such judgments may be passed on the motives of acts as well. By "motive" I understand a conation which "moves" the will, in other words, the conative cause of a volition.† The motive itself may be, or may not be, a volition. If it is, it obviously falls within the sphere of moral valuation. The motive of an act may even be an intention, but an intention belonging to another act. When Brutus helped to kill Caesar in order to save his country, his intention to save his country was the cause, and therefore the motive, of his intention to kill Caesar. The fact that an intention frequently acts as a motive has led some writers to the conclusion that the motive of an act is a part of the intention. But if the intention of an act is a part of the act itself, and a motive is the cause of an intention, the motive of an intention cannot be a part of that

* Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ii, 21, 30 (*Philosophical Works*, p. 219).

† "The term 'motive,'" says Professor Stout (*Groundwork of Psychology*, p. 233 sq.), "is ambiguous. It may refer to the various conations which come into play in the process of deliberation, and tend to influence its result. Or it may refer to the conations which we mentally assign as the ground or reason of our decision when it has been fully formed." Motive, in the former sense of the term, is not implied in what I here understand by motive. On the other hand, it should be observed that there are motives not only for decisions, but for deliberate wishes—another circumstance which shows the affinity between these two classes of mental facts.

intention, since a part cannot be the cause of the whole of which it forms a part.

But even motives which, being neither deliberate wishes nor intentions, consist of non-volitional conations, and, therefore, are no proper subjects of moral valuation, may nevertheless indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments. Suppose that a person without permission gratifies his hunger with food which is not his own. The motive of his act is a non-volitional conation, an appetite, and has consequently no moral value. Yet it must be taken into account by him who judges upon the act. Other things equal, the person in question is less guilty in proportion as his hunger is more intense. The moral judgment is modified by the pressure which the non-volitional motive exercises upon the agent's will. The same is the case when the motive of an act is the conative element involved in an emotion. If a person commits a certain crime under the influence of anger, he is not so blameable as if he commits the same crime in cold blood. Thus, also, it is more meritorious to be kind to an enemy from a feeling of duty, than to be kind to a friend from a feeling of love. No man deserves blame or praise for the pressure of a non-volitional conation upon his will, unless, indeed, such a pressure is due to choice, or unless it might have been avoided with due foresight. But a person may deserve blame or praise for not resisting that impulse, or for allowing it to influence his will for evil or good.

It is true that moral judgments are commonly passed on acts without much regard being paid to their motives ;* but the reason for this is only the superficiality of ordinary moral estimates. Moral indignation and moral approval are, in the first place, aroused by conspicuous facts, and, whilst the intention of an act is expressed in the act itself, its motive is not

* Cf. James Mill, *Fragment on Mackintosh*, p. 376 ; Sidgwick, *op. cit.* p. 364.

But a conscientious judge cannot, like the multitude, be content with judging of the surface only. Stuart Mill, in his famous statement that "the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent,"* has drawn a distinction between acts and agents which is foreign to the moral consciousness. It cannot be admitted that "he who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble." He ought, of course to save the other person from drowning, but at the same time he ought to save him from a better motive than a wish for money. It may be that "he who betrays his friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations";† but surely his guilt would be greater if he betrayed his friend, say, in order to gain some personal advantage thereby. Intentions and motives are subjects of moral valuation, not separately, but as a unity; and the reason for this is that moral judgments are really passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract. It is true that our detestation of an act is not always proportionate to our moral condemnation of the agent; people do terrible things in ignorance. But our detestation of an act is, properly speaking, a moral emotion only in so far as it is directed against him who committed the act, in his capacity of a moral agent. We are struck with horror when we hear of a wolf eating a child, but we do not morally condemn the wolf.

A volition may have reference not only to the doing of a thing, but to the abstaining from doing a thing. It may form part not only of an act, but of a forbearance. A forbearance is morally equivalent to an act, and the volition involved in it is equivalent to an intention. "Sitting still, or holding one's

* Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, p. 26.

† *Ibid.*, p. 26.

peace," says Locke, "when walking or speaking are proposed, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being as often weighty in their consequences as the contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for actions too."* Yet it is hardly correct to call them acts. Bentham's division of acts into acts of commission and acts of omission or forbearance† is not to be recommended. A not-doing I do not call an act, and the purpose of not doing I do not call an intention.‡ But the fact remains that a forbearance involves a distinct volition, which, as such, may be the subject of moral judgment no less than the intention involved in an act.

Willing not to do a thing must be distinguished from not willing to do a thing; forbearances must be distinguished from omissions. An omission is characterised by the absence of volition. It is, as Austin puts it, "the not doing a given act, without adverting (at the time) to the act which is not done."§ Now moral judgments refer not only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances, but to omissions. It is curious that this important point has been so little noticed by writers on ethics, although it constitutes a distinct and extremely frequent element in our moral judgments. It has been argued that what is condemned in an omission is really a volition, not the absence of a volition; that an omission is bad, not because the person did not do something, but because he did something else, "or was in such a condition that he could not will, and is condemned for the acts which brought him into that condition."|| In the

* Locke, *op. cit.* ii, 21, 28 (*Philosophical Works*, p. 218).

† Bentham, *op. cit.* p. 72.

‡ Cf. Clark, *Analysis of Criminal Liability*, p. 42.

§ Austin, *op. cit.* i, 438.

|| Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, p. 34 *sq.* So, also, Professor Sidgwick maintains (*op. cit.* p. 60) that "the proper immediate objects of moral approval or disapproval would seem to be always the results of a man's volitions so far as they were intended—*i.e.*, represented in thought

latter case, of course, the man cannot be condemned for his omission, since he cannot be blamed for not doing what he "could not will"; but to say that an omission is condemned only on account of the performance of some act is undoubtedly a psychological error. If a person forgets to discharge a certain duty incumbent on him, say, to pay a debt, he is censured, not for anything he did, but for what he omitted to do. He is blamed for not doing a thing which he ought to have done, because he did not think of it; he is blamed for his forgetfulness. In other words, his guilt lies in his negligence.

Closely related to negligence is heedlessness, the difference between them being seemingly greater than it really is. Whilst the negligent man omits an act which he ought to have done, because he does not think of it, the heedless man does an act which he ought to have forborne, because he does not consider its probable or possible consequences.* In the latter case there is acting, in the former case there is absence of acting. But in both cases the moral judgment refers to want of attention, in other words, to not-willing. The fault of the negligent man is that he does not think of the act which he ought to perform, the fault of the heedless man is that he does not think of the probable or possible consequences of the act

as certain or probable consequences of such volitions," and that, in cases of carelessness, moral blame, strictly speaking, attaches to the agent only "in so far as his carelessness is the result of some wilful neglect of duty." A similar view is taken by the moral philosophy of Roman Catholicism (Göpfert, *Moraltheologie*, i, 113). Binding, again, assumes (*Die Normen*, ii, 105 *sqq.*) that a person may have a volition without having an idea of what he wills, and that carelessness implies a volition of this kind. Otherwise, he says, the will could not be held responsible for the result. But, as we shall see immediately, the absence of a volition may very well be attributed to a defect of the will, and the will thus be regarded as the cause of an unintended event. To speak of a volition or will to do a thing of which the willer has no idea seems absurd.

* The meaning of the word "negligence," in the common use of language, is very indefinite. It often stands for heedlessness as well, or for carelessness. I use it here in the sense in which it was applied by Austin (*op. cit.* i, 439 *sq.*).

which he performs. In rashness, again, the party adverts to the mischief which his act may cause, but, from insufficient advertence assumes that it will not ensue; the fault of the rash man is partial want of attention.* Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness are all included under the common term "carelessness."

Our moral judgments of blame, however, are concerned with not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is attributed to a defect of the will, not to the influence of intellectual or other circumstances for which no man can be held responsible. That power in a person which we call his "will" is regarded by us as a cause, not only of such events as are intended, but of such events as we think that the person "could" have prevented by his will. And just as, in the case of volitions, the guilt of the party is affected by the pressure of non-voluntary motives, so in the case of carelessness mental facts falling outside the sphere of the will must be closely considered by the conscientious judge. But nothing is harder than to apply this rule in practice.

Equally difficult it is, in many cases, to decide whether a person's behaviour is due to want of advertence, or is combined with a knowledge of what his behaviour implies, or of the consequences which may result from it—to decide whether it is due to carelessness or to something worse than carelessness. For him who refrains from performing an obligatory act, though adverting to it, "negligent" is certainly too mild an epithet, and he who knows that mischief will probably result from his deed is certainly worse than heedless. Yet even in such cases the immediate object of blame may be the absence of a volition—not a want of attention, but a not-willing to do, or a not-willing to refrain from doing, an act in spite of advertence to what the act implies or to its consequences. I may abstain from performing

* Austin, *op. cit.* i, 440 *sq.* Clark, *op. cit.* p. 101.

an obligatory act though I think of it, and yet, at the same time make no resolution not to perform it. So, too, if a man is ruining his family by his drunkenness, he may be aware that he is doing so, and yet he may do it without any volition to that effect. In these cases the moral blame refers neither to negligence or heedlessness, nor to any definite volition, but to disregard of one's duty or of the interest of one's family. At the same time the transition from conscious omissions into forbearances, and the transition from not-willing to refrain from doing into willing to do, are easy and natural: hence the distinction between willing and not-willing may be of little or no significance from an ethical point of view. For this reason such consequences of an act as are foreseen as certain or probable have commonly been included under the term "intention,"* often as a special branch of intention—"oblique," or "indirect," or "virtual" intention;† but, as was already noticed, this terminology is hardly appropriate. I shall call such consequences of an act as are foreseen by the agent, and such incidents as are known by him to be involved in his act, "the known concomitants" of the act. When the nihilist blows up the train containing an emperor and others, with a view to killing the emperor, the extreme danger to which he exposes the others is a known concomitant of his act. So, also, in most crimes, the breach of law as distinct from the act intended, is a known concomitant of the act, inasmuch as the criminal, though knowing that his act is illegal, does not perform it for the purpose of violating the law. As Bacon said, "No man doth a wrong for the wrong's sake, but thereby to purchase himself profit, or pleasure, or honour, or the like."‡

* Cf. Sidgwick, *op. cit.* p. 202.

† Bentham, *op. cit.* p. 84. Austin, *op. cit.* i, 480. Clark, *op. cit.* pp. 97, 100.

‡ Bacon, "Essay IV. Of Revenge," in *Essays*, p. 45. Cf. Grotius *De jure belli et pacis*, ii, 20, 29; 1, "Vix quisquam gratis malus est."

Absence of volitions, like volitions themselves, give rise not only to moral blame, but to moral praise. We may, for instance, applaud a person for abstaining from doing a thing, beneficial to himself but harmful to others, which, in similar circumstances, would have proved too great a temptation to any ordinary man; and it does not necessarily lessen his merit if the opposite alternative did not even occur to his mind, and his abstinence, therefore, could not possibly be ascribed to a volition. Very frequently moral praise refers to known concomitants of acts rather than to the acts themselves. The merit of saving another person's life at the risk of losing one's own, really lies in the fact that the knowledge of the danger did not prevent the saviour from performing his act; and the merit of the charitable man really depends on the loss which he inflicts upon himself by giving his property to the needy. In these and analogous cases of self-sacrifice for a good end, the merit, strictly speaking, consists in not-willing to avoid a known concomitant of a beneficial act. But there are instances, though much less frequent, in which moral praise is bestowed on a person for not-willing to avoid a known concomitant which is itself beneficial. Thus it may on certain conditions be magnanimous of a person not to refrain from doing a thing, though he knows that his deed will benefit somebody who has injured him, and towards whom the average man in similar circumstances would display resentment.

All these various elements into which the subjects of moral judgments may be resolved, are included in the term "conduct." By a man's conduct in a certain case is understood a volition, or the absence of a volition in him—which is often, but not always or necessarily expressed in an act, forbearance, or omission—viewed with reference to all such circumstances as may influence its moral character. In order to form an accurate idea of these circumstances, it is necessary to consider not only the case itself, but the man's character, if by character is understood a person's will regarded as a continuous

entity.* The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions; and, since a man's will or character is a continuity, it is necessary that any judgment passed upon him in a particular case, should take notice of his will as a whole, his character. We impute a person's acts to *him* only in so far as we regard them as a result or manifestation of his character, as directly or indirectly due to his will. Hume observes:—"Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some *cause* in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. . . . The person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance."† There is thus an intimate connection between character and conduct as subjects of moral valuation. When judging of a man's conduct in a special instance we judge of his character, and when judging of his character we judge of his conduct in general.

It will perhaps be remarked that moral judgments are passed not only on conduct and character, but on emotions and opinions; for instance, that resentment in many cases is deemed wrong, and love of an enemy is deemed praiseworthy, and that no punishment has been thought too severe for

* Cf. Alexander, *op. cit.* p. 49: "Character is simply that of which individual pieces of conduct are the manifestation." To the word "character" has also been given a broader meaning. According to John Grote (*Treatise on the Moral Ideals*, p. 442), a person's character "is his habitual way of thinking, feeling, and acting."

† Hume, *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, viii, 2 (*Philosophical Works*, iv, 80). Cf. *Idem*, *Treatise of Human Nature*, iii, 2 (*ibid.*, ii, 191). See also Schopenhauer, *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* (*Sämmtliche Werke*, in "Cotta'sche Bibliothek der Weltliteratur," vol. vii), pp. 123, 124, 281.

heretics and unbelievers. But even in such instances the object of blame or praise is really the will. The person who feels resentment is censured because his will has not given a check to that emotion, or because the hostile attitude of mind has led up to a definite volition. Very frequently the irascible impulse in resentment or the friendly impulse in kindly emotion develops into a volition to inflict an injury or to bestow a benefit on its object; and the words resentment and love themselves are often used to denote, not mere emotions, but states of mind characterised by genuine volitions. An emotion, or the absence of an emotion, may also, when viewed as a symptom, give rise to, and be the apparent subject of, a moral judgment. We are apt to blame a person whose feelings are not affected by the news of a misfortune which has befallen his friend, because we regard this as a sign of an uncharitable character. We may be mistaken, of course. The same person might have been the first to try to prevent the misfortune if it had been in his power; but we judge from average cases.

As for opinions and beliefs, it may be said that they involve responsibility in so far as they are supposed to depend on the will. Generally it is not so much the opinion itself but rather the expression, or the outward consequence, of it that calls forth moral indignation; and in any case the blame, strictly speaking, refers either to such acts, or to the cause of the opinion within the will. That a certain belief, or "unbelief," is never as such a proper object of censure is recognised both by Catholic and Protestant theology. Thomas Aquinas points out that the *sin* of unbelief consists in "contrary opposition to the faith, whereby one stands out against the hearing of the faith, or even despises faith," and that, though such unbelief itself is in the intellect, the cause of it is in the will. And he adds that in those who have heard nothing of the faith, unbelief has not the character of a sin, "but rather of a penalty, inasmuch as such ignorance of divine things is a consequence of

the sin of our first parent.”* Dr. Wardlaw likewise observes : —“ The Bible condemns no man for not knowing what he never heard of, or for not believing what he could not know Ignorance is criminal only when it arises from wilful inattention, or from aversion of heart to truth. Unbelief involves guilt, when it is the effect and manifestation of the same aversion—of a want of will to that which is right and good.”† To shut one’s eyes to truth may be a heinous wrong, but nobody is blameable for seeing nothing with his eyes shut.

* Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, ii, 10, 1 sq.

† Wardlaw, *Sermons on Man’s Accountableness for his Belief*, &c., 1830, p. 38.

VII.—KANT'S IDEALISM.

By G. E. MOORE.

"It has been hitherto assumed," says Kant,* "that all our knowledge must conform to objects; but on this assumption all attempts to make out anything about those objects *a priori* by means of conceptions, in such a way as to enlarge our knowledge, came to nothing. Then let us try for once, whether we do not succeed better in the problems of Metaphysics, by assuming that objects must conform to our knowledge; an hypothesis, which is immediately more agreeable to the desired possibility of an *a priori* knowledge of them—a knowledge which can establish something with regard to objects, *before they are given to us*.† It is with this assumption as with the first ideas of Copernicus, who, when he found he could not advance in the explanation of the motions of the heavenly bodies, on the assumption that the whole host of stars revolved around the spectator, tried whether he could not succeed better, if he supposed the spectator to revolve and the stars to stand still. Now a similar experiment can be made in Metaphysics, so far as concerns the *Intuition* of objects. If our intuition were bound to conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything *a priori* about that nature; but if the object (as presented to the senses) conforms to the nature of our intuitive faculty, I can very well imagine such a possibility. Since, however, I cannot stop short at these intuitions, if they are to be converted into knowledge, but must relate them as presentations to something or other as object and must determine this object by their means, I can again

* Preface to Second Edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*.

† My italics.

either assume that the *conceptions*, by means of which I bring this determination to pass, also conform to the object, and then I am again in the same perplexity regarding the manner in which I can know anything about it *a priori*: or else I assume that the objects or (which is the same thing) our *experience*, in which alone they are known as given objects, conforms to these conceptions, and then I at once see an easier way out of my difficulty, since experience is itself such a kind of knowledge as to require the Understanding; and I must presuppose the rule of the Understanding *in myself*,* before objects are given me, that is, must presuppose it *a priori*—a rule which is expressed in *a priori* conceptions, to which accordingly all objects of experience must necessarily conform, and with which they must agree.”

In this passage Kant gives a sufficiently clear account of one of the points in which his Idealism differs from the Idealism of Berkeley, with which he was so angry at having his own confused. And this point is the one to which, as he himself explains, he refers by calling his theory Transcendental Idealism. He means by that title that he attributes merely ideal existence, or existence in the mind, to certain entities which are not indeed *transcendent*, since they are not *objects*, but which are also not *parts* of experience or particular experiences, since they are, as he says, conditions of all possible experience. These entities are not *objects*—substantial individuals or things—but are merely “forms” in which the objects of experience are arranged: they are the forms of Intuition, Space and Time, and the forms of thought, conceptions of the Understanding or “categories,” of which one instance is “causality.” Kant’s Idealism is Transcendental, and differs from Berkeley’s in that, whereas Berkeley only maintained the “ideality,” or merely mental existence of particular objects, Kant maintains the ideality of the forms in which these objects are arranged. Berkeley and others before Kant had not perceived the

* My italics.

necessity of distinguishing so clearly between sense-impressions, "the matter of knowledge," and the forms in which all such impressions are always arranged.

Kant, then, here gives us one point in which his Idealism differs from Berkeley's; he holds, what Berkeley did not expressly hold, that space and time and causality exist only in or for the mind. And he also gives us one of the reasons which lead him to think this particular view of his true. If, he says, we only saw [that particular objects had geometrical properties, we could not possibly be entitled to assert that *all* objects would *always* have them. It is only if the mind is so constituted that, whenever anything is presented to it, it invests that thing with geometrical properties, that we can be entitled to assert that everything we shall ever experience will have those properties. In short, Kant offers his theory as an explanation of how we can know that certain things are true of *all* objects. If, he says, we know that the mind always attaches these predicates to everything presented to it, then we can know that everything presented will have these predicates. Therefore, he concludes, the only predicates which do attach to *all* things—formal predicates—are given to them by the mind.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism is thus connected with what was certainly a great discovery of his. He discovered that all mathematical propositions are what he calls "synthetic"—as he here says, that they "enlarge our knowledge." They do not merely tell us that a certain predicate is a part of that of which we predicate it: they tell us that A has the predicate B, although B is neither identical with A, nor a part of A; they are not identical nor analytic. Hume had convinced Kant that the proposition, "Every event has a cause," was not analytic; and, in thinking of this fact, Kant discovered, what no one had clearly recognised before, that $2 + 2 = 4$ was not analytic either. Hume had inferred that we had no reason whatever to believe that every event had a cause; but Kant thought it was obviously absurd to maintain this of $2 + 2 = 4$: it was

absurd to say that we had no title to assert " $2 + 2$ are *always* 4"; to admit that $2 + 2$ might sometimes make 4 and sometimes not. But, on the other hand, all previous philosophers, who had held that we did know *universal* propositions, had held that they were analytic; that it was only because they asserted "B is a part of A B," or "A" is identical with "A," that we could know them to be *always* true. Kant, therefore, saw an entirely new difficulty. He saw, in consequence of what Hume said, that $2 + 2 = 4$ was synthetic; yet he was convinced (what Hume would have led him to deny) that $2 + 2 = 4$ was *always* true—true of every case. In his own words, he recognised for the first time that there are "*a priori* synthetic propositions." He asked himself the question: How are synthetic *a priori* propositions possible? And Transcendental Idealism was his answer. They are possible only because Space, Time, and the categories are "ideal"—ways in which the mind arranges things.

I have thus represented Kant's Transcendental Idealism as an attempt to answer the question: How can we know *universal* synthetic propositions to be true? This is certainly a part of the meaning of the passage which I have quoted: Kant certainly does maintain this, whatever else he may maintain besides. And it is only this theory which I propose to consider. I may, perhaps, explain (since I have used ambiguous language) that I mean by a universal proposition, any proposition which asserts, either "All instances of A have the predicate B," or "Anything which has the predicate A has the predicate B." I may also add that I have no doubt whatever that the instances of such propositions which I have quoted, namely, all mathematical propositions and the proposition, "Every event has a cause," are, as Kant thought, synthetic. I do not propose to argue that point. I regard it as an exceedingly important discovery of Kant's—a discovery which would, perhaps, by itself alone, entitle him to the rank usually assigned him among philosophers.

My present business, however, is with Transcendental Idealism.

I propose to consider *both*, whether Transcendental Idealism gives a satisfactory answer to the question: How are synthetic propositions *a priori* possible? *and* whether Transcendental Idealism is true. And for this purpose, I will first try to re-state, in the simplest possible terms, with less reference to Kant's own language than I have hitherto used, precisely what the question is, to which I doubt whether Transcendental Idealism is a satisfactory answer. Kant, as I have said, may be trying to answer other questions as well; the meaning of his terms is much more complex than that of those which I shall use: but he certainly does pretend to have solved the difficulty I shall state—that was one of the difficulties in his mind—and I only propose to consider that part of his doctrine.

Well, then, we have the fact that we do make judgments of the following kind. We believe that: If there be *any* two groups of objects, of each of which it may be truly predicated that there are two objects in the group, then it may be truly predicated of the whole that it is a group of four objects: this proposition is *universal*, it concerns *all* groups of the kind named. And we have similar geometrical beliefs. We believe that: Of any objects of which we can truly predicate certain geometrical relations, we may also truly predicate some other different geometrical relation. Finally, we can at least think, whether we believe or not, that: Every event in time has been preceded at a certain interval by some other event, such that, whenever an event of precisely this second kind exists, an event of the first kind will exist after it at exactly the same distance in time: *i.e.*, every event has a cause. These are all of them universal propositions, they all assert that a certain predicate, of what Kant calls a *formal* kind, attaches to *all* objects to which a certain other predicate attaches. And,

being universal, they are all independent of experience in the following sense: they all assert that certain predicates apply to things which we never have seen and never shall see—to things which nobody has even thought of: they say that certain predicates apply to *all* objects of a certain kind, whether actually experienced or not. This was Kant's difficulty. How can we know that certain predicates do attach to things which we have never experienced? How can we know that any universal proposition is true? And his answer is: Because the mind is such that it attaches these predicates to everything whatever which it ever experiences. This is the doctrine of Transcendental Idealism.

Now what I want first to point out is that Kant's question is ambiguous. He is asking, as if they were one, *two* quite different questions. *Two* questions are always asked, whenever we ask: How can we or do we *know* a thing? for the simple reason that knowledge is a complex concept. When we say we *know* a thing, we mean *both* that we believe it, that we have a certain mental attitude towards the proposition in question, and also we mean that the proposition is *true*. Hence, when we ask: How do you know that? we are asking both: (1) How do you come to believe it, what is the *cause* of your believing it? and (2), How do you know that what you believe is true? What title have you to say that your belief is knowledge and not *mere* belief? What evidence proves that the object of your belief is true?

Now it is evident that the second of these questions is far the more important; and it is evident also that Kant intended to answer this second question. He wished to explain the *validity* of universal propositions; not only how we could come to believe them, but how they could be valid. Only so, could he be contradicting Hume's sceptical conclusion. Hume asserted: We have no title to believe that every event has a cause; and Kant answers: We have a title; I can prove it *true* that every event has a cause.

Kant, therefore, is trying to prove the validity of universal propositions—that we have a title to assert them. And he regards his Transcendental Idealism as giving this title. His argument is: Every object will have certain formal predicates, because mind always gives an object that form. I wish to point out two absolutely conclusive objections to this argument:—

(1) Kant says: From the fact that mind is so constituted as to give to every object a certain form, we can infer that every presented object will have that form. And this reasoning is perfectly valid; the conclusion does follow from the premiss. But the *first* objection which I have to make to the whole argument is this, namely, that the premiss itself is a universal proposition of exactly the same kind which it was proposed to *prove*. The premiss is: Mind *always* acts in a certain way upon, arranges in a certain manner, *everything* which is presented to it. That is to say, the only evidence which Kant offers to prove the validity of universal propositions is—merely another universal proposition. It is, then, perfectly certain that he has not done what he professed to do—given us a title to believe all universal propositions. There is *one* universal proposition, at least, which he has simply assumed, for which he has given no reason. If you ask him: How can you know that mind will *always* act in that manner? he has no answer to give. He simply assumes that *this* proposition is true, and that there is no need of evidence to prove it so. It is certain, on the contrary, that it needs evidence just as much as $2 + 2 = 4$; if we need a title to believe that $2 + 2 = 4$, we certainly need one to believe that mind always acts in a certain way on every presented object. I do not now say that this universal proposition of Kant's is untrue; I shall presently try to show that it is. My present point is only this perfectly certain one: that there is *one* universal proposition, at least, which Kant has given us no title to believe; that, therefore, Kant has *not*, in his own words, “explained the possibility of *all* synthetic propositions *a priori*.”

But (2) there is a far more serious objection to Kant's argument. I have just said that a certain conclusion will follow from Kant's premiss, if once you assume that premiss to be true; and it is, I think, this fact—the fact that that conclusion does follow from the premiss, which gives to Kant's Transcendental Idealism whatever plausibility it possesses. But what is the conclusion which follows from the premiss? The premiss is: "Mind always gives a certain form to everything presented"; and the conclusion which follows from this is: "Everything presented will always have the formal predicates which mind gives to it." And what I have now to point out is that this conclusion, which *does* follow from Kant's assumption, is *not* the conclusion which Kant set out to prove. Let us remember what the universal propositions were, of which Kant was going to prove the possibility. One of them was: The total number of objects in any two groups, of two each, is 4. And *this* conclusion will *not* follow from Kant's premiss. What *will* follow is only this: Whenever we perceive two groups of 2, then the whole group has the predicate 4 given it by mind. That is to say, it does not entitle us to assert that *any* 2 groups of 2 make 4; but only that any two presented groups make 4 *at the time when they are presented*. Kant's premiss does not entitle him to any more than this: he has given us no reason whatever to think but that the moment 2 groups of 2 objects cease to be presented, precisely the very same objects in those same two groups, which had the total number 4 when presented, may have the total number 7 or 5 or a hundred billions. In other words, Kant's premiss does *not* prove that $2 + 2 = 4$ in every case: on the contrary, it allows that more often than not $2 + 2$ may make 5 or any other number. That is to say, Kant's Transcendental Idealism gives no answer to that scepticism, greater than Hume's, which he devised it to answer.

3 But, so far, I have given to Kant's argument the interpretation which is the most favourable for him in one respect:

I have assumed his principle to be that mind does really give to objects the formal predicates in question, so that when they are presented they really and truly have those predicates; I have allowed that, assuming his premiss, it would follow that 2 and 2 are *sometimes* 4; and this is certainly the *most* favourable interpretation possible: his premiss certainly will not entitle us to assert that 2 and 2 are always or even generally 4. But even this conclusion—that 2 and 2 are *sometimes* 4—will only follow if we assume him really to mean that mind *gives* these predicates to objects, so that, for the moment, they really belong to them: and I believe that this hypothesis was part of what was in Kant's mind. Yet I believe also that he would never for a moment have entertained such a belief, unless he had confused it with another, which is quite different and much more plausible. No one, I think, has ever definitely maintained the proposition, that mind actually *gives* properties to things: that, *e.g.*, it *makes* one thing the cause of another, or makes $2 + 2 = 4$. What it *is* plausible to maintain is that the nature of our mind causes us to *think* that one thing is cause of another, and to *think* that 2 and 2 are 4. This, I think, is certainly *part* of what Kant meant by his Transcendental Idealism; though he confused it with the different theory that mind gave objects these properties. Indeed, I think it may be worth while to point out that this interpretation strictly follows from one doctrine of Kant's, the precise meaning of which has not received all the attention it deserves. Namely, Kant holds that we cannot know *at all* what properties belong to "Things in Themselves." What I wish to point out is that if we examine carefully the meaning of the statement, it merely amounts to this: That we never can know that a thing, *as it is in itself*, really has, even for a moment, any property whatever. It would follow, therefore, that in Kant's view, when I think "The fingers on this hand are five," I do not really know that those fingers, as they are in themselves, are five; and if I don't know that, the only alternative is that, in Kant's view, I merely

think them to be 5. A good deal of confusion has, I think, arisen from the failure to see that the only alternative to the admission that we do know things *as they are in themselves*, is the admission that we have no knowledge at all. We cannot escape this dilemma by contrasting with "Things-in-themselves" the "objects of experience": for, if we know anything about the objects of experience, then we know what properties the objects of experience have, *as they are in themselves*. Even to know what we think about them is to know a Thing-in-itself. For if we do know that we think a thing at all, then we know that our thought, *as it is in itself*, really is a thought of that thing. Thus, in so far as Kant denies any possible knowledge of "Things-in-themselves," there is reason to suppose that he does not really think that mind *gives* predicates to objects, so that even for a moment those objects really have their predicate: his theory is that we do not know what properties anything really has itself.

Let us then suppose his Transcendental Idealism to mean that the mind is so constituted as always to *make us think* that the objects presented to it have certain predicates. Can he infer from this premiss the validity of universal propositions? On the contrary, he cannot now infer that 2 and 2 are 4 even in any one instance: he can only infer that we shall always think them to be so. From the fact that we always think a thing it certainly does not follow that what we think is true.

I have, then, tried to show that on neither of two possible interpretations of Kant's Transcendental Idealism will it follow from that doctrine that universal propositions are valid: on the first, it will only follow that 2 and 2 are sometimes 4, on the second it will not follow that 2 and 2 are ever 4, but only that we always think so. And, before that, I pointed out that Kant's Transcendental Idealism was itself an universal proposition; and that, therefore, even if it proved the validity of any others (as we now see it doesn't), it does not prove the validity of all.

itself.

I now propose to deal briefly with the question: Is this universal proposition itself—the proposition that the mind always attaches to things certain formal predicates, or makes us think that things have these predicates—itself true? And first of all: What reason has Kant to give for it? Here we find, curiously enough, that his chief reason is the assumed fact that other universal propositions are true: he infers that this must be true of the mind, from the assumed fact that mathematical propositions and the principle of causality are true. What he says is: They could not be true, *unless* mind contributed these predicates; we could have no title to assert that all things had causes, unless the mind gave them this predicate. Since, therefore, all things have causes, and 2 and 2 are always 4, the mind must give these predicates. This reasoning obviously will not prove Transcendental Idealism. From the mere fact that the number of objects in two groups of two is 4, we cannot infer that mind caused them to have that predicate; nor from that fact can we even infer that mind caused us to think that they were 4. There is, therefore, so far, no reason whatever to think Transcendental Idealism true; and I am not aware that Kant gives any other reason for it. He does not profess, by an empirical observation of the mind, to discover that it always does cause events to have effects or cause us to think that 2 and 2 are 4. Nor do I know of any facts tending to show that this is the case. It may be true that every mental event has some mental cause; and thus if Transcendental Idealism only asserted that our *belief* in universal propositions has some mental cause, Transcendental Idealism might possibly be true. But even this is quite doubtful; I have only to say, as against one form of the theory, that I can find no evidence that, when I apprehend that 2 and 2 are 4, that apprehension is any more due to the activity of my mind than when I see the colour of that tablecloth. I can apprehend that 2 and 2 are 4 as passively as I can apprehend anything. Transcendental Idealism may possibly be true if it

be understood as this comparatively unimportant psychological proposition; what is certain is that it does not explain the possibility of experience, if by that be meant that it gives us a title to assert universal propositions, and not merely that it asserts our belief in them to have some mental cause.

So much then for Kant's Idealism, so far as regards the point, in which, as I said, it differs obviously from that of Berkeley, namely, the contention that our knowledge of universal propositions is due to the constitution of our minds. This appears to me to be the only Idealistic contention for which Kant offers any arguments, and I have tried to show with regard to those arguments (1) that it will not explain the validity of universal propositions, *i.e.*, will not give us any ground for thinking them true, and (2) that it will not follow from their validity, and is at best merely a doubtful psychological assumption. But I have now to mention certain idealistic opinions, for which Kant gives no arguments, but which he certainly holds and which differ in no respect from those of Berkeley. Kant holds, namely, that spatial and temporal properties, that sounds and colours, and that causality exist only in the mind of him who is aware of them. He holds that space and time themselves are forms of consciousness, that sounds and colours are sensations, that causality is a conception. In all this he agrees with Berkeley; Berkeley also held that everything of which we are aware is an idea or a notion—a constituent part, that is, of our own minds. Kant himself has denied furiously that he does agree with Berkeley; he says he holds that we do know that objects really exist in space; and if he had held that, he certainly would not have agreed with Berkeley. But I shall try to show that he himself did not know what he held; that, at least, he certainly held that objects do not exist in space. It has often been pointed out that at one time Kant says his difference from Berkeley is that he asserts the existence of Things-in-themselves, while Berkeley denies it; and at another time says his difference is that he

asserts the existence of things in space, while Berkeley denies that. On the first point he certainly does not differ from Berkeley, since Berkeley also holds that there do exist things-in-themselves, though he says there are none except God and other minds. But that matter exists, Berkeley certainly does deny: and what I have now to show is that Kant denies it too.

Let us consider what is Kant's theory of experience. He holds that objects of experience, *e.g.*, chairs and tables, consist of the "matter of sensation," colours, sounds, and other qualities, arranged in the "forms" of space and time, and connected by the categories or forms of understanding. With regard to the first of these entities, sensations, he never suggests for a moment that he means by them anything but mental facts: on the contrary, he repeatedly insists that what he is talking about is *presentations* (*Vorstellungen*), *i.e.*, when he says "blue," he means *the consciousness of blue*; when he says "hard," he means *the sensation of hardness*. It is, then, these mental, purely subjective, elements, out of which, according to him, when they are arranged in space and time, matter and all material objects are *composed*. When we perceive an object in space, what we perceive, according to him, is merely some sensations of our own arranged in space and time and connected with other things by the categories. That is to say, the *subjects* of what I have called his formal predicates are exclusively our own sensations: when I say that there are 4 chairs there, he understands me to say that I have 4 groups of sensations—it is to my sensations that the predicate 4 attaches. It is plain, then, that the matter of sensation is, according to him, merely in my mind. But it is equally plain that time and space and the categories are so too: his great discovery is, he often says, that the former are ways in which the subject is affected, and that the latter are ways in which it acts. If, then, he did maintain that matter really existed, other than as a part of mind, he would be maintaining that

out of three subjective things, things in my mind, there was somehow composed one thing that was objective, *not* in my mind. But he never does maintain this: what he does maintain is that to say that sensations have spatial predicates and are connected by the categories, is *the same thing* as to say that they exist objectively. And, if this be understood, it is plain why he thought he disagreed with Berkeley. If to say that matter exists is simply equivalent to saying that the categories do apply to it, he does hold that matter exists. But the fact is that the two statements are *not* equivalent: I can see quite plainly that when I think that chair exists, what I think is *not* that certain sensations of mine are connected by the categories. What I do think is that certain *objects* of sensation do really exist in a real space and really are causes and effects of other things. Whether what I think is true is another question: what is certain is that if we ask whether matter exists, we are asking this question; we are not asking whether certain sensations of ours are connected by the categories. And one other thing is certain too, namely, that colours and sounds are *not* sensations; that space and time are *not* forms of sense; that causality is *not* a thought. All these things are things *of* which we are aware, things *of* which we are conscious; they are in no sense parts of consciousness. Kant's Idealism, therefore, in so far as it asserts that matter is composed of mental elements, is certainly false. In so far as it asserts this, it differs in no respect from Berkeley's, and both are false. Whether or not Kant's further contention, in which he also agrees with Berkeley, is also false—namely, that what we really do mean by matter, something *not* composed of mental elements, does not exist—this, as I say, is quite another question.

VIII.—PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

By G. F. STOUT.

"EVERYONE," says Thomas Reid, "knows that extension, divisibility, figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softness, and fluidity were by Mr. Locke called primary qualities of body; and that sound, colour, taste, smell, and heat or cold were called secondary qualities. Is there a just foundation for this distinction? Is there anything common to the primary which belongs not to the secondary? And what is it?"

The first of the questions thus formulated by Reid may be regarded as settled. No competent person doubts that the distinction has a real foundation. But on the second question it seems to me that there is much room for discussion. The answer which is most familiar and also most precise and clear is, I think, definitely wrong. On the other hand, those philosophers who reject this false doctrine do not in general substitute for it any positive and detailed view of their own which I find myself able to accept. They are more bent on showing their opponents do not solve the problem than on solving it themselves.

The definite view commonly accepted by representatives of Physics and Physiology and also by many Philosophers is that the primary qualities really do belong to bodies, whereas the so-called secondary qualities are not qualities of external things at all but qualities of sensations experienced by percipient minds when external things stimulate the organs of sense in certain ways.

Postponing consideration of that part of this theory which relates to primary attributes, let us first examine the contention that the secondary attributes are attributes not of bodies but of sensations. This contention is urged against

what is presumed to be a natural fallacy of ordinary thinking. It is directed against a supposed confusion of common sense between qualities of sensation and properties of external things. When the plain man says that burning coal is hot he is taken to mean that the peculiar quality of the sensation felt by him when he holds his hands near the fire is actually part of the nature of the burning coal. Similarly, when he says that grass is green he is taken to mean that the specific quality of the visual appearance of the grass when he looks at it by ordinary daylight inheres in the grass itself. Against such a view it is urged that heat in this sense is no more in the fire, and that greenness in this sense is no more in the grass than pain is in the surgeon's knife. Grass and burning coal being insentient cannot experience temperature-sensations or colour-sensations. Hence, all that the plain man ought to mean in asserting, for example, that the fire in the grate is hot, is that it has a power of making him feel hot under certain conditions. If we enquire on what this power depends we are referred to the primary properties of the fire, such as the vibrations of its molecules.

Now, this criticism of common sense seems to me to be founded on a misconception of the actual procedure of ordinary thinking. In principle the plain man is not really guilty of the confusion with which he is charged. He does not in general confound intrinsic characters of his own sensations with attributes of external things. On the other hand, I admit and maintain that in ascribing secondary qualities to corporeal things he does not merely mean their power to produce certain sensations in us. His point of view is not that of his critics; but neither is it that which his critics ascribe to him. What it really is remains to be investigated. When it is fairly presented it will, I think, be found defensible, and indeed the only one which is defensible, for the case of primary as well as of secondary qualities.

In investigating the view of the plain man, the very worst course we can pursue is to ask the plain man himself what he

means. His thought is through and through based on latent assumptions and implicit inferences which he does not ordinarily attempt to define and formulate. So soon as he attempts to define and formulate them he becomes a philosopher. But his first untrained ventures in philosophical analyses are sure to be extremely crude and unsatisfactory. To depend on his raw opinions about such topics as we are here concerned with is like depending on a child for an account of the psychology of his own mental processes. If we wish really to understand common sense we must follow and analyse its actual procedure with the view of bringing out the presuppositions which underlie this procedure. We must not ask it directly to give an account of these presuppositions.

This being understood, we may now proceed to enquire what is meant in ordinary, unreflective thought, when things are asserted to be hot, cold, sweet, red, blue, &c. We may take as typical the case of temperature. I touch a piece of iron and feel a sensation of heat. I consequently assert that the iron is hot. What do I mean by this assertion? Not merely that the body is actually producing a certain sensation in me. For I presume that the iron was hot before I touched it or came near it, and that it will continue to be so if I remove my hand and go away. Do I, then, regard the hotness of the iron as a power to produce a sensation of heat under certain assignable conditions? That is certainly a part of my meaning. But it is far from being the whole of it. On the contrary, the hotness of the iron is thought of as being a quality in it as specific and positive as the quality of my sensation when I touch it. The one is no more a mere possibility than the other. This is shown by the fact that in ascribing secondary qualities to things we normally think of the things as if they were actually producing the sensations in a hypothetical perceiver. When we think of iron as hot and gradually cooling down, we think of it as if it were in fact generating gradually diminishing sensations of heat in some one near enough to

feel them, even though we are quite well aware that no one is actually present. When we now think of the books in our library as red, blue, green, and yellow, we think of them as they would appear to us were we there to look at them in ordinary daylight. But we proceed quite otherwise in the case of mere possibilities. When we think of a hayrick as inflammable we do not do so by representing it as if it were actually in flames. When we think of a window pane as brittle we do not represent it as actually being broken. In such case we consciously distinguish between possibility and its actualisation. We do not lose sight of the possibility as such and mentally substitute the actuality.

Are we then to conclude that common sense actually supposes sensations exist and change when no one actually experiences them? Before charging it with so flagrant an absurdity we ought, I think, to enquire first whether there may not be another and more defensible interpretation of its procedure. It seems to me that there is another which is not merely defensible, but the only one which is defensible.

There are two main points to be emphasised. The first is that the sensations which mediate our knowledge of the secondary qualities do so only in so far as they represent, express, or stand for something other than themselves; and their representative function being independent of their actual existence at this or that moment in this or that mind, they may be validly thought of as if they existed when in fact they do not and cannot exist. The second point is that the distinction between what is represented and its sense-representation is only a latent presupposition of ordinary thinking. The plain man does not in general formulate it, though in our logical analysis of his procedure we must formulate it for him. What are called the secondary qualities of matter are not identified with what is represented in distinction from its sense-representation, nor yet with the sense-representation in distinction from what it stands for. It is rather the

complex unity formed by both together and commonly left unanalysed.

The representative function of sensation may be best exhibited by contrast with cases in which it is absent.

The gradual diminution and final discontinuance of heat sensations which ensue when the sentient organism is withdrawn from the perceived object is without representative value. It depends on movements of the organism which neither produce nor imply any relevant change in the object. Hence the concomitant change of sensation is rightly regarded as merely a change in the sensible appearance of the thing which does not express or represent any corresponding alteration in the thing itself. All such variations in sense experience may therefore be ignored or cancelled as irrelevant in mentally dealing with external objects. Now, if it is legitimate to cancel out variations of sensible appearance due merely to variable conditions of perception, it is for that very reason legitimate to represent the object as it would appear under uniform conditions of perception, whether or not it is actually so perceived, or, indeed, whether or not it is perceived at all. All sensible changes and differences under uniform conditions of perception express or represent corresponding changes in things perceived ; for by hypothesis they can be due to no other cause (and the principle of causality underlies the whole procedure). Hence we are interested in their representative value, and not in their actual existence. We may and do think of them as if they actually existed when they do not actually exist. We may, for instance, legitimately represent the sun as sensibly hot before any sentient beings appeared on this planet. Such procedure is logically justifiable provided always that one grand rule is observed. In comparing one thing with another, or different states of the same thing, it is always presupposed that the conditions of perception are sufficiently similar to prevent confusion between mere difference of sensible appearance and difference in the nature of the things

compared. The uniformity is, of course not absolute, but only sufficient in view of the fineness of discrimination required.

Coming now to our second point, we must insist that, though this distinction between the independent nature of material things and the mode in which their nature is sensibly represented is logically presupposed in ordinary thinking, yet it is not, as a rule, explicitly recognised. On the contrary, both the sensible representation and what is represented are equally included in what are called the secondary properties of matter. Were it otherwise the secondary properties would be for common sense mere powers, or occult qualities, or if they had a positive and specific content, this would be definable only in terms of the primary properties. In fact, however, they have for common sense a positive and specific qualitative content of their own. They possess this content because the qualities and relations of temperature, colour, sound, smell, and taste sensations enter in virtue of their representative function into the essential constitution of the corresponding secondary attributes of matter.

If this analysis is correct it follows that the secondary attributes of matter are correlated but not identical with corresponding qualities of sensation. Hence, in ordinary language we speak not of a yellow sensation or a hot sensation, but of a sensation of yellow or a sensation of heat. In ordinary life our predominant interest is in the sensible properties of bodies with which we are conversant through the medium of sense, and therefore we name these directly. The corresponding sensations are named indirectly by reference to these. But it would be a gross error to suppose on this account that the sensations as such are without qualitative content. On the contrary, whatever qualitative content belongs to the secondary properties of matter presupposes and is derived from the qualitative content of sensations *quâ* sensations. This is to be borne in mind when we come to deal with primary qualities.

We have seen that in comparing objects with each other as regards their secondary qualities, standard conditions of perception are presupposed. The selection of the standard conditions is, of course, in part determined by convenience of reference. But there is also another motive which involves an important principle. Distinct sensible appearances are preferred to those which are relatively indistinct. The principle involved is that difference in the sensible appearance under uniform conditions of perception always expresses difference in the things perceived, whereas absence of difference in the sensible appearance does not necessarily express absence of difference in the things perceived. In the latter case all that is implied is that the differences which fail to appear are slighter than those which do appear. For this reason a near view of an object is preferred to a more distant view, and in determining the proper or constant colours of things we think of them as they appear by ordinary daylight and not as they appear in the dusk when only different shades of grey are discernible and other colour distinctions are hidden from view.

This analysis of the secondary attributes of matter holds good in all essential respects for the primary also. The primary, like the secondary, are correlated but not identical with intrinsic characters of sensation, especially visual, tactual, and motor sensation. The correlation is essentially of the same kind for both. Sensation enters into the constitution of the primary attributes only in so far as certain features of sense-experience represent something other than themselves, and it is only because this representative function is logically independent of the actual occurrence and fluctuation of sense-affectations that the primary qualities can be validly thought of as existing in the absence of percipients. We are justified in thinking of matter as extended and movable in space before the existence of sentient being. But we have exactly the same justification for thinking of it as hot or coloured. Finally, the positive and specific nature of the primary

qualities no less than that of the secondary is derived from corresponding sensations.

We may take as our chief example the most fundamental of the primary qualities—Extension. In ordinary language it seems strange to speak of sensations as extended. The reason is that they are not extended in the same sense as corporeal things. Bodies are extended in space. But touch and sight sensations do not in the ordinary sense of the words occupy Space. They do not occupy any part of the single, homogeneous, infinite space which embraces all material things and their distances. They do not occupy any part of the space in which Cardiff or Oxford is so many miles from London, and in which bodies attract each other inversely as the square of their distance. None the less, touch and sight sensations have an intrinsic character correlated with spatial size and shape, just as the quality of sensations of yellow is correlated with the yellowness of buttercups and oranges. We may call this intrinsic character sensible extension. Since in ordinary life we are interested in sensible extension mainly as an expression or manifestation of spatial extension, spatial extension may be called real and sensible extension apparent. Thus we contrast the apparent size of a thing as seen at this or that distance from the eye with its real size as measured in feet or inches. Spatial or real extension is throughout homogeneous; sensible extension is of two kinds, the visual and the tactual. Their difference is perhaps comparable to that of the intensity of light sensations and the intensity of sound sensations.

Consider first visual extension. On closing the eyes though we cease to see external objects or any part of our own bodies, there is still a field or expanse of visual sensation which may be entirely grey or variegated with colour. Each distinguishable part of this field or expanse has local relations of position and distance to other parts, and the whole is a single continuous extensive quantum. Yet the visual expanse thus

presented for our attentive scrutiny does not occupy any part of space. If it is in space it must be here or there. But we cannot from the nature of the case say where it is. There is no room for it in the space occupied by bodies. It may be suggested that the extent of the visual field coincides with that of the retina. To this it seems a sufficient reply that the extent of the visual field or its parts is not merely dependent on the size of the retina or its parts, but also on its anatomical structure—on the packing of rods and cones. Thus, the same stimulation of the lateral portions of the retina gives a less extensive sensation than stimulation of the *fovea centralis*. Again, if the expanse of visual sensation occupies any portion of space it must be conterminous with other outlying portions of space. But in this sense it is boundless though not of course infinite in magnitude. Parts within it are bounded by other contiguous parts, but in its totality it does not form part of a more extensive whole, and it has therefore no limits which are in any sense spatial. It has no shape. If you doubt this try to discover what its shape is. In the next place, if it occupied space, it would be commensurable with other spatial quanta. It ought to be possible to express its magnitude in feet or inches. But this is an intrinsic impossibility. We cannot, for instance, say that it is equal in extent to the total tract of the external world which comes within the range of vision when the eyes are open. For what we can thus embrace in one view may vary indefinitely in extent. It may include the expanse of the starry heavens or it may be confined to the walls of a room. Again, a part of space may be conceivably empty; but the conception of a vacuum has no application to visual extension. There is no visual extension where there are no colour and brightness sensations.

Finally, space is a common object, in principle equally accessible to all of us. But each of us is directly acquainted only with his own visual field. The extension of colour and brightness sensations disappears with the sensations themselves,

when a man dies or is afflicted with cortical blindness. But no part of space is thereby annihilated.

What has been said of the visual field of the closed eye holds also in all essentials for the visual field of the open eye. To avoid tedious repetition, I shall leave you to make the application for yourselves. I now pass on to consider the relation of real or spatial extension to the visual extension, which is its sensible appearance. The relevant facts are familiar to everyone. Everyone knows that the size and shape of the visible appearance of a thing vary indefinitely as we approach or recede from it, or otherwise change our position in relation to it, while the thing remains constant in shape and size. The visual appearance of a match-box in my hand may be co-extensive with the visual appearance of a distant mountain. The entire disappearance of things when we go far enough away is a limiting case of such variations. Now, we cannot identify the real size of a thing with the whole series of possible changes in the extent of its visible appearance, nor yet with the fixed order of their possible occurrence. For the real extension may remain constant, while its appearance alters, and it does not in its own nature include or imply the concept of change. Still less can we select this or that apparent extension and identify it with the real. For each of them has in principle just as much and just as little logical title to be so regarded as any of the others. They pass into one another by continuous gradations, so that it is impossible to fix on one only, to the exclusion of all others differing ever so slightly from it. We do, indeed, usually think of the real extension in terms of its visual appearance under certain conditions. But these conditions are loosely determined, and they are variable according to our convenience or the degree of accuracy required. We may choose any conditions we please, provided we abide by them with sufficient strictness in comparing one object with another, and provided they yield visual appearances sufficiently distinct in view of the required fineness

of discrimination. If we are interested in differences too slight to be revealed to the naked eye, we have recourse to a magnifying glass; and the visible extent of the thing under the magnifying glass has just as much claim to be identified with its real magnitude as its extent when it is seen by the naked eye.

In general, extension as a characteristic of visual sensation is quite distinct from the extension of things in space. And yet if we leave tactual experience out of count, extension as a property of bodies and the space in which bodies are extended derive their positive and distinctive content from the extensiveness of visual sensation. Real extension is, indeed, something other than visual extension; but its extensive character belongs to it only inasmuch as this something is represented in terms of the extensiveness of sight sensations or of touch sensations.

Since Berkeley's time it has been customary to assume that touch affords an immediate revelation of the real size and shape which is denied to sight. Visual extension is admitted to have a merely representative value, but the reality represented is identified with tactual extension. It is easy to show that this distinction is indefensible. Apply the blunt end of a pencil to the forehead, to the lips, to the back of the hand, to the tip of a finger, to the drum of the ear. The resulting tactual sensations vary conspicuously in extent, though the areas of the skin affected are throughout equal and the surface with which they are brought in contact remains constant in size. None of the tactual extensions has any better logical claim than the others to be identified with the real extent either of the skin stimulated or of the surface applied to it; and their rival claims are mutually destructive. Skin sensibility is also variable in this respect from one individual to another; it is different in the child and the adult; it is affected by diseases of the brain, and by the use of drugs such as narcotics.

The case is not altered if we turn to what are called kinaesthetic sensations—muscle, joint, and tendon sensations. Berkeley identified the real distance between one body and another with the series of joint, muscle, and tendon sensations which would be experienced in moving from one to the other. We ask what series is meant? Is it that which would be experienced in walking, or in running, or in hopping on one leg? Is it that which would be experienced by a child of three or by an adult with a long stride? Which of these series consists of feet and of yards? There is only one tenable answer to such questions, whatever sense-experience we may be considering. Given uniform conditions of perception, whatever these may be, differences of sensible extension and differences of more and less in the series of motor sensations represent differences in the external world and the differences as thus represented—the differences together with the mode of representing them are what we call differences of real, physical, or spatial extension. The more differences are discernible in the sensible appearance under sufficiently uniform conditions, the fuller and more exact is our knowledge of real size, shape, and distance. But we cannot fix on any set of conditions and identify the corresponding sensible extension with extension in space. Neither tactual nor visual extension occupy any part of the space in which bodies attract each other inversely as the square of the distance.

It follows that the single infinite all embracing Space of Kant is not, as he assumes, a form of sensibility at all. It is essentially a form of what he calls external objects, and as such already presupposes the work which he ascribes to the categories. Yet it is presented by him at the outset as a pre-condition of the work of the categories, and is from the outset confounded with sensible extension. No wonder that he found in it a most convenient middle term between the pure concepts of the understanding and the disparate matter of sense. This confusion, and a similar one relating to time, seem to me to vitiate

the argument of *Critique of Pure Reason* from beginning to end.

It is needless for me to deal separately with the other primary qualities, resistance and mobility. These are correlated with sensations of muscular tension and with sensible displacement within the field of sight and touch just as real extension is correlated with tactual and visual extension.

Our general result up to this point is that there is no essential difference between the primary and secondary attributes of matter so far as regards their connexion with sense-experience. Both are in one way independent of sense and in another dependent on it. Both are dependent on it for the positive content which makes them more than mere powers or occult qualities. Both are in the sense explained independent of it as regards their existence.

What, then, is the true foundation of the undoubted distinction between them which is marked by calling them respectively primary and secondary qualities? So far as I can see the difference lies in their respective relation to the interaction of material things. The executive order of the material world can be expressed only in terms of the primary and not in terms of the secondary properties of matter. The unity and continuity of material processes is intelligible only through the unity and continuity of Space. The system of uniformities of co-existence and sequence, and of quantitative equivalences and correspondences which constitutes the order of physical nature in its causal aspect can be formulated only in terms of extension, motion, and tension. On the other hand, we find no such constancy, continuity, and quantitative equivalence in the occurrence of sounds, colours, or smells. There is, *e.g.*, no system of laws according to which sounds succeed each other or vary concomitantly in loudness. But you can always obtain a certain note by striking the right key of a piano, and by striking more or less hard you can make it louder or softer.

This is mere common-place and needs no further exposition. But something must be said concerning the implications of this common-place. For an attempt may be made to use it so as to upset the results of our previous analysis. It may be urged that if agency belongs to matter in virtue of its primary properties, these properties must have an existence independent of sense-experience such as does not belong to the secondary. The steam hammer beats out the bar of steel and the sun attracts the planets independently of anyone's sensations. The primary properties are presupposed in the processes by which the organs of sense are stimulated; how, then, can they be dependent on the resulting sensations? Again, science finds itself bound to postulate operative conditions and therefore primary qualities where the secondary can have no place. Thus the particles of luminiferous ether cannot themselves be coloured. Does not this point to a radical difference between the primary and the secondary qualities in their relation to sense-experience?

In reply to such contentions, I need only refer again to the distinction between sensible representation and that which is represented. What is represented exists and operates independently of the coming and going of the sensuous presentations through which we express its existence and operation. It is independent of these as the topography of England is independent of the map of England, or as the rise and fall of temperature is independent of the rise and fall of the mercury in a thermometer. There is a systematic agency which we express in terms of sensible extension, motion, and muscular tension; so expressed it is what we call material causation—the interaction of bodies in space. But the features of sense-experience through which we represent it contribute nothing to its agency. On the other hand, since the representative value of sense-experience is independent of the existence of sensations, we may validly represent in terms of sensible extension, motion, and resistance, the processes through which

these and other sense-experiences come to be and cease to be. From the same point of view, it is easy to account for the existence of primary qualities in the absence of the secondary. There is no reason why sensible extension, motion, and resistance should not have a representative value, where sensible colour, sound, heat, and taste have none, just as relative positions and distance on a map have representative value where the flatness of the map, its absolute size, and the colouring of the counties have none. Similarly, in thinking of empty space, representative value attaches only to sensible extension and the series of muscle, joint, and tendon sensations.

And now I might regard my immediate problem as disposed of, so far as I am able to deal with it, were it not that a rival theory still demands attention—the theory which resolves the material world into a system of possibilities of sensation. This view is advocated in its purity by Mill, and with a well known reservation by Berkeley, and Kant at times seems to lean to the same side. According to it sensations have indeed a representative value, but what they represent is always only the possibility of getting other sensations in a fixed and systematic order. The material world is supposed by it to be constituted of actual sense-experiences, together with the systematic order of possible sense-experience. Against this doctrine I urge in the first place that the order of possible sensations is widely divergent from the order of the physical world and its processes. Consider the fluctuation of the visible appearance of a body as we approach or recede from it, and the variations of tactual extent as a body is applied to different parts of the skin. Such differences are not differences in the size of the body itself, and they are not included in what we mean when we say, for instance, that the body is three inches long. Again, as Kant has insisted, there is a contrast between the succession of our sensations and co-existence in the external world. The back and front of a house co-exist, but the corresponding sensations are successive. Finally, how can the

internal content of a solid body be resolved into any possible series of sensory presentations. Slice it as you will you only disclose surfaces; not solid content, but only the boundaries of solid content. The supporters of the theory usually meet such arguments by the help of extravagant illustrative hypotheses. They urge, for instance, that sentient beings, otherwise conditioned than ourselves, would experience simultaneously the sensations which we can experience only successively. But the appeal to such an imaginary percipient implies that at least the successive order of *our own* sensations, in spite of its fixed and systematic character, forms no part of the order of the physical world. Nor can the theory so long as it remains self-consistent supply us with any reason why the imaginary experience should be preferred to ours. The relevant difference cannot lie in the diverse conditions of perception. For these conditions, according to the theory, can themselves consist only in an order of actual and possible sensations. There seems to be no assignable ground for preferring the fictitious experience unless we already presuppose a knowledge that, *e.g.*, the order of the external world is co-existent as contrasted with the successive order of its sensible appearance to us. There is a still more fundamental objection to the doctrine. It dislocates and transposes the relation of the possible and actual. It commits the old blunder of dogmatic metaphysics, making essence prior to existence, investing it with a pseudo-existence, and deriving actual existence from it. Possibility essentially presupposes actuality. To say that something is possible is to say that there is something actual which would behave in a certain way under certain conditions. But the doctrine we are discussing deals freely in mere possibilities without any such relation to anything actual; these naked possibilities it regards as the source of actual sensations, and to intensify the absurdity it supposes that actual changes take place in these naked possibilities, and also that change in one naked possibility determines changes in others. Take Mill's example of the table

which is believed to exist when no one is present to perceive it. This belief is construed as meaning that if any one went into the room, or were now in it, and suitably directing his organs of sense he would be aware of certain sensations, *e.g.*, of a group of visual sensations. Now, the going into the room and the being in the room and the adjustment of the sense organs must, of course, in accordance with the theory be simply identified with having certain possible sensations in a certain order. Suppose these sensations actualised. It does not therefore follow that a table becomes visible. I should have just the same sensations without seeing any table if no table were there. The table itself is that which so reacts, or would so react under the assigned conditions, as to give rise to those actual sensations which are called the visible appearance of the table. But according to the theory under discussion the table is nothing actual but only a naked possibility. Thus a naked possibility is supposed to operate as an agent giving rise to something actual—to actual sensations. To crown the absurdity, it is supposed to effect this by determining other naked and unactualised possibilities of sensation which again consist in changes taking place in yet other naked and unactualised possibilities. For such is the only interpretation which the theory can put on the proposition that the table affects the sentient organism by reflecting light to the eye and so setting up molecular processes in the nervous system.

For these, among other reasons, I feel bound to reject the doctrine of Mill and Berkeley, though I imagine it is held in substance by some at the present day who belong to a very different school of thought. I am quite prepared to be told by thinkers with whom I have at bottom much in common that my own position is at least as untenable. I expect to be charged with reviving the exploded doctrine of things in themselves, disparate and discontinuous with our immediate experience. With a clear conscience I plead not guilty to all counts of this indictment.

There is, indeed, a sense in which I postulate things in themselves. But in this sense I do not see how anyone can deny them. I postulate things in themselves in the sense in which another man's toothache is relatively to me a thing in itself as having an inner being of its own which I do not immediately experience though I may know of it. I postulate them in the sense in which my own past toothache is a thing in itself relatively to my present existence inasmuch as I do not immediately experience it when I remember it. But so understood things in themselves are surely admitted facts and not exploded figments of an obsolete metaphysics.

In distinguishing between sensible representation and what it represents I do not commit myself to any irreducible dualism. I do not divide the universe into disparate and discontinuous parts. On the contrary, the existences and processes which have an inner being of their own are the very same existences and processes which as sensibly represented constitute the world of material phenomena. It is with the things in themselves, if we choose to name them thus, that we are incessantly conversant through the medium of sense. They constitute the constant presupposition and necessary complement of our conscious experience. Their inner being cannot therefore be disparate and discontinuous with our own conscious life. On the contrary, we and they must form part of one continuous whole. They must be bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. This means for me that their inner being is ultimately psychical. Indeed, like Lotze, I fail to understand what "inner being" can possibly mean unless it means "psychical being."

But how, it will be asked, can we know all this? Am I not begging the question in assuming that in any relevant sense we are or can be conversant with the things in themselves so as to be able to represent them in terms of sensation? Granted that they determine modifications of our sense-experience how **can** we be aware of anything except the resulting sensation. The scratch, as H. Stirling says, knows nothing of the thorn.

Confined at the outset to our own states—our own immediate experience—by what possibility can we ever transcend these? Evidently we can only do so by way of inference. But how can we infer from A to B, when B is supposed to be something with which we are totally unacquainted?

As regards this last question I would point out that unless what is inferred is other than the datum there is no inference. All that is necessary for inference is (1) that the datum shall be by its intrinsic nature a fragment of a wider whole, and shall therefore point beyond itself to its own necessary complement; (2) that there shall be a thinking and willing being capable of discerning and actively eliciting the implication. Turning to our special problem, I admit that on my view the primary datum for the individual mind is its own immediate experience. But this proposition seems to me to be not only distinct from but in direct contradiction to the statement that in the first instance we know only our own states. If our own states could be known in pure isolation from aught else, they would not be data. An isolated datum is a contradiction in terms. A datum is a datum only because being essentially a fragment it points beyond itself; and what it thus implies cannot be merely being in general or merely the absolute, but always something as specific as itself. A state of feeling incapable of revealing anything beyond itself that would be a petty absolute. This applies to the primary datum—immediate experience; the immediate experience of each of us being a fragment of the one continuous universe must manifest itself as such to a thinking being. Immediate experience must from the outset be inseparably blended with immediate inference, and this in manifold ways. It is in this direction and not in any *a priori* contribution of the understanding that I would look for the source and the justification of the Kantian categories.

I can here only say one word or two to indicate the bearing of these general remarks on the question, how we can know the

existence and processes which, as represented in terms of sensation, constitute the external world. The only answer which I have to offer is an old one, but one which has not, so far as I can discover, been yet properly stated or understood or intelligently criticised. I turn for a solution to the intrinsic nature of conation and will and the mode in which conation and will find themselves conditioned as regards success or failure in the control of sense-experience. From the same source I coincidentally derive the concept of tendency which seems to be the most distinctive and indispensable element in concrete causality. It lies beyond the limits of this paper to follow out this line of thought in detail. It is sufficient for my present purpose if I have succeeded in showing how I conceive the problem without attempting to solve it.

ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION.

Meeting, November 2nd, 1903, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—The following resolution was passed unanimously :—"That the Society has heard with the deepest regret of the death of Dr. Alexander Bain. And that a message of condolence be sent to Mrs. Bain." The Chairman then delivered the Inaugural Address on the subject "Method in Philosophy." The Chairman invited discussion, and Mr. Shand, Dr. Hicks, Dr. Westermarck, and others made remarks on some of the points brought forward in the Address, and Mr. Hodgson replied.

Meeting, December 7th, 1903, at 8 p.m. Mr. A. F. Shand, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. Herbert W. Blunt read a paper on "Bacon's Method of Science." In the discussion, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Boutwood, Mr. Carr, Mr. Finberg, Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Spiller, and Mr. Walker took part, and Mr. Blunt replied.

Meeting, January 4th, 1904, at 8 p.m. Dr. G. Dawes Hicks, V.P., in the Chair.—The following resolution was carried unanimously :—"That the Members of the Aristotelian Society, at this their first meeting after Mr. Herbert Spencer's death, desire to express their sense of the great loss suffered by English Philosophy, and to place on record their high appreciation of the laborious work he was enabled to complete." Miss E. E. Constance Jones read a paper on "Professor Sidgwick's Ethics." A discussion followed, in which Mr. Moore, Mr. Daphne, Mr. Hodgson, Professor Brough, and Dr. Goldsbrough took part, and Miss Jones replied.

Meeting, February 1st, 1904, at 8 p.m. Mr. A. F. Shand, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. F. B. Jevons was elected a member. The following resolution was carried unanimously :—"That the

Members of the Aristotelian Society, London, desire to express at this time their high appreciation of the great work of Kant in philosophical enquiry, and to convey to Professor Vaihinger and his colleagues their best wishes for the success of the meeting in Halle on February 12th, and of the Kantgesellschaft then to be founded." Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson read a paper on "Reality." In the discussion, Dr. Hicks, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Shearman, Mr. Carr, and others took part, and Mr. Hodgson replied.

Meeting, March 7th, 1904, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. L. T. Hobhouse read a paper on "Faith and the Will to Believe." The Chairman, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Boutwood, Mr. Carr, and others took part in the discussion, and Mr. Hobhouse replied.

Meeting, April 11th, 1904, at 8 p.m. Dr. G. Dawes Hicks, V.P., in the Chair.—Dr. Edward Westermarck read a paper on "Remarks on the Subjects of Moral Judgments." In the discussion Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Carr, Mr. Shearman, and others took part, and Dr. Westermarck replied.

Meeting, May 2nd, 1904, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair.—Mr. F. Tavani was elected a member. Mr. G. E. Moore read a paper on "Kant's Idealism." The Chairman, Mr. Carr, Dr. Grece, and Mr. Shearman took part in the discussion, and Mr. Moore replied.

Meeting, June 6th, 1904, at 8 p.m. The President in the Chair.—The Report of the Executive Committee for the Twenty-fifth Session and the Financial Statement were read and adopted. The Rev. Hastings Rashdall was elected President for the ensuing session. Dr. G. Dawes Hicks, Mr. G. E. Moore, and Professor W. R. Sorley were elected Vice-Presidents. Mr. A. Boutwood was elected Treasurer and Mr. H. W. Carr, Honorary Secretary.

The President, Mr. G. F. Stout, read a paper on "Primary and Secondary Qualities." Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Boyce Gibson, Mr. Shand, Mr. Carr, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Shearman, and others took part in the discussion, and Mr. Stout replied.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION.

(Read at the Meeting on June 6th, 1904.)

THE following papers have been read during the Session :—

- “Method in Philosophy.” Being the opening Address, by Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson.
- “Bacon’s Method of Science,” by Mr. Herbert W. Blunt.
- “Professor Sidgwick’s Ethical Theories,” by Miss E. E. Constance Jones.
- “Reality,” by Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson.
- “Faith and the Will to Believe,” by Mr. L. T. Hobhouse.
- “Remarks on the Subjects of Moral Judgments,” by Dr. Edward Westermarck.
- “Kant’s Idealism,” by Mr. G. E. Moore.
- “Primary and Secondary Qualities,” by Mr. G. F. Stout.

All of these papers have been printed and form the new number of the *Proceedings* in course of publication. The number of members remains unaltered since last report, two members having resigned and two having joined during the session.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR THE 25TH SESSION, 1903-1904.

GENERAL ACCOUNT.					
	RECEIPTS.		EXPENDITURE.		
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.		£ s. d.	
Subscriptions—	Printing "Proceedings," N.S., Vol. III	..	55 14 2
60 Members	63 0 0	Rent of rooms (24th Session)	8 8 0
<i>Less</i> —Unpaid..	..	16 16 0	Printing cards and proofs of Papers (25th Session)	7 3 10
		————	Advertisement in <i>Athenæum</i>	0 8 8
Arrears from 23rd and 24th Sessions	10 10 0	Gratuities to attendants	1 2 6
<i>Less</i> —Unpaid	7 7 0	Hon. Treasurer's expenses, including cost of new receipt book	0 16 7
		————			
From Treasurer			
From Publication Account			
		————			
		£73 13 9			£73 13 9

Examined and found correct—

(Signed) F. KAIBEL.
G. F. GOLDSBROUGH.

(Signed) ARTHUR BOUTWOOD,
Hon. Treasurer.

RULES OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NAME.

I.—This Society shall be called "THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY," or, for a short title, "THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY."

OBJECTS.

II.—The object of this Society shall be the systematic study of Philosophy; 1st, as to its historic development; 2nd, as to its methods and problems.

CONSTITUTION.

III.—This Society shall consist of a President, Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, a Secretary, and Members. The Officers shall constitute an Executive Committee. Every Ex-President shall be a Vice-President.

SUBSCRIPTION.

IV.—The annual subscription shall be one guinea, due at the first meeting in each session.

ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.

V.—Any person desirous of becoming a member of the ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY shall apply to the Secretary or other officer of the Society, who shall lay the application before the Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee, if they think fit, shall nominate the candidate for membership at an ordinary meeting of the Society. At the next ordinary meeting after such nomination a ballot shall be taken, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for election.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

VI.—Foreigners may be elected as corresponding members of the Society. They shall be nominated by the Executive Committee, and notice having been given at one ordinary meeting, their nomination shall be voted upon at the next meeting, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for their election. Corresponding members shall not be liable to the annual subscription, and shall not vote.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS.

VII.—The President, three Vice-Presidents, Treasurer, and Secretary shall be elected by ballot at the last meeting in each session. Should a vacancy occur at any other time, the Society shall ballot at the earliest meeting to fill such vacancy, notice having been given to all the members.

SESSIONS AND MEETINGS.

VIII.—The ordinary meetings of the Society shall be on the first Monday in every month from November to June, unless otherwise ordered by the Committee. Such a course shall constitute a session. Special meetings may be ordered by resolution of the Society or shall be called by the President whenever requested in writing by four or more members.

BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.

IX.—At the last meeting in each session the Executive Committee shall report and the Treasurer shall make a financial statement, and present his accounts audited by two members appointed by the Society at a previous meeting.

BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.

X.—Except at the first meeting in each session, when the President or a Vice-President shall deliver an address, the study of Philosophy in both departments shall be pursued by means of discussion, so that every member may take an active part in the work of the Society.

PROCEEDINGS.

XI.—The Executive Committee are entrusted with the care of publishing or providing for the publication of a selection of the papers read each session before the Society.

BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.

XII.—No resolution affecting the general conduct of the Society and not already provided for by Rule XIV shall be put unless notice has been given and the resolution read at the previous meeting, and unless a quorum of five members be present.

VISITORS.

XIII.—Visitors may be introduced to the meetings by members.

AMENDMENTS.

XIV.—Notices to amend these rules shall be in writing and must be signed by two members. Amendments must be announced at an ordinary meeting, and notice having been given to all the members, they shall be voted upon at the next ordinary meeting, when they shall not be carried unless two-thirds of the votes cast are in their favour.

LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION, 1904-1905.

PRESIDENT.

REV. HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1880 to 1894).

BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1894 to 1898).

G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1899 to 1904).

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., PH.D.

G. E. MOORE, M.A.

W. R. SORLEY, M.A.

TREASURER.

A. BOUTWOOD.

HONORARY SECRETARY.

H. WILDON CARR, 22, Albemarle Street, W.

HONORARY AND CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

Elected.

1885. Prof. SAMUEL ALEXANDER, M.A., 13, Clifton Avenue, Fallowfield, Manchester (elected hon. member 1902).

1899. Prof. J. MARK BALDWIN, Princetown, New Jersey.

1889. J. M. CATTELL, M.A., Ph.D., Garrison, New York.

1880. Prof. W. R. DUNSTAN, M.A., F.R.S., 30, Thurloe Square, S.W. (elected hon. member 1900).

1891. M. H. DZIEWICKI, 21, Szpitalna, Cracow, Austria.

1881. Hon. WILLIAM T. HARRIS, LL.D., Washington, United States.

1883. Prof. WILLIAM JAMES, M.D., Cambridge, Mass., United States.

1899. EDMUND MONTGOMERY, LL.D., Liedo Plantation, Hempstead, Texas.

1880. Prof. A. SENIER, M.D., Ph.D., Gurthard, Galway (elected hon. member 1902).

1899. Prof. E. B. TITCHENER, Cornell University, United States.


MEMBERS.

Elected.


1898. Miss DOROTHEA BEALE, Ladies' College, Cheltenham.
 1893. E. C. BENECKE, 174, Denmark Hill, S.E.
 1888. H. W. BLUNT, M.A., 183, Woodstock Road, Oxford.
 1886. Prof. BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, The Heath Cottage, Oxshott.
 1890. A. BOUTWOOD, *Treasurer*, Bledlow, Bucks.
 1889. Prof. J. BROUGH, LL.M., University College, Aberystwyth.
 1895. Mrs. SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc., 6, Eldon Road, Hampstead.
 1883. Prof. S. H. BUTCHER, M.A., 6, Tavistock Square, W.C.
 1881. H. W. CARR, *Hon. Sec.*, 25, Cumberland Terrace, Regent's Park.
 1895. STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.W.
 1884. P. DAPHNE, LL.B., 9, Roseleigh Avenue, Highbury.
 1896. E. T. DIXON, M.A., Racketts, Hythe, Hants.
 1899. J. A. J. DREWETT, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
 1891. Lady EVANS, Nash Mills, Hemel Hempstead.
 1893. W. H. FAIRBROTHER, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford.
 1901. A. J. FINBERG, 34, Bartholomew Road, N.W.
 1897. Prof. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A., 9, Briardale Gardens, Platt's Lane, Hampstead.
 1900. G. F. GOLDSBROUGH, M.D., Church Side, Herne Hill, S.E.
 1882. C. J. GRECE, LL.D., Redhill, Surrey.
 1901. Mrs. HERZFELD, 53, Marlborough Mansions, Finchley Road, N.W.
 1890. G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., *Vice-President*, 7, Highbury Grange, N.
 1902. Mrs. HICKS, 7, Highbury Grange, N.
 1892. L. T. HOBHOUSE, M.A., 32, Lancaster Road, Wimbledon, S.W.
 1880. SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, 45, Conduit Street, W.
 1896. Miss L. M. JACKSON, 29, Manchester Street, W.
 1904. F. B. JEVONS, M.A., Litt.D., Univ. of Durham, Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham.
 1892. Miss E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, Girton College, Cambridge.
 1899. ROBERT JONES, M.A., M.D., Claybury, Woodford Bridge.
 1896. FREDERICK KAIBEL, 27, Kensington Mansions, Earl's Court, S.W.
 1881. A. F. LAKE, 12, Park Hill, Clapham Park, S.W.
 1898. Prof. ROBERT LATTA, M.A., D.Phil., The College, Glasgow.
 1897. Rev. JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., D.D., Springhill Terrace, Kilmarnock, N.B.
 1899. J. LEWIS MCINTYRE, D.Sc., Rosslynlee, Cults, N.B.
 1896. Miss E. A. MANNING, 5, Pembridge Crescent, W.
 1883. C. C. MASSEY, 124, Victoria Street, S.W.
 1889. R. E. MITCHESON, M.A., 11, Kensington Square, W.
 1896. G. E. MOORE, M.A., *Vice-President*, Trinity College, Cambridge.


Elected.

1900. Rev. G. E. NEWSOM, M.A., King's College, London.
 1900. R. G. NISBET, M.A., 13, Nelson Terrace, Hillhead, Glasgow.
 1903. Miss E. A. PEARSON, 129, Kennington Road, S.E.
 1903. GEORGE CLAUS RANKIN, M.A., The Settlement, Tavistock Place, W.C.
 1889. Rev. HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., *President*, New College, Oxford.
 1893. GEORGE S. RHODES, Ashby, Otley Road, Harrogate.
 1895. ARTHUR ROBINSON, M.A., 4, Pimlico, Durham.
 1896. Hon. B. A. W. RUSSELL, M.A., 44, Grosvenor Road, S.W.
 1897. Mrs. SCHWANN, 4, Princes Gardens, S.W.
 1892. ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A., 1, Edwardes Place, Kensington, W.
 1901. A. T. SHEARMAN, M.A., 67, Cranfield Road, Brockley, S.E.
 1900. Prof. W. R. SORLEY, M.A., *Vice-President*, St. Giles, Chesterton Lane, Cambridge.
 1901. GUSTAV SPILLER, 54, Prince of Wales Road, Battersea Park.
 1888. G. JOHNSTONE STONEY, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., 30, Ledbury Road, Bayswater, W.
 1887. Prof. G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, Craigard, St. Andrews, N.B.
 1893. HENRY STURT, M.A., 5, Park Terrace, Oxford.
 1904. FR. TAVANI, Merchant Venturers' School, Bristol.
 1900. Prof. C. B. UPTON, M.A., St. George's, Littlemore, near Oxford.
 1886. FRAMJEE R. VICAJEE, High Court of Judicature, Bombay.
 1902. JOSEPH WALKER, Pellcroft, Thongsbridge, Huddersfield.
 1890. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
 1896. Prof. R. M. WENLEY, M.A., D.Sc., East Madison Street, Ann Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.
 1897. EDWARD WESTERMARCK, Ph.D., 8, Rockley Road, Shepherd's Bush, W.









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